◎第二決擇法無我。
1.3.2.3.2 How to determine that there is no self in phenomena
1.3.2.3.2.1 Refutation of production from self
1.3.2.3.2.2 Refutation of production from another
1.3.2.3.2.3 Refutation of production from both self and another
1.3.2.3.2.4 Refutation of causeless production
1.3.2.3.2.5 How to infer that intrinsic production does not exist.
補特伽羅假施設事，謂五蘊地等六界眼等六處，是名為法，彼自性空名法無我。
The bases to which the person is imputed include the five aggregates, the six constituents—such as the earth constituent—and the six sources—the eyes and so forth. These are objects. Their emptiness of essential or intrinsic existence is the absence of an objective self.
決擇此理雖有多種，《入中論》中以破四生決擇諸法皆無自性，釋論說彼為法無我，故於此中當略宣說。
There are many ways to determine that objects lack intrinsic self. However, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 determines that things lack intrinsic existence by refuting four possible types of production. Since the 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says that this determination is a determination of the absence of an objective self, I will now give a brief explanation of that refutation of four types of production.
如《初品》云﹕「非自非從他，非共非無因，諸法任於何，其生終非有。」
Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:”
There is no sense in which anything
Has ever been produced
Either from itself, from something else,
From both, or without a cause.
謂內外諸法，任於何所其從自生終非所有，於餘三宗亦如是立。
This means, in part: "No internal or external thing is ever in any way produced from itself." Three other theses can be constructed in the same way.
如是以應成式破自生者，謂如是立已，於此未說能立因喻，是於違逆彼諸宗者，顯示妨難。
Reductio ad absurdum arguments will refute the claim that something can be produced from itself. Thus, these theses do not offer probative examples or reasons, but offer a critique of the contrary positions.
此謂若由自性生者，待不待因兩關決斷，其待因中，因果二性一異兩關，亦能決斷。
Here, if something is intrinsically produced, it is limited to two possibilities: either it relies upon a cause or it does not rely upon a cause. Hence, if it relies upon a cause, the cause and the effect are limited to two possibilities: they are either intrinsically one or intrinsically different.
其中因果一性生者是為自生，異性生者是從他生。
Production in which cause and effect are intrinsically one is called production from self; production in which cause and effect are intrinsically different is called production from another.
其中復有自他各別，自他共生二關決定。
Production that relies upon a cause is certain to be either production from self or production from another—which can be considered individually—or else to be production from both self and other in combination.
各別即是自生他生，唯破四生即遣餘邊，道理即爾。
Individually, there are two cases—production from self and production from other. Therefore, this is how we rule out other possibilities while refuting just four possible types of production.
◎若諸苗芽從芽體生，生應無義，生是為得所生體故，苗芽自體已得訖故，譬如已顯苗芽。
1.3.2.3.2.1 Refutation of production from self
If a seedling were produced from itself, its production would be pointless because production means that what is produced has come into being. If it were produced from itself, a seedling would already have come into being—as in the case of a seedling that is clearly manifest.
其生又當無窮，已生種子若更生者，即彼種子當數數生。
Production also would be endless because if an already-arisen seed were to arise again, the very same seed would have to arise repeatedly.
若爾唯有種子續生，其苗芽等不得生位，故成過失。
In that case, there is the fallacy that since the seed itself is arising continuously, there is never a chance for the production of seedlings and such.
《二十品》云﹕「若因果是一，能所生當一。」
Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
If cause and effect were the same,
Then the produced and the producer would be the same.
《入中論》云﹕「彼從彼生全無
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德，生已更生不應理，若計生已更當生，故此不得生芽等。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
There is no advantage in its arising from itself;
There is no reason for something which has been produced to be produced again.
If you suppose that something already produced is produced again,
Then the production of seedlings and such would not be found in this world.
又云﹕「故此妄計法自生，真實世間俱非理。」
And:
Therefore, the imputation that things arise from themselves
Is reasonable neither in terms of reality nor in terms of the world.
◎若謂經說從他四緣而生果故從他生者，
1.3.2.3.2.2 Refutation of production from another
Opponent: The Buddha said that effects are produced from the four conditions which are other. Therefore, things are produced from another.
若從異性因生果者，當從火焰亦生黑暗，以是他故。
Reply. If effects were produced from intrinsically different causes, then thick darkness could arise even from a flame because those two are other.
又從一切是因非因，當生一切是非之果，同是他故。
Furthermore, all things—whether or not they are effects—would be produced from all things—whether or not they are causes—because they are alike in their otherness.
義謂若許種芽有性，則諸稻芽與非自因火焰等事，由自性門性異之理，及與自因稻種子性性異之理，二種性異一切相同。
This means that if you assert that seed and seedling exist essentially or intrinsically, then it is evident that the way that a rice seedling essentially or intrinsically differs from things that cannot produce it, such as fire, is identical to the way that a rice seedling intrinsically differs from its cause, a grain of rice.
由是因緣，如與非因見異性時，覺諸異性互無仗托，與自稻種見異性時，相異之分亦覺如是。
That is, when it appears to be intrinsically different from something that cannot produce it, a seedling seems different in the sense of being autonomous and independent, and it would seem different in the same way when it appears to be different from its own seed.
又此現為殊異之理，若是彼等自體之性，則其不從火等出生，從稻種生所有差別，於一切種不能分別。
If the way they seem different is that they appear to be essentially or intrinsically different, then it is completely impossible to make the distinction that the rice seedling is not produced from fire and such, but is produced from a rice seed.
若謂可判能不能生所有差別，則其性異殊異之理，亦當分別，此顯相違。
Objection: We distinguish that which produces a seedling from that which does not. We make this distinction in terms of whether something differs from the seedling in the sense of differing intrinsically.
如《入中論釋》云﹕「如能生稻種，與自果稻芽是為異性。如是諸非能生火炭麥種彼等亦異。又如從他稻種而生稻芽，如是亦當從火炭麥種等生。又如他稻芽從稻種生，如是瓶衣等亦當從生，然未見是事故彼非有。」
Reply: This has been shown to be a contradiction. Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 states this clearly:
Just as a productive rice seed is other than the rice seedling which is its effect, so it is that such things as fire, charcoal, and barley seed—which do not produce it—are also other than that seedling. Yet just as a rice seedling arises from a rice seed which is other, it would also arise from fire, charcoal, barley seed, etc. And just as from a rice seed there arises a rice seedling which is other, so things like pots and cloth would also arise from a rice seed. Yet you never see this. Hence, this is not the case.
此說顯然，故許唯以一類因力成其決定相非論師意。
Thus, the assertion [by earlier Tibetans] that logical entailments are proven by a multitude of isolated cases [i.e., by induction] is not what Candrakirti holds.
其中過難，如破灶上不成有煙定有火時，已廣說訖。
I explained the arguments contradicting that claim above, in the section on the refutation of the position that it is not established that, in a kitchen, the mere presence of smoke entails the mere presence of fire.
《第二十品》云﹕「若因果性異，因非因應同。」
Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
If cause and effect were other,
Then causes and non-causes would be just alike.
《入中論》云﹕「依他若有他法生，從焰亦當生重闇，當從一切生一切，諸非能生他性
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同。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
If things arose in dependence upon what is other,
Then thick darkness would arise even from a flame.
Everything would arise from everything. Why?
Because, in being other, all of the non-producers of something would be just like its producers.
又於此能破，謂是一相續攝不攝等，亦不能答，以異性他是一相續，非是極成，與前等故。
You cannot answer such reductio arguments by distinguishing what produces something from what does not in terms such as whether something is included within the same continuum with the effect. For, as explained above, if things are other in the sense of being intrinsically different, their inclusion within the same continuum cannot be established.
又謂現見其生不生有決定者，亦不能答。
Also, it is inadequate to reply that we can see a definite regularity as to what produces a certain effect and what does not.
其異非由名言心立，現是觀察境上自性，云見決定如何應理。
This is because what we are now analyzing is whether such regularity could hold up if the difference between a cause and its effect were essential to objects themselves, rather than being posited by the mind.
◎計俱生者作是說云，瓶由泥成是從自生，由陶師等是從他生。
1.3.2.3.2.3 Refutation of production from both self and another.
Advocates of production from both self and another claim that the production of a clay pot from clay is production from self and the production of a clay pot by a potter, etc. is production from another.
內如天授由前餘生有命根故，而受今生，天授與命二是一故，是從自生。
Even among Buddhists there are those who advocate production from both as follows: Since Devadatta takes birth in other lifetimes only by way of a life-essence, Devadatta and his life-essence are one. Therefore, he is produced from self.
又從父母及黑白業生，是從他生。
At the same time, Devadatta's being produced from his parents and from his virtuous and nonvirtuous karma constitutes production from other.
唯自不生唯他亦不生，二俱乃生。
Since there is neither production from self alone nor production from another alone, there is no production from the two together.
以前正理即能破彼，謂自生分以破自生正理而破，從他生分以破他生正理而破。
The same arguments given above refute this. Within production from both, the factor of production from self is refuted by the arguments that refute production from self, and the factor of production from another is refuted by the arguments that refute production from another.
《入中論》云﹕「俱生亦非正理性，俱有已說諸過故，世間真實皆無此，從各各生未成故。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Production from both is also unreasonable. Why?
