菩提道次第廣論卷二十一

◎又云﹕「果故此雖無，我就世說有。」

[Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way"] states:
I say they exist for the effect, even though they do not.
Taking the perspective of the world, I speak of a self.

此義非說一切建立唯就他立，以諸法無性，須以如理觀察有無自性理智安立，非於庸常名言識前能安立故。

You cannot use this as a source to prove that all positions are taken only in terms of the perspective of others. Why? One posits phenomena as lacking essential or intrinsic nature only in the purview of reasoned knowledge that properly analyzes whether such a nature exists. One does not posit this in the purview of an ordinary conventional consciousness.

若彼能立無性，理智應無義故。論云﹕「我就他說有。」

Why? Were that ordinary consciousness able to establish the lack of intrinsic nature, then reasoned knowledge would be pointless, which is absurd. Also, since the same text says, "I say they exist... taking the perspective of the world,"

此說立有色等就世立故。

it means that the existence of forms and such is posited in terms of the perspective of the world.

言不許世俗者，謂如唯識宗所許依他，自不許之義，非說自宗不許世俗，故云如汝依他事。

When that text, in the lines prior to those just cited, states that we do not accept the conventional, it means that we do not accept dependent entities as Cittamatra accepts them; it does not mean that we do not in our own system accept the conventional, for it says "real dependent entities such as you accept."

又即彼論連續文云，若汝正理能遣依他，我即以汝正理遣汝世俗。

This stanza responds to a Cittamatrin argument given in a transitional passage of the commentary on that text: "If you use what is valid or reasonable to refute dependent entities, I will use your arguments to refute what you consider the conventional."

為答此諍，如汝所許依他實事，堪忍正理之所觀察，我諸世俗未如是許，正理能不能破有所不同，是此義故。

Hence, the meaning is this: You Cittamātrins believe dependent entities to be things that can withstand rational analysis. I do not accept such conventional phenomena. Hence, we disagree as to whether one can use reason to refute them.

言就世者，非說就他而非自宗，是於無損名言諸識，安立一切世俗義有，皆就此故。諸中觀師自身亦有此諸安立名言量故。

We do not take the expression "taking the perspective of the world" to refer to the perspective of others who do not belong to our own system; rather it refers to unimpaired conventional consciousnesses. This is because the existence of conventional objects must always be posited within the purview of such a consciousness and because the valid cognitions that posit conventionalities exist even in the Mādhyamika's own mind-stream.

言雖無者，是自相無，不可釋為雖自相無，然於彼有，及雖無而有。

Therefore, we take the words "even though they do not exist" to refer to their lack of existence by way of intrinsic character. So the passage should be glossed as, "I tell them they exist, even though they do not exist by way of their intrinsic character." It is inappropriate to gloss it as, "I say they exist even though they do not exist."

以是自宗立名言義之理，其自相有，雖於名言亦非有故。

This is because this passage represents our way of positing conventional objects in which existence by way of intrinsic character is not possible even conventionally.

釋論引經證云﹕「世許有無，我亦許爾。」不可無故。

Also, in the portion of the commentary to his 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 that explains that passage, Candrakirti states that "I accept whatever exists or does not exist for the world just as the world does." Thus, that passage cannot be taken to mean that things do not exist.

故如常說，「於勝義無，然世俗有。」其有無義異故無過失。

Therefore, since there are many such instances in which the text states that even though things do not ultimately exist, they nonetheless exist conventionally, there is no the slightest fault in taking the existence that is affirmed and the exisence that is denied as having different meanings in the pass "I say they exist even though they do not."

若爾《迴諍論》說，無宗無立，其義云何，應當宣說。

Objection: You still have to explain what Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 means when it says that Mādhyamikas have no positions and theses.

若立宗云芽無自性，次辯因云是緣起故，喻如影像，皆須受許。

If you adopt the thesis, "the seedling has no essential or intrinsic nature," then you also have to accept the reason, "because it is a dependently arisen thing," and the example, "for example, like a reflected image."

如是三相之因及因所成立之
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宗，并依能立言令諸敵者生悟彼之比量，亦須受許。

Accordingly, you accept that a syllogistic statement creates for the opponent (1) areason that has bearing on the subject and has the two forms of pervasion, (2) a probandum that the reason proves, and (3) an inference that understands that probandum.