Because the fallacies already explained befall it.
Production from both together exists neither in terms of the world nor in terms of reality,
Because, individually, production from self and from another are not established.
◎自然生者作是說云，蓮藕粗硬，蓮瓣柔輭，未見有人功用而作。如是孔雀等類，未見有人捉而彩布形色顯色，故諸法生唯自然生。
1.3.2.3.2.4 Refutation of causeless production
Lokayata proponents of spontaneous origination argue that the production of things is only a matter of spontaneous origination, for no one is seen working to make lotus roots rough or to make lotus leaves soft, nor is anyone seen catching peacocks and such so as to put on their shapes and colors.
此不應理。若無因生，則於一時一處有者，一切時處皆當為有或全非有。
This is incorrect. For if production were causeless, then production such as exists at one place and time would have to exist at all places and times, or else must never exist anywhere.
於此時處生不生理，不可說是因有無故。烏鴉應有孔雀色等，總之一生一切當生或全不生。
This is because things arise at one place and time, and not at another, due to the presence or absence of their causes—something you do not accept. The "eyes" on the tail feathers of peacocks would also be present on crows and the like. In brief, if something were produced causelessly, then it would have to be produced from everything, or else it would never be produced.
又諸世人為得果故，勤作其因皆應無義。
Worldly beings, in order to obtain a desired effect, would not have to work to create the causes of that effect, and everything would be senseless.
《入中論》云﹕「若見唯是無因生，一切恆從一切生，世人不應為果故，多方攝集種子等。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
If it were the case that things are produced without any cause, then these worldly beings would not go through hundreds of hardships to collect seeds and such for growing crops.
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◎如是由見四生違害，即能成立四邊無生，於此能立皆無性生，如前遮止餘邊時說。
1.3.2.3.2.5 How to infer that intrinsic production does not exist.
Thus, by seeing the arguments contradicting the four alternative types of production, you establish that production from these four extremes does not exist. This entails the nonexistence of intrinsic production, as proven above in the section on precluding other possibilities beyond these four.
故於諸法皆無自性，亦由依此而生定解。
Therefore, you can use these [arguments] to become certain that things do not intrinsically exist.
此是依止應成作用引生比量，非有論式親成所立。
When you make these reductio ad absurdum arguments, inference is thereby generated; at that time there is no syllogistic statement that directly proves the thesis.
《入中論》云﹕「諸法非從自他共，無因而生故離性。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 concisely states the point of the arguments contradicting these four possible types of production:
Because things are not produced from self, another, both,
Or without relying on causes, they lack intrinsic existence.
總說違害四生義者，是顯安立應成果中依止正因，云何引生比量之理，非從最初便對敵者，安立如是他許比量。
This indicates how, as an effect of having stated reductio ad absurdum arguments, you can develop an inference based on a syllogistic reason. It is not that you begin by stating to the opponent this sort of syllogism based on what the other party accepts.
如是若依破自性生，能解有事無自性者，次於無事亦易獲得無性定解，故易獲得達一切法性空中觀。
By refuting intrinsically existent production in this way, you become certain that things do not intrinsically exist; it is then easy to be certain that non-things [permanent phenomena] also lack intrinsic existence. You thereby find the view of the middle way—that is, the knowledge that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence.
如《第七品》云﹕「若法是緣起，其自性寂滅。」
Furthermore, Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
That which is dependently arisen
Is naturally at peace.
《入中論》云﹕「若法依緣生，分別不能觀，故此緣起理，斷諸惡見網。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Because things arise dependently
These misconceptions cannot bear scrutiny.
Therefore, the reasoning of dependent-arising
Cuts all the entanglements of bad views.
依緣起因，若能定解芽等性空，斷諸歧途於心最顯，故略宣說。
Accordingly, you use dependent-arising as a reason to become certain that seedlings and such are empty of intrinsic existence. When you do this, the eradication of any possible misstep is extremely clear in your mind. Hence, we will say a little about this.
如立他比量云﹕「芽無自性，依自因緣所生起故，譬如影像。」
In this case, you use an argument based on what others accept: "A seedling does not intrinsically exist because of arising in dependence upon its causes and conditions, like a reflection."
譬如本質所現影像，諸兒童等於彼所現眼耳等事，不謂於心如是顯現，非如所現實有斯義，反執眼等自性實有。
For example, when a reflection of a face appears, young children do not see it and think, "This appearance of eyes, nose, and so for this like this for the perspective of a mind such as mine, but the way it appears is not the way it exists." Rather, they consider what appears to be the way things actually exist, the way that they are.
諸有情類於自所受，所見諸法，不謂由心如是顯現增上安立，妄執此義如所顯現，於彼境上自性實有，即是增益有自性理。
Similarly, when living beings experience or see a phenomenon, they do not apprehend it as being set up by the power of the mind to which it appears. Rather, they apprehend it as existing just as it appears, i.e., as existing in an essentially objective manner. This is how intrinsic existence is superimposed.
彼境自性即是自體自性自在之義。
The presence of such a nature in the object is what is meant by essence, intrinsic nature, and autonomous existence.
若有彼性，依他因緣則成相違。若不相違許已成瓶，依諸因緣不須更生不應道理。
Thus, if such a nature were present, this would contradict reliance upon other causes and conditions. If this were not a contradiction, then it would be impossible to hold that an already existing pot does not need to be produced again from causes and conditions.
《四百論》云﹕「若法緣起有，即應無自在，此皆無自在，故我終非有。」
Accordingly, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
That which arises dependently
Does not exist autonomously;
All of these things lack autonomous existence.
Therefore, they have no self.
其釋說云﹕「若法是有自性自體自在，不依他性，則由自有應非緣
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起，然一切有為皆是緣起。如是若法是緣起有，即非自在，依仗因緣始得生故。此一切法皆無自在，故皆無我，皆無自性。」
And Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 comments on that passage:
That which has its own essence, intrinsic nature, autonomy, or independence from othersis self-existent and thus is not a dependent-arising. All compounded phenomena are dependent-arisings. Anything that is a dependent-arising is not autonomous because it is produced in dependence upon causes and conditions. These things all lack autonomy. Therefore, there is nothing which has self, that is, intrinsic nature.
言自在者，義謂現似有自性時，所現實有，覺非依仗諸識而現。
"Autonomous" means something appears to be intrinsically existent, and when it does so (1) it appears to those same consciousnesses as not depending on other phenomena, and (2) it exists as it appears.
然以不依因緣為自在義，則破彼義對自部師不須更成。
However, if you take autonomous existence to mean not depending on other causes and conditions, and refute that sort of autonomous existence, then there will be no need to prove the lack of such autonomous existence to our own Buddhist schools.
又破彼義不能立為得中觀見，故於境上，若由自性能自立性，是自在義。
Yet despite refuting that, you will be unable to posit the view of the Madhyamaka middle way. Hence, we take autonomy to mean that something exists in a manner such that it is essentially capable of objectively establishing itself.
故性空義，即是離彼自在之性，非謂全無作用之事。
Therefore, since emptiness of intrinsic existence refers to the lack of that autonomy just described rather than to the nonexistence of functioning things,
故緣起因能破自性，即前釋云﹕「是故此中是緣起故，離自在性，離自在義即是空義，非謂一切皆是無事。」
you can use dependent-arising as a reason to refute intrinsic existence.
The earlier citation of Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 continues:
Therefore, since in this Madhyamaka system to be a dependent arising is to lack autonomy, lacking autonomy is what emptiness means; emptiness does not mean that nothing exists.
故見全無作用事者，是謗如幻染淨緣起，是顛倒見。
Consequently, the view that functioning things do not exist is a mistaken denial of the existence of illusion-like dependent-arisings, both the pure and the afflicted; hence, it is not accurate.
又若見有自性之事，亦是顛倒，以此自性無所有故。
The view that things intrinsically exist is also inaccurate because such intrinsic nature does not exist in anything.
即前釋論無間又云﹕「故謗此中緣起如幻染淨因者是倒無見，又無性故，見有實事亦是顛倒。故說諸法有自性者，無有緣起成常斷見而為過失。」
Thus, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 continues:
Therefore, according to this Madhyamaka system, the view that those functioning things do not exist is inaccurate insofar as it mistakenly denies the functioning of dependent-arising and of illusion-like causes, both the pure and the afflicted. Because they do not intrinsically exist, the view that things intrinsically existis also inaccurate. Therefore, for those who claim that things have intrinsic nature, dependent-arising does not exist and the faults of the views of permanence and annihilation ensue.
故欲遠離常斷二見，應當受許無性如幻染淨緣起。
Therefore, those who wish to be free from the views of permanence and annihilation should assert both the lack of intrinsic existence and the illusion-like dependent-arising of both pure and afflicted phenomena.
◎若作是念，作用緣起破自在性，離自在義即緣起義，汝何破我，我許緣起有作用故。故汝與我全無差別。
Objection: If you use functional dependent-arisings to refute autonomy, and say that lacking autonomy means being a dependent-arising, then how will you refute us? For, we [other Buddhist schools] also assert functional dependent-arisings. Therefore, there is no difference between you and us.
汝雖亦許緣起因果，然如愚兒見質影像執為實質，即於緣起增益自性，說為諸法實有自性，故於緣起非如實知，非如實說。
Reply: Although you assert dependently arisen causes and effects, you are like a small child apprehending a reflection of a face as truly being a face. You reify dependent-arising as intrinsically existent and then call that the essence of things. Thus, you do not accurately know the meaning of dependent-arising and you express its meaning inaccurately.
我許無性故說緣起彼即差別，
Since we hold that dependent-arisings lack intrinsic existence and say so, that is the difference between you and us.
即前釋論無間又云﹕「若作是思，無自在義即緣起義，若爾汝難何損於我，汝我何別。
Accordingly, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 continues:
Qualm: If lacking autonomy means to be a dependent-arising, then how will you refute us? What difference is there between you and us?
答曰﹕汝未如
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實了知宣說緣起之義，此即差別。
Reply: I will explain this. You do not understand how to know or to express the meaning of dependent-arising accurately. That is the difference.
如諸愚童不善言說，於諸影像增益實有，反破如實住性空性執有自性，不知是影。
By reifying a reflection as a truth, a young, pre-verbal child obviates its actual nature, emptiness; when the child thinks of the reflection and its nature, those ideas about the reflection are ignorant ones.
汝亦如是雖許緣起，然未了解等同影像緣起性空如實住性，於無自性而不執為無自性故。
Similarly, you assert dependent-arising, but while dependent-arisings, like reflections, are empty of intrinsic nature, you do not understand their nature accurately. This is because you do not apprehend what lacks intrinsic nature as lacking intrinsic nature.
於非有性反增益為有自性故，亦不善說。不能宣說無自性故，反說諸法有自性故。」
You reify an essence that does not exist into an essence that does exist. You also do not understand how to express the meaning of dependent-arising because you do not say that it is the absence of intrinsic existence, and because you call it the essence of things.
雖同受許因果緣起，然許無性與有性故，說於緣起如實證知與不實知，如實善說與不善說，所有差別。
While we and they are alike in asserting the dependent-arising of causes and effects, the difference is that we understand, and they do not understand, how to know and to express dependent-arising accurately in terms of intrinsic nature and its absence.
由此若說，許作用事與實事師許彼實有諍有無諦實，唯諍於名，如是若謂許名言中有作用事與自續師諍名言中有無自相，唯諍於名，以自續師說名言中有自相故，此諸妄執顯然亦破。
The advocates of intrinsic existence call something "truly existent" if it can be accepted as a functioning thing, and amongst them there are some who conclude that the debate as to whether things truly exist is only a semantic one. Likewise, they say that it is only semantics when we debate with the Svātantrikas—for even the Svātantrikas claim that things exist by way of their intrinsic character—as to whether something that functions conventionally has a nature that conventionally exists by way of its intrinsic character. This teaching by Candrakirti clearly refutes these ideas.
如是說者，猶如說云﹕「諸數論師，說耳識境所聞義常，故若許此耳識境義，然破聲常唯瞋於名。」
For example, it would be as though someone absurdly claimed that since Samkhyas say that the thing that is known as the object of auditory consciousness is permanent, Buddhists are only quibbling over semantics when they refute the permanence of sound while accepting the thing that is known as the object of auditory consciousness.
諸餘有情許因緣生，依此反執實有自性，故成繫縛。
When other living beings see something as produced in dependence upon causes and conditions, they see it as essentially or intrinsically existent, and thus they are bound in cyclic existence;
餘諸智者依彼因緣破有自性，於無自性引生定解，斷邊見縛。
but for noble beings, production in dependence upon causes and conditions is reason enough to refute intrinsic existence and develop certainty about the lack of intrinsic existence.
故緣起因成立無性，是最希有善權方便。
Because it cuts the bonds of extreme views, the use of dependent-arising as a reason to prove that there is no intrinsic existence is a marvelous and highly skillful method.
世尊由見此義，故云﹕「若從緣生即無生，其中非有生自性，若法依緣即說空，若知空性不放逸。」
After the Bhagavan saw the force of this point, he said [in the 《Question of the Nāga King Anavatapta》]:
Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced;
It is not intrinsically produced.
Whatever depends upon conditions, I consider empty;
One who knows emptiness is diligent.
初二句說從緣生者，皆無性生，第三句說依仗因緣緣起之義即性空義，第四句顯通達空性所有勝利。
The first two lines mean that production from conditions entails not being intrinsically produced. The third line states that dependent-arising, which is reliance on conditions, is the meaning of emptiness of intrinsic existence. The fourth line indicates the benefit of knowing emptiness in this way.
如是又云﹕「聰叡通達緣起法，畢竟不依諸邊見。」說達緣起能斷邊執。
Similarly, that sūtra says that by knowing dependent-arising, you cut off extreme conceptions:
The learned will know dependently arisen phenomena,
And avoid extreme views.
若有自性，佛及弟子當能觀見，然未曾見。
Moreover, if things were essentially or intrinsically existent, the Conqueror and his disciples would have to have seen them in that way, but they did not.
又彼自性非緣能改，
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則執有實相諸戲論網，應不可斷故無解脫。
And since what intrinsically exists does not in any way work through conditions, it does not cut the net of elaborations, i.e., the conceptions of signs; thus, there would be no liberation.
如《象力經》云﹕「設若諸法有自性，佛及弟子當見知，常法不能般涅槃，聰叡終無離戲論。」
As the 《Elephant Ornament Sūtra》 says:
If phenomena were intrinsically existent,
Then the Conqueror and his disciples would know it.
With static phenomena, no one would pass beyond sorrow.
The learned would never be free from elaborations.
三四五品破處蘊界自性之理，決擇法無我雖亦甚善，然恐文繁故不廣說。
In the third, fourth, and fifth chapters [of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamenttal Treatise》], there are arguments that refute the intrinsic existence of the sources, aggregates, and constituents. In demonstrating that objects lack self, it is excellent to use those arguments as well. Yet I am wary of becoming long-winded and will not elaborate.
◎第三修習此見斷障之理。
1.3.2.3.3 How to eliminate afflictive and cognitive obscurations by becoming accustomed to those views.
如是若見我及我所無少自性如微塵許，由修彼義便能滅除我我所執薩迦耶見。
After you have seen that the self and that which belongs to the self lack even the slightest particle of intrinsic nature, you can accustom yourself to these facts, thereby stopping the reifying view of the perishing aggregates as the self and that which belongs to the self.
彼見若滅，則欲取等廣如前說四取皆滅。
When you stop that view, you will stop the four types of grasping—grasping that holds on to what you want, etc.—explained earlier.
此取若滅，則無取緣所生之愛，故以愛緣結蘊相續其生亦盡，便得解脫。
When you stop these, existence conditioned by attachment will not occur; hence, there will be an end to the rebirth of the aggregates conditioned by existence; you will attain liberation.
如《十八品》云﹕「我我所滅故，無我我所執。」
Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
Because of the pacification of the self and that which the self owns,
The conception "I" and the conception "mine" will be gone.
又云﹕「若於內外法，盡我我所慢，即能滅諸取，彼盡故生盡。」
And:
When thoughts of the self and that which belongs to the self
Are extinguished in regard to internal and external things,
Grasping will stop;
Through its extinction, birth will be extinguished.
取是煩惱，有即是業，其生之因業惑已盡，故得解脫。
Accordingly, since grasping is an affliction and potential existence is karma, you are liberated through extinguishing the causes of birth, i.e., karma and afflictions.
即前論云﹕「業惑盡解脫。」
Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise says:
Through extinguishing karma and afflictions, there is liberation.
由盡何法業惑乃盡，即前論云﹕「業惑從分別，分別從戲論，戲論以空滅。」
As for the extinction through which karma and afflictions are extinguished, that same passage continues:
Karma and afflictions arise from misconceptions;
These misconceptions arise from elaborations;
These elaborations are stopped by emptiness.
此謂流轉生死，係從業生，唯污染心三業諸行，乃是能感生死之業，故業從煩惱生。
That is, the cyclic flow of birth and death arises from karma. Only physical, verbal, and mental compositional activity associated with an afflicted mind constitutes karma that establishes cyclic existence, so karma arises from afflictions.
若不令起非理分別，於境增益淨不淨相，則不能生薩迦耶見為本一切煩惱，故薩迦耶見為本，貪瞋等煩惱從非理分別生。
Afflictions that are rooted in the reifying view of the perishing aggregates do not arise without the operation of misconceptions that superimpose upon objects signs such as pleasant and unpleasant. Thus, afflictions such as attachment and hostility—rooted in the reifying view of the perishing aggregates—are produced from such misconceptions.
唯由妄執世間八法男女瓶衣色受等實，乃有非理作意分別分別諸境，故彼分別從執諦實戲論而生。
These misconceptions operate mistakenly only by clinging to the notion, "This is real," in regard to the eight worldly concerns, or men and women, or pot, cloth, form, or feeling. Since it is these misconceptions that conceive those objects, they are generated from the elaboration of conceptions of true existence.
《顯句論》云﹕「世間戲論皆以空滅，謂由觀見一切法空，故能滅除。云何能滅，謂緣實事乃有如前所說戲論。
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若未曾見石女之女，諸貪欲者緣彼戲論即不生起。若不戲論，則於彼境亦定不起非理分別。若不分別，則從貪著我及我所薩迦耶見以為根本諸煩惱聚皆不得生。若不生起薩迦耶見以為根本諸煩惱聚，則不造諸業。若不造業，則不更受生及老死生死輪轉。」
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Emptiness—viewing all things as emptiness—stops all worldly elaborations. Why? Because when you see something as real, there are going to be elaborations such as those explained. Insofar as the daughter of a barren woman is not seen, the lustful will not engage in elaborations with her as the object. When elaborations are not operating, their object is not going to be misconceived. As misconceptions are not operating, afflictions rooted in the reifying view of the perishing aggregates are not generated through clinging to "I" and "mine." As afflictions rooted in the reifying view of the perishing aggregates are not generated, actions are not performed. Those who do not perform actions Will not experience cyclic existence, which is called "birth, aging, and death."
由達空性滅彼之理，即前論云﹕「由依如是，戲論永滅，行相空故，能離戲論。由離戲論，滅諸分別，分別滅故，滅諸煩惱。由惑業滅故生亦滅，故唯空性是滅一切戲論行相，名曰涅槃。」
Candrakirti's Clear Words also states very clearly how knowing emptiness stops those elaborations and misconceptions:
Why? It is like this: Emptiness is not elaborated insofar as it has the character of thoroughly quelling elaboration. Since it is not elaborated it stops misconceptions; through stopping misconceptions, it stops the afflictions. Stopping karma and afflictions stops birth. Therefore, since only emptiness has the character of stopping all elaborations, it is called "nirvāna."
此說極顯，即此顯示空見違害三有根本，成立等同解脫道命，於此當得堅固空解。
This passage proves that the view of emptiness cuts the root of cyclic existence and is the heart of the path to liberation. Hence, you must gain firm certainty about this.
◎是故龍猛菩薩諸論，明顯宣說聲聞獨覺亦證一切諸法無性，以說解脫生死要由無性空見乃成辦故。
Accordingly, the treatises of the noble master Nāgārjuna clearly state that even Śrávakas and pratyekabuddhas can know that all phenomena lack intrinsic existence. For, they state that liberation from cyclic existence is achieved through the view of emptiness of intrinsic existence.
聲聞獨覺乃至未盡自心煩惱當修彼見。若煩惱盡，以此便足不長時修，故不能斷諸所知障。
Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas meditate on that view for as long as their afflictions remain. When their afflictions are extinguished, they are satisfied and do not persist in meditation; hence they are unable to eliminate cognitive obscurations.
諸菩薩者，唯斷煩惱自脫生死不以為足，為利一切有情欲求成佛，故至斷盡諸所知障，經極長時無邊資糧莊嚴而修。
Bodhisattvas, not content with mere liberation from cyclic existence through the mere extinction of afflictions, seek buddhahood for the sake of all living beings; hence they meditate so as to utterly extinguish cognitive obscurations. Thus, they meditate for a very long time and are adorned with limitless collections of merit and wisdom.
如是拔除二障種子，真能對治，雖是前說空性正見，然由長時修不修故，有唯能斷諸煩惱障而不能斷所知障者。
Accordingly, while the remedy that purges the seeds of both obscurations is the view of emptiness, as explained above, because of the limited duration of their meditation śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can eliminate only afflictive obscurations; they do not eliminate cognitive obscurations.
譬如唯一通達無我，俱是見惑修惑對治，然由唯能現見無我，若斷見惑不斷修惑，斷修惑者須長時修。
For example, the very same knowledge of the lack of self is the remedy for both the objects which are eliminated on the path of seeing and the objects which are eliminated on the path of meditation. Yet simply directly seeing the lack of self can eliminate the objects that are eliminated on the path of seeing, but cannot eliminate the objects to be eliminated on the path of meditation. Thus, you must meditate for a long time in order to eliminate the objects that are eliminated on the path of meditation.
如是斷除所知障者，僅長時修猶非能斷，亦必觀待學餘眾多廣大妙行。
It is similar to this case. Still, the elimination of the cognitive obscurations cannot be accomplished even by meditating for a longtime on that alone; it also involves training in many other sublime activities.
不修對治諸所知障，唯
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修能斷諸煩惱障所有方便，故說聲聞獨覺證法無我，無圓滿修。
Since Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not cultivate the remedy to cognitive obscurations, but cultivate only the means to eliminate afflictive obscurations, it is said that Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas lack full and complete knowledge of the lack of self in phenomena.
《入中論釋》云﹕「聲聞獨覺，雖亦現見此緣起性，然而彼等於法無我未圓滿修，有斷三界煩惱方便。」
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Although even Šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas see this same condition of dependent-arising, they still lack a full and complete cultivation of the lack of self in phenomena; they have only a means to eliminate the behavioral afflictions of the three realms.
由是因緣，餘中觀師許為法我執者，在此論師許為染污無明。
Thus what other Madhyamikas consider a conception of self in phenomena, this master considers afflictive ignorance.
又雖斷彼修法無我，然法無我無圓滿修，當知如前及此所說。
Even though Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas meditate on the lack of self in phenomena to the point of utterly eliminating afflictive ignorance, they lack a complete meditation on the lack of self in phenomena. These statements should be understood as I have explained them both here and above.
若爾，此宗何為所知障耶，謂從無始來著有自性，由彼耽著熏習內心，安立令成堅固習氣，由彼習氣增上力故，實無自性，錯亂顯現名所知障。
What are cognitive obscurations in this [Prāsangika] system? Certain latent propensities are firmly set in the mind-stream through its being beginninglessly suffused with strong attachment to things regarded as intrinsically existent; these latent propensities give rise to errors of dualistic appearance, so that things appear to be intrinsically existent when they are not. These errors are cognitive obscurations.
《入中論釋》云﹕「此於聲聞獨覺及諸菩薩，由其已斷染污無明，觀見諸行如影像等。
As Candrakirti says in his 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》:
Śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have eliminated afflictive ignorance see composite phenomena as like something that is merely existent, e.g., a reflection.
唯現假性非是諦實，以無諦實增上慢故，於諸愚夫而現欺誑。
For them, because they lack the inflated sense of true existence, composite phenomena have fabricated natures and are not truths. These fabrications deceive children.
於諸聖者唯現世俗，緣起性故猶如幻等。此於諸聖有相行者乃得顯現，以所知障相無明現行故，非於諸聖無相行者。」
For others, they are mere conventions since, like illusions and such, they are just dependent-arisings. Also, because these three types of beings partake of the mere ignorance that has the character of being a cognitive obscuration, these mere conventionalities appear to noble beings whose spheres of activity are associated with appearance, and not to those whose spheres of activity are devoid of appearance.
永斷染污無明菩薩，如前所引《四百論釋》，謂得無生法忍菩薩，是得八地。
"Bodhisattvas who have eliminated afflictive ignorance" refers to those who have attained the eighth level, because Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》, as cited earlier, states that they are bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance regarding the teaching of non-production.
故小乘羅漢及八地菩薩，乃盡新熏錯亂習氣，然昔所熏錯亂習氣尚有眾多應淨治者，其後更須長時淨修。由修彼故，錯亂習氣無餘永滅，是名為佛。
Therefore, bodhisattvas and Hinayāna arhats who have reached the eighth level have put an end to the creation of new latent propensities for errors of dualistic appearance, but since they have many long-established latent propensities for dualistic appearance that are yet to be cleared away, they still must train for a long time. When they clear away these propensities—stopping all latent propensities for error—they become buddhas.
聖者父子說大小乘了義見同。
The noble Nāgārjuna and his successors taught that Hinayāna and Mahāyāna are alike in their views of the definitive meaning;
此中可引二種希有定解，一況云成佛，若無通達一切法無性正見，無餘方便解脫生死。
this implies two marvelous certainties. After you have developed certainty that there is no way to attain even mere freedom from cyclic existence—let alone buddhahood—without the view that knows that all phenomena lack intrinsic existence,
由此定解，以多方便發大精勤，求彼淨見。
you find the stainless view by making great effort at many methods.
二能判大乘小乘不共特法，謂菩提心及諸菩薩廣大妙行。
After you have developed certainty from the very depths of your heart that the features that differentiate Mahāyāna from Hinayāna are the precious spirit of enlightenment and the sublime bodhisattva activities,
由此定解，於諸行品特能認為教授
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中心，受菩薩戒學習諸行。
you accept the teachings on the behavioral aspects of the practice as the most intimate advice. After you have taken the vows of a conqueror's child [bodhisattva], you train in those activities.
此說頌云﹕「佛在共稱靈鷲峯，最勝希有大山王，六返震動此大地，神變光明滿百剎。
Here I say:
Going to that most beautiful mountain,
That lord of mountains called "Vulture Peak,"
Shaking the universe in six directions,
And magically filling a hundred pure lands with light,
能仁妙喉善演說，猶如經咒二道命，生諸聖子為大母，無比善說名慧度。
The Sage gave forth from his magnificent throat
The great mother from whom all noble children are born,
The incomparably eloquent Perfection of Wisdom,
The heart of both sūtra and mantra paths.
授記勇識曰龍猛，如理解釋造勝論，名為吉祥根本慧。如日共許其釋中，佛護佛子無比論。
Nāgārjuna, the hero who had been prophesied,
Gave a precise commentary on it in the best of all treatises,
That incomparable explanation, as famous as the sun,
Known as the magnificent 《Fundamental Treatise》.
The treatise by the conqueror's child Buddhapālita
於彼善說為善說，善通達已廣解釋，謂月稱論顯句義。
Explains it well; and what he explained well
Was well understood by Candrakirti, whose fine treatise
Comments on it extensively, clarifying its words and its meaning.
彼等無垢清淨宗，謂於無性如幻法，生死涅槃緣起理，作用皆成略顯說。
Using words that are easy to understand, I have explained
Their stainless system—how it is that dependently arisen objects and agents
Of cyclic existence and nirvâna are possible
Among things that, like illusions, lack intrinsic existence.
修習甚深中論友，汝心雖覺全無性，因果緣起難安立，然彼乃是中觀宗。
My friends who study the profound Madhyamaka texts,
Although it is hard for you to posit the dependent-arising
Of cause and effect within the absence of intrinsic existence,
It is better to take the approach of saying,
依此宣說最端嚴，不爾為他所立過，自宗不能如實離，願謂無宗尚應學。
"Such is the Madhyamaka system."
Otherwise, you will not be able to escape the fallacies
That you have stated to others, and will find yourself drawn
To a non-system. In that case, you must continue to study.
如是聖父子，論中求見理，令作此善說，為佛教久住。」
The treatises of the noble Nāgārjuna and his followers
Give good explanations of the way to search out the correct view
And are for the sake of the Conqueror's teaching
Remaining for a long time.
◎第二觀之差別。
2. Classifications of insight
如是依止《修次中篇》所說，親近善士，徧求多聞，如理思惟，毘缽舍那三資糧已，若有正見證二無我，次當修習毘缽舍那。
Kamalaśīla's 《Second Stages of Meditation》 sets forth three requisites for insight: (1) reliance on an excellent being, (2) genuinely pursuing extensive study of explanations of reality, and (3) appropriate reflection. By relying upon these three, you will discover the view— the understanding of the two selflessnesses. Then cultivate insight.
若爾所修毘缽舍那總有幾種，此暫不重宣說大地毘缽舍那，正為顯示異生所修毘缽舍那，圓滿修彼毘缽舍那，謂修四種三種及修六種毘缽舍那。
What insights should you cultivate? Here, our immediate and primary concern is not the insights of the elevated stages; we are mainly setting forth the insights that you cultivate while you are an ordinary being. For an ordinary being, complete insight is the cultivation of the fourfold, the threefold, and the sixfold insight.
◎一四種者，解深密經說思擇等四。
The fourfold insight refers to differentiation and so forth, as stated in the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》.
正思擇者緣盡所有，最極思擇緣如所有。
Differentiation observes the diversity of conventional phenomena. Full differentiation observes the real nature of phenomena.
初有周徧尋思周徧伺察之二。
The first [differentiation] is of two types—thorough examination and thorough analysis;
第二亦有尋思伺察之二，謂粗細相思擇其義，
and the second [full differentiation] is of two types—examination and analysis. Examination and analysis are distinguished according to whether the object is coarse or subtle.
如《聲聞地》云﹕「云何四
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種毘缽舍那，謂有苾芻依止內心奢摩他故，於諸法中能正思擇，最極思擇，周徧尋思周徧伺察。云何名為能正思擇，謂於淨行所緣，或於善巧所緣，或於淨惑所緣，能正思擇盡所有性。最極思擇如所有性，由慧俱行有分別作意，取彼相狀周徧尋思，審諦推求周徧伺察。」
Asanga's 《Sravaka Levels》 says:
What is the fourfold insight? It is thus. Using the serenity within his mind, a monk differentiates, fully differentiates, fully examines, and fully analyzes phenomena. How does he differentiate? He differentiates by way of their diversity the objects of meditation that purify analysis, the objects of meditation of the learned, and the objects of meditation that purify the afflictions. He fully differentiates through analyzing the real nature of those three types of object. Full examination occurs when he uses conceptual attention endowed with those two kinds of wisdom to apprehend the distinguishing signs of those three types of object. When he analyzes them correctly, it is full analysis.
集論毘缽舍那道，亦說彼四。慧度教授論，明彼等相如聲聞地。
The same four paths of insight are set forth in Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge. The identification of them in Ratnākaraśānti's Instructions for the Perfection of Wisdom also agrees with the 《Sravaka Levels》.
◎又三種者，如《解深密經》云﹕「世尊，毘缽舍那凡有幾種。
Regarding the threefold insight, the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》 says:
Bhagavan, how many types of insight are there?
慈氏，略有三種，一者有相毘缽舍那，二者尋求毘缽舍那，三者伺察毘缽舍那。云何有相毘缽舍那，謂純思惟三摩所行有分別影像毘缽舍那。云何尋求毘缽舍那，謂由慧故，徧於彼彼未善了解一切法中為善了故，作意思惟毘缽舍那。云何伺察毘缽舍那，謂由慧故，徧於彼彼已善了解一切法中。為善證得極解脫故，作意思惟毘缽舍那。」
Maitreya, there are three types: that which arises from signs, that which arises from thorough searching, and that which arises from analytical discrimination. What is insight which arises from signs? It is insight that attends only to a conceptual image within the sphere of concentration. What is insight which arises from thorough searching? It is insight that attends to features which were not well understood by previous wisdom consciousnesses bearing upon the given object, so that those features may be well understood. What is insight which arises from analytical discrimination? It is insight that attends to features that were well understood by earlier wisdom consciousnesses bearing upon the given object, so that you may feel the genuine bliss of liberation.
聲聞地說﹕「謂於所聞所受持法，或於教授，由等引地作意暫思，未思未量未推未察，如是名為唯隨相行。若復於彼思量推察，爾時名為隨尋思行。若復於彼既推察已，如所安立復審觀察，如是名為於已尋思隨伺察行。是名三門毘缽舍那。」
Regarding this, Asanga's 《Sravaka Levels》 says that those at the stage of equipoise may attend to a teaching they have studied and memorized, or to personal instructions. This is attention but it is not contemplation; nor is it consideration, evaluation, or examination. It is involved only in the signs. As you move from contemplation through to examination, you are engaged in thorough searching. To have exact analytical discrimination of what has been thus determined constitutes engaging in analytical discrimination of that for which you have thoroughly searched. Those three are the three doors of insight.
總此諸義，初者例如緣無我義，作意彼相，不多決擇。
To summarize, in the first you might, for example, observe the meaning of selflessness and attend to its signs, but you do not do much to come to a conclusion.
第二於前未決定義為決定故，正善決擇。第三謂於已決定義，如前伺察。
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In the second, you come to a conclusion in order to determine what you had not previously determined. In the third, you analyze, as before, a meaning that you have already determined.
◎又六種者，謂緣六事，此是尋思毘缽舍那。
The sixfold insight refers to the observation of six bases; it is a search procedure for the insight of thorough searching.
尋思之理，謂尋思一義二事三相四品五時六理。既尋思已，復審伺察。
You thoroughly search for—and, after you have sought, analytically discriminate—meanings, things, characteristics, categories, times, and reasonings.
尋思義者，謂正尋思如是語中有如是義。
Searching for meanings refers to seeking the meaning of a given term.
尋思事者，謂正尋思此為外事，此為內事。
Searching for things refers to seeking [to determine] whether something is an internal thing or an external thing.
尋思相者，謂正尋思諸法二相，此是自相，此是共相，或共不共。
Searching for characteristics is of two types: seeking to determine whether something is a general characteristic or a specific characteristic, and seeking to determine whether a characteristic is shared or unique.
尋思品者，謂尋思黑品過失過患及尋思白品功德勝利。
Searching for categories is seeking to determine what is in the negative category based on its faults and defects and seeking to determine what is in the positive category based on its good qualities and benefits.
尋思時者，謂尋思如是事曾在過去世，尋思如是事當在未來世，尋思如是事今在現在世。
Searching for times is seeking to determine how something could have occurred in the past, how it could occur in the future, and how it might be occurring in the present.
尋思理者，謂正尋思四種道理，一觀待道理，謂諸果生，觀待因緣。此別尋思世俗勝義及彼諸事，
Searching for reasoning is of four types: (1) the reasoning of dependence is that effects arise in dependence on causes and conditions. You search from the distinctive perspectives of the conventional, the ultimate, and their bases.
二作用道理，謂一切法各有作用，例如火有燒作用等，此尋思相謂此是法，此是作用，由此法故作此作用。
(2) The reasoning of performance of function is that phenomena perform their own functions, as in the case of fire performing the function of burning. You search, thinking, "This is the phenomenon, this is the function, this phenomenon performs this function."
三證成道理，謂所立義不違諸量，是正尋思於此法中，有無現比至教三量。
(3) The reasoning of tenable proof is that something is proven without being contradicted by valid knowledge. You search, thinking, "Is this supported by any of the three forms of valid knowledge—perception, inference, and reliable scripture?"
四法爾道理，謂火燒熱性，水濕潤性等，於彼法性應發勝解，是為世間共許法性，難思法性，安立法性。
(4) The reasoning of reality gives you confidence in the reality of things as known in the world—e.g., the reality that fire is hot and water is wet—or confidence about inconceivable realities, or confidence about the abiding reality;
不應思惟有餘道理，令其如是。
it does not consider any further reason as to why these things are that way.
◎建立如是六種事者，謂瑜伽師所知唯三，謂言說義及所知中盡所有性，如所有性。
A yogi's understanding of the six just presented is of three types: the meaning of the terms expressed, the diversity of objects of knowledge, and the actual nature of objects of knowledge.
依第一故，立義尋思。
The first of the six kinds of searching, searching for meanings, falls within the first type, the meaning of the terms expressed.
依第二故，立事尋思自相尋思。
Searching for things and searching for specific characteristics fall within the second type, the diversity of objects of knowledge.
依第三故，建立餘三及共相尋思。
Searching for general characteristics and searching for the remaining three of those six fall within the third type, the actual nature of objects of knowledge.
《聲聞地》云﹕「如是六事差別所緣及前三門毘缽舍那，略攝一切毘缽舍那。」
Asanga's 《Sravaka Levels》 says:
This is the observation of the three doors of insight and the six categories within the basis. In brief, these fully encompass all types of insight.
謂彼所說能攝一切
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毘缽舍那。
This means those that are explained there in the Śrāvaka Levels encompass all types of insight.
又初四種毘缽舍那其門有三，即彼三中隨尋思行，說有六種尋思之理，是故三門六事尋思，攝於前四。
Furthermore, the doorways to the four insights that we explained first are the three types of insight—that which is arisen from just the signs, etc.
又前所說，力勵運轉作意等四，聲聞地說是奢摩他毘缽舍那二所共同，故毘缽舍那亦有四種作意。
It is said that you enter them through searching with the six ways of searching from the point of view of those three doorways, so it seems that the three doorways and the six ways of searching are included within the previous fourfold division. Asanga's 《Sravaka Levels》 states that the attention of tight focus, etc.— a set of four explained above—are common to both serenity and insight; hence, insight also has these four attentions.
《慧度教授論》云﹕「如是四種毘缽舍那修習圓滿，便能解脫諸粗重縛，九奢摩他修習圓滿解脫相縛。」
Therefore, Ratnākaraśānti's 《Instructions for the Perfection of Wisdom》 says:
Thus, completing the cultivation of the fourfold insight frees you from the bondage of rebirth in the miserable realms. Completing the cultivation of the ninefold serenity frees you from the bondage of signs.
諸大論中多作是說，故修觀者，謂如《解深密經》所說，由思擇等四門而修。
There are a great many texts that say the same thing; hence, insight is cultivated via the four—differentiation and so forth—as they are indicated in the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》.
其修止者，謂由無分別九住心修。
Serenity is cultivated via the nine states of mind which stabilize your attention without any discursive movement from object to object.
第三修觀之法分二﹕一 破他宗， 二 立自宗。
3. How to cultivate insight in meditation
This section has two parts:
3.1 the refutation of other systems
3.2 the presentation of our own system.
◎初中有四。
3.1 the refutation of other systems. This section has four parts:
破第一宗者，
3.1.1 The first refutation
有作是說，雖未證得無我正見，但能執心令無分別，便是修習本性實義。
Opponent's position: One does not find any view, any understanding of selflessness; rather, one meditates on the meaning of how things exist by holding the mind in a state that lacks any thought.
以實義空，永離一切是此非此，如是住心與彼實義隨順轉故，以境全非有，心全無執故。
This is because the way that things exist, emptiness, cannot be identified in terms of what it is or is not. Therefore, setting the mind in that way brings it into accordance with the way that things exist. For, with no object existing at all in the face of emptiness, the mind does not apprehend anything.
當問彼云，如是修者，於諸境界全無所有，為已了知全無所有，次隨順彼心全無執而安住耶？
Reply: Is it that these meditators for whom no objects exist at all first understand that objects do not exist, and then must set their minds accordingly, in a state of not apprehending anything at all?
為先未知由境實義無所有故，心無執住即為修習境實義耶？
Or is it that they do not think that objects do not exist, but instead think that the object's ontological status can never be established, and so consider meditation on its ontological status to occur when you go into a state of suspension in which your mind does not apprehend anything at all?
若如初者，云彼未得正見而成相違，汝許彼是了義見故。
If it is the first, it contradicts your assertion that they do not find the view, because you assert that the nonexistence of everything is the definitive view.
若如我說彼乃未明正理所破界限，凡有所許，便見正理之所違害。
According to us, such a position fails to restrict the object that reasoning refutes. No matter what might be asserted, you regard it as contradicted by reason, and you then take this to mean that there is nothing whatsoever that can be identified.
其次全無所受取處，是誹謗見，故住彼上，非是修習無倒真空，前已廣說。
Since this constitutes a view that mistakenly denies what in fact does exist, stabilizing your mind on such a view is not meditation on genuine emptiness, as I have explained at length above.
若作是思，若以觀察實義正理推察諸法，其諸有事無事法等皆非正理，能立其有。
If you analyze these phenomena using reasoning that analyzes the way that they exist, that reasoning will not establish the existence of any of these things and non-things.
故於勝義，
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諸法永離一切戲論，雖彼補特伽羅未如是知，然彼住相與彼相順，是修空者，太為過失。
So perhaps, considering the fact that phenomena are ultimately free from all elaborations, you are claiming that a person who is meditating does not know that, but rather stabilizes his or her mind in that way, without identifying anything, and that this way of meditating accords with that lack of elaboration of phenomena. It is most absurd to claim that this is meditation on emptiness.
一切根識皆不妄執此是此非順境實義，應彼一切皆修實義。
For, none of the sensory consciousnesses think, "This is this, this is not this." Hence they would also all be meditations on the ontological status of phenomena because they would be in accord with the ontological status of their objects.
又如前說，一切外道無分別止，皆應修空。此等尚多。
As explained before, there are a great many absurd consequences of such a position, such as the consequence that the meditative serenity of non-Buddhists in which there is no thought whatsoever would be meditation on the emptiness of everything.
又境本性與彼住心，二相隨順，唯由餘人證知便足，則外道等皆成修空，無可遮遣。
Furthermore, if you claim that it is enough to have some person other than the meditator recognize the concordance between the ontological status of the object and the way that the meditator's mind is set, then it would be impossible to avoid the consequence that non-Buddhists would meditate on emptiness.
若謂不同，此要由彼補特伽羅自知隨順次乃安住。
Objection: This is not the case because here the person first recognizes the concordance of the two and then stabilizes the mind.
若知如是隨順道理，即得正見，云未得見無執安住便是修空，成相違失。
Reply: Since the recognition of such a concordance is the discovery of the view, this contradicts your assertion that one does not understand the view, but meditates on emptiness by simply stabilizing his or her mind without thinking of anything.
若謂任隨分別何事，一切分別皆繫生死，故無分別住是解脫道，
Objection: All conceptual thoughts, no matter what one thinks about, bind one in cyclic existence. Therefore, setting the mind in a nonconceptual state of suspension is the liberating path.
前已廣破。若如是者，則於和尚派，亦無少過可設。
Reply: I refuted this at length earlier. If this is your position, you should not attribute even the slightest fault to the system of Ha-shang.
《修次後篇》云﹕「起如是思，立如是論，諸分別心，起善不善業增上故，令諸有情受善趣等果流轉生死。若全不思惟，全不造作，則解脫生死。
Kamalaśīla's 《third Stages of Meditation》 says:
Some say that virtuous and nonvirtuous karma are produced by conceptions in your mind, and through this living beings experience results such as high status in cyclic existence and continue to revolve in cyclic existence. Those who think nothing and do nothing will be fully liberated from cyclic existence.
以是因緣，當全不思惟，全不應修施等善行。修施等者，唯為愚夫增上而說。彼乃毀謗一切大乘，大乘既是一切乘本，由謗彼故謗一切乘。
Therefore, they do not think about anything when they meditate and they perform no virtuous deeds, such as deeds of generosity. They suppose that practices such as generosity are only taught for foolish beings. But those who say this entirely abandon the Mahāyāna. The root of all vehicles is the Mahāyāna, so if you abandon it, you abandon all vehicles.
言不思惟，謗觀察慧，審觀察慧是正智本，謗彼即謗出世間慧，斷其本故。
If you say that you should not think about anything, you abandon the wisdom which has the nature of correct analytical discrimination. The root of the sublime wisdom that knows reality is correct analytical discrimination; if you abandon it, you sever the root, and thus abandon the wisdom which passes beyond the world.
言不應修施等善行，畢竟謗毀施等方便。
By saying that one should not practice generosity and such, you utterly abandon methods such as generosity.
總其智慧方便，是名大乘。
In brief, wisdom and method are the Mahāyāna.
如《聖伽耶經》說，諸菩薩道略有二種，何等為二，謂慧及方便。
As the 《Foremost of Gayā Sūtra》 says:
The path of bodhisattvas, in brief, is twofold. What are the two? Method and wisdom.
聖如來秘密經說，方便智慧，由此二種，總攝菩薩一切正道。
The 《Sūtra of Showing the Tathāgata's Inconceivable Secret》 says:
All the paths of bodhisattvas are included in these two: method and wisdom.
故謗大乘作大業障，由是因緣，毀謗大乘是諸寡聞執者我見，未能承事聰叡丈夫，未能了解如來語言，自害害他違越教
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理。
Because of this, abandoning the Mahāyāna creates a great obstacle on the path. Therefore, they abandon the Mahāyāna, they do minimal study, they consider their own view to be supreme, they do not respect the learned, they do not know the way taught in the Tathāgata's scriptures. After they have ruined themselves, they ruin others.
彼毒語言，凡諸聰叡自愛樂者，猶如毒食，而當遠棄。」
Their words are contaminated by the poison of contradicting scripture and reason. The learned who seek what is good should leave them at a great distance, like poisoned food.
此先安立和尚所許，顯然說其若如是許，則是誹謗一切大乘，如是敵者汝當了知。
This refers to the position of Ha-shang. This passage clearly sets forth how it completely abandons the Mahāyāna, and while it may be that this is what Ha-shang asserts, you yourself should recognize this position.
若謂我許修施等行不同彼者，若唯以修施等行故，與他分別，是說我與和尚修了義見同。
Objection: We are not like that because we practice generosity.
Reply: If it is the case that Ha-shang and you must be distinguished only in terms of practices such as deeds of generosity, then this indicates that you and Ha-shang are alike in meditating on the definitive view.
若不爾者，無分別定亦當分別，又一切分別皆繫生死，汝豈非求解脫生死，若求解脫，則行惠施持淨戒等皆須分別，修彼何益，前已廣說。
Otherwise, it would be fitting that you also distinguish yourself from him on the issue of the concentration that does not think about anything at all. Furthermore, if all conceptual thoughts whatsoever bind one in cyclic existence, then do you seek liberation from cyclic existence? If so, then inasmuch as giving gifts and maintaining ethics must involve conceptual thought, what purpose is there in performing them? I have already explained this point at length.
以是若許一切分別皆繫生死，和尚尤善，汝被相違重擔所壓。
Therefore, if you assert that all thoughts whatsoever serve to bind one in cyclic existence, then you might as well adopt the position of Ha shang; one who takes your position will be saddled with a load of contradictions.
◎又彼學者，有作是念，若多觀察二我相執之境，其次乃斷能執之心。
Also, some who follow this line of thought entertain the following view: If one does much analysis of an object that has been conceived to have signs of the two selves and thereby stops the grasping by the subject that apprehends such an object,
如犬逐石是名由外斷截戲論，故從最初持心不散，如犬逐咬擲石之手。由修彼故，於相執境令心不散，一切戲論自內斷截。
this is to eliminate elaborations from the outside, like a dog chasing after a ball. But to hold the mind without distraction from the outset is to eliminate all elaborations from within. By this very act, one prevents the mind from scattering to those objects in which signs would be apprehended, like a dog grabbing the ball right from the hand that is about to throw it.
故學教理決擇正見，唯於名言漂流隨轉。
Hence, those who train in scriptures and reasonings that determine the view are devotees of mere conventional words.
此乃最下邪見，謗毀一切佛經六莊嚴等聰叡諸論。
This vile misconception dispenses with the scriptures of the Buddha and with all of the texts of scholars such as the 《Six Ornaments》,
以彼經論，唯用教理決擇義故。
for it is they who strive only to determine the import of scripture and reason.
又二我相執所執之義，當善觀察境為何等，次以清淨教理，於彼所執定解為無。
Furthermore, after you carefully analyze how your mind conceives of signs of the two selves and what the object of ignorance is like, genuine scripture and reasoning must pulverize the deep falsehood of error by bringing about certainty that things do not exist as they are conceived by that ignorant mind.
須從根本傾彼謬妄。若全未得如斯定解，唯持其心，爾時於二我境雖未流散，然非唯彼證無我義。
It may be that when you merely hold your mind without finding any such certainty, it does not scatter to objects such as the two selves, but this does not constitute an understanding of the meaning of the two selflessnesses.
若不爾者，則重睡眠悶絕等位，彼心無散，彼等亦當通達無我，太為過失。
If it did, then it would most absurdly follow that even those who are falling asleep or passing out would understand selflessness because their minds do not scatter to those objects.
猶如夜往未諳崖窟，有無羅剎心懷恐怖，不使然燭照觀有無，除彼怖畏，而云持心莫令羅剎分別散動與彼相同。
For example, if you are frightened, wondering whether there is a demon in a strange cave at night, your fear is not dispelled until you light a lamp and carefully investigate whether it is there. Their position is something like saying, "Hold the mind and do not allow it to move to the thought of a demon."
《修次下編》說，猶如戰時，不效勇士張目，
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善觀怨敵所在而相擊刺，反如怯兵，見他強敵閉目待死。
Kamalaśīla's 《third Stages of Meditation》 says that what they say is like the cowardice of those who in battle shut their eyes when they see a powerful enemy, instead of behaving as heroic warriors who open their eyes and look well to see where the enemy is.
如云﹕「《曼殊室利遊戲經》云﹕童女，云何菩薩勝諸怨敵？
As the Play of Mañjuéri Sūtra says:
Daughter, how are bodhisattvas victorious in battle?
白言﹕曼殊室利，謂善觀察，見一切法皆不可得，故瑜伽師應張智眼，以妙慧劍敗煩惱敵，住無所畏，不應如彼怯人閉目。」
Mañjuśrī, when they analyze, they do not observe any phenomena. Thus, yogis open the eye of wisdom and defeat the enemy of the afflictions with the weapon of wisdom. They are fearless; they do not shut their eyes like cowards.
故如於繩誤以為蛇生恐怖時，當生定解，知彼盤者是繩非蛇，滅其錯誤及怖畏苦。
Therefore, when you are frightened upon mistaking a rope for a snake, you have to stop the suffering of fear and error by developing certain knowledge that the coiled thing is a rope rather than a snake.
如是誤執實有二我，由彼錯誤起生死苦，應以教理引決定解，決斷全無我執之境，了知我執純為錯亂。
Likewise, you are mistaken in thinking that the two selves exist, and this mistake creates the sufferings of cyclic existence. But decisive scripture and reasoning bring certainty that the object of the conception of the self does not exist, and you understand that the conception of self is a mistake.
次修彼義滅除錯誤。若彼滅者，則彼所起生死眾苦一切皆滅。
Through then growing accustomed to this fact, you overcome that misconception. When you stop that misconception, you overcome all the sufferings of cyclic existence which it created.
中觀論等觀境破者理由即爾。
Therefore, this is the reason that the collections of Madhyamaka arguments and other such works refute objects by analyzing them.
提婆菩薩云﹕「若見境無我，能滅三有種。」
Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
When you see that objects have no self,
The seeds of cyclic existence will cease.
《入中論》云﹕「分別依有實事生，實事非有已思擇。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
There will be conceptions if you accept the existence of real things;
We have already fully analyzed how it is that real things do not exist.
此說由邊執分別執有實事，彼等乃生，已多觀察彼境非有。
He says that conceptions which are extreme views arise when such misconceptions hold that real things exist. So he gives many ways of analyzing how the objects of those misconceptions do not exist.
又云﹕「通達我為此境已，故瑜伽師先破我。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 also says:
Having understood that the self is the object of this ignorance,
Yogis put an end to the self.
《正理自在》云﹕「若未破此境，非能斷此執，故斷有德失，貪欲瞋恚等，由不見彼境，非以外道理。」
The Lord of Reasoning [Dharmakirti, in his 《Commentary on the "Compendium of Valid Cognition"》] says:
Without negating the object of this conception of self,
It is impossible to eliminate it.
In reaction to good qualities and faults
There is attachment, hostility, and so forth.
You eliminate them by not seeing their objects as real,
Rather than by purifying the external object of attachment.
其說極多。
There are many such statements.
◎又若宣說，一切分別皆繫生死，故修空時應當斷除一切分別，應如是觀，異生修空，空無我義，為現不現。
Some say that all conceptual thought of any sort binds you to cyclic existence, and thus all thoughts cease when you meditate on emptiness. This has to be analyzed. For ordinary beings who meditate on emptiness, is emptiness—the meaning of selflessness— manifest or hidden?
若現見者，彼補特伽羅應成聖者，以現通達無我義故。
If it is the former, then those persons would be noble beings because they perceive the meaning of selflessness.
若汝妄說現證無我，不違異生。我等亦說雖未現證空無我義補特伽羅，不違聖者，遍相等故。
If you say that it is not contradictory for someone to be an ordinary being and yet to perceive the meaning of selflessness, then we would say that it is not contradictory for a person for whom the meaning of selflessness is hidden to be a noble being, for the two cases are completely similar.
若謂如此現證
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真實補特伽羅，未知自境是真實義，更待諸餘補特伽羅，以聖教因成立真實令彼了解，尤為智者堪笑之處。
Also, if such ordinary persons perceived reality, they would not understand that their object was reality. Therefore, someone else would have to identify their object for them by using scriptural evidence to prove that it was reality. To scholars, this is ridiculous
以說弟子現量證得，猶待師長比量立故。
because you are claiming that the teacher uses inference to prove something that the student has established with perception.
如斯言論，莫於了知正理者前而妄談說。
You should not talk like this in the presence of those who understand philosophical reasoning.
又不應說雖以現量證真實義，以比量因成立其名，
You cannot argue that even though perception establishes the meaning of reality, reason establishes its conventional name.
《正理自在》云﹕「彼為極愚者，牧女已成故。」
For, Dharmakirti, the 《Lord of Reasoning》 says:
That is a point for someone who is extremely ignorant
Because it is taken for granted by women who herd cattle.
謂已成義乃至牧女皆能立名，若於彼義仍復愚蒙，乃立彼因，愚癡如斯，若許亦能現證真實，當說更有何等愚人不證真實。
He is referring to the case of arguing with someone who is ignorant of something which even herders take for granted, that is, that when a meaning is established, one knows to use the term. So if you claim that this sort of profoundly ignorant person perceives reality, you must tell us what kind of fool does not know reality.
縱是真實，譬如白相雖亦是牛，然非牛相，如是唯由現見真實，不可安立為真實相，亦違自許。
Even if we did allow that reality is something an ordinary person can perceive, perception alone is not tenable as the defining characteristic in terms of which reality is posited—just as a dkar-zal [a Holstein-like cow] is a cow but is not appropriate as the defining characteristic of a cow. Since to argue that this is tenable would contradict even your own assertions,
故說成立真實名言，顯然言竭，茲不廣破。
it is obvious that there is nothing left to say about your claim that perception establishes the meaning of reality, but reason is still needed to establish its conventional name. I will not elaborate.
若修空者所修無我空義非是現事，則許無分別識取非現事，尤為可笑。
If the meaning of emptiness—the selflessness which is the object of meditation—is hidden from the meditator, then it is ridiculous to claim that this hidden object is apprehended by a consciousness which is free from conceptual thought.
總其修空，異生之心，於無我境心未趣向，修空相違，若心趣向，其境定是現否隨一。
In brief, if the minds of ordinary beings who are meditating on emptiness are not directed toward selflessness as their object, then it is contradictory to claim that they are meditating on emptiness. If they are directed at that object, then it is certain that the object is either manifest or hidden.
現證無我應成聖者，若許異生其無我義是不現見，爾時唯以總相證無我義，與離分別，則成相違。
If it were manifest to them, then they would be noble beings. Therefore, it must be held that for ordinary beings the meaning of selflessness is hidden. As this is so, they know the meaning of selflessness by way of a concept, so it is contradictory to claim that this knowledge is free from conceptual thought.
又加行道世第一法，尚須總相證無我義，而許現在初發業者，修習空性心離分別，最為相違。
Furthermore, as it is asserted that even someone on the great level of the supreme mundane quality stage of the path of preparation knows the meaning of emptiness by way of a concept, it is most contradictory to claim that a beginner meditates on emptiness with a mind that is free from conceptual thought.
於無我義若離分別，猶易成立。其無錯亂，應是瑜伽現量，於無我義，是離分別無錯識故。
If an ordinary being's consciousness could know the meaning of selflessness without conceptual thought, this would readily prove that this consciousness is non-mistaken. It would therefore be a yogic perception because it would be a non-mistaken, nonconceptual awareness of the meaning of selflessness.
故若未得正見，以正理破我執境，唯執持心於二我等不令逸散，許為修習真無我義，及許異生離分別識修習無我，是極漂流教理道外。
There are those who claim that one meditates on the meaning of selflessness by merely holding the mind in check and not allowing it to scatter to the two selves, yet without discovering the correct view which uses reason to refute the object of the conception of self. And there are those who claim that ordinary beings meditate on selflessness with a consciousness that is free from conceptual thought. For the reasons given, those who make these claims go far astray from the path of scripture and reason.
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◎破第二宗者。
3.1.2 The second refutation
有作是說，若未獲得無我空見，不分別住理非修空，我等亦許，故前非理。
Opponent's position: We agree that it is not correct for meditation on emptiness to be the mere setting of the mind in a state that lacks any thought, without finding the view of emptiness which is selflessness. Therefore, the position given above is not correct.
然得無我了義正見補特伽羅，其後一切無分別住，皆是修空，
However, once someone finds the view which is the definitive meaning of selflessness, all cases of that person placing the mind in a nonconceptual state are meditations on emptiness.
此亦非理。若得正見補特伽羅，凡彼所修無分別義，一切皆修了義正見所決擇義，則彼補特伽羅修菩提心，有何理由非修正見，汝當宣說。
Reply: This is not correct. Your claim implies that because a person has found the view of the definitive meaning, all of his or her nonconceptual meditations are meditations on the meaning determined by the definitive view. If that is the case, then please tell us why that person's meditation on the spirit of enlightenment would not be a meditation on the view of the definitive meaning.
若謂修菩提心，雖是已得了義正見補特伽羅所修之事，然於爾時，非憶彼見，安住見上而修習故。
Opponent: The meditation on the spirit of enlightenment is the meditation of a person who has found the view of the definitive meaning. Yet it is not a meditation during which one is mindful of the view and stabilizes the mind upon it.
若爾，已得正見補特伽羅於修行時，若憶彼見安住見上所有修習，縱是修空，然彼一切無分別住，云何皆為修習正見。
Reply: Indeed, I agree that when a person who has found the definitive view meditates, it may be considered meditation on emptiness if it is a meditation in which he or she is mindful of the view and then stabilizes the mind on the view. But how could this entail that all instances of that person placing the mind in a nonconceptual state are meditations sustaining the view?
故得見已，於修習時當憶前見所決擇義而修真空，唯悶然住無所分別，非修空義。
Therefore, although you have found the view, when sustaining the view you must meditate on emptiness by remembering the meaning which the view previously determined. Simply placing your mind in a state of nonconceptual suspension does not constitute meditation on emptiness.
此中自宗言全不分別，前奢摩他及此科中，多數宣說，謂不多觀察此是此非，執一所緣而便安住，非離分別。
Our own system's understanding of the meaning of the phrase "without any discursive thought" has already come up several times in the sections on serenity and insight. It means to keep holding the mind on the object of meditation without engaging in a great deal of analysis which thinks, "This is that and this is not that." We do not accept the claim that it means being free from conceptual thought.
◎破第三宗者。
3.1.3 The thrid refutation
有作是說，不許初宗未得正見無分別住為修真空，其得見後無分別住皆修空性，亦非所許。
Opponent's position: We also do not agree with the first position which says that meditation on emptiness means setting the mind in a nonconceptual state, without finding the view. Nor do we agree with the second position which says that after one has found the view, any placement of the mind in a nonconceptual state is a meditation on emptiness.
然每臨修無分別時，先以觀慧觀察一次，其後一切無分別住，皆是修習空性之義。
However, one should meditate with: out any discursive thought in alternating periods, beginning with a period devoted to analysis using discriminating wisdom. Following that, any placement of the mind in a nonconceptual state is o meditation on the meaning of emptiness.
此亦非理。若如是者，則臨睡時，先以正見觀察一次，其後重睡無分別時，亦成修空，太為過失。
Reply: This also is not correct because, if this were the case, it would most absurdly follow that when someone analyzes the view while falling asleep, that person's subsequent nonconceptual condition during sleep would be a meditation on emptiness.
以此二者同以正見觀察為先，不須當時安住見上而修習故。
This is because the two situations are alike in that they are preceded by analysis of the view, and because apparently your position is that meditation on emptiness does not require placement of your mind on the view at that same time.
故以正見善觀察已，住所決擇無自性義，次略延長便失其見，全無分別安住其心，亦非修空。
Therefore, after you have analyzed the view, you stabilize your mind on the conclusion that phenomena do not intrinsically exist. If it then moves slightly, its placement on the view is lost. At that point, keeping your mind in a generalized condition of thoughtlessness does not constitute meditation on emptiness.
故當令自
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分別敏捷，住不住見相續觀察而善修習。
Therefore, you must train in conceptual analysis. You have to monitor whether your attention is remaining on the view, and then sustain the view in meditation.
◎破第四宗者。
3.1.4 The fourth refutation
有作是說，不許前三，修空性時，當於空性先引定解。
Opponent's position: We do not agree with the previous three. When one meditates on emptiness, one brings about certain knowledge of the view.
次於彼義攝持其心，不觀餘事，正安住者，是為無倒修習空性。
Then, holding the mind on that point, one stablizes the mind without analyzing anything else.
以非如初宗心未向空，非如二宗修無分別不憶空見，非如三宗見觀為先，次無分別不住見故。
This is genuine meditation on emptiness because unlike the first system, it is not the case that the mind is not even turned toward emptiness; unlike the second system, it is not the case that one is not mindful of the view of emptiness while sustaining a nonconceptual state; unlike the third system, it is not the case that one first analyzes the view and then stabilizes the mind in a nonconceptual condition in which the mind does not remain on the view.
此言以見觀察義，謂憶其見，次於見上唯修安住許為修空，非應正理。
Reply: What you call "analysis of the view" is simply remembering the view and then performing only stabilizing meditation on the view. To claim that this is meditation on emptiness is not correct
如是於空作止住修唯奢摩他，仍無觀修毘缽舍那修習之理，故無止觀雙運修法，唯一分故。
because, if it were, there would be only serenity which performs stabilizing meditation on emptiness; there would be no analytical meditation, which is the method for sustaining insight. Therefore, this is a one-sided practice that cannot sustain the union of serenity and insight.
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