爾時唯瞋自續之名，何故劬勞破自續耶。

This being the case, then—aside from simply hating the name "autonomous syllogism"—why do you go to the trouble of refuting autonomous syllogisms?

彼中雖有如汝所引似說無宗無立之文，然亦多說須立自許。

Reply: The Refutation of Objections does explain that we have no theses and positions, just as you have cited it, but since there are also many passages that state that it is necessary to posit assertions,

故僅引彼文，豈能立為自無所宗。

how can simply citing that one passage prove that Mādhyamikas have no positions?

然許無性宗，則成自續，實有此疑，此乃最細難解處故。

It is quite true, however, that there has been concern that anyone who holds the absence of intrinsic existence as a thesis is a Svatantrika. This is because this is an exceedingly subtle and difficult point.

立自宗時當為答釋。

Our response to that will be explained when we set forth our own position.

◎《迴諍論》說無立宗者，謂中觀師說法無自性，

As for Nāgārjuna's statement in the 《Refutation of Objections》 that he has nothesis, Mādhyamikassay that things lack intrinsic nature.

實事師難云﹕「如是立宗之言，若有自性，說一切法無性非理，若無自性，則不能破法有自性。」

The essentialists argue that if the words of such a thesis have intrinsic nature, then it is incorrect to say that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature; if those words lack intrinsic nature, then they cannot repudiate the existence of intrinsic nature.

乃是從此諍辯而出。雖無自性，立破作用皆應理者，如前所引迴諍本釋。

However, something without intrinsic nature can function to prove or to disprove; according to previously cited passages from the 《Refutation of Objections》 and its commentary, this is admissible.

故有無宗者，非總諍有無，是於宣說一切諸法皆無自性，立宗之言諍性有無。

Therefore, the issue as to having or not having theses is not an argument about whether Nāgārjuna has them in general. It is instead an argument as to whether the words of the thesis "all things lack intrinsic nature" have intrinsic nature.

若於如斯立宗之言許有自性，則與立一切法皆無自性，我有相違之過。

Hence, the meaning of the lines from the 《Refutation of Objections》 is this: If I accepted that the words of such a thesis had an intrinsic nature, then I could be faulted for contradicting the thesis that all things lack intrinsic nature,

然我不許爾，故無彼過。

but because I do not accept that, I cannot be faulted.

是顯此義非立無宗，無與無性二者差別，極重要故。

That is why these lines cannot be taken as proving that Mādhyamikas have no theses, for there is a very great difference between the absence of intrinsic existence and nonexistence.

又「若由現等義」等文，說現量等無少可緣者，亦如前引明顯句論，是顯能量所量無自性之能緣所緣，非顯全無緣起之能量所量。

The verse of the 《Refutation of Objections》—"If sensory perception and so forth..."—does state that sensory perception and such have no perception at all. However, according to the previously cited passage from the 《Clear Words》, this means that valid cognition and the phenomena it perceives are not essentially existent perceived objects and perceiving agents. It does not mean that there are no dependently arisen valid cognitions or phenomena that they perceive.

又此論意，是答他難，他意中謂，若由現量立法自相，次破應理。然中觀師說一切法皆自性空，是則現量及所量境，法所攝故亦當性空，若爾則無，故不能破。

In [the essentialists'] opinion, even if the intrinsic character of things as established by sensory perception could be refuted, the Madhyamikas' claim that all things are empty of intrinsic nature would still require that sensory perception and the objects perceived by it be empty of intrinsic nature inasmuch as they are included among "things." In that case, sensory perception and the objects perceived by it would in their view be nonexistent; hence one cannot refute the intrinsic character of things.

《迴諍論》云﹕「若現量緣法，次乃能遮遣，然能緣諸法，其現量全無。」

That passage from the 《Refutation of Objections》 which states that sensory perception lacks perception is given in answer to this essentialist view, a view which it states in these lines:
If the things perceived by sensory perception
Were then repudiated,
The sensory perception by which things are perceived
Would itself be nonexistent.

其釋亦云﹕「若汝現量緣一切法，次遮一切諸法皆空，乃可應理，然彼非理。

The Commentary to those lines states:
Nor is it possible to claim that perception observes all things and then to repudiate them by stating, "All things are empty."

何以故，一切法中攝現量故，亦
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應是空。

Why? Valid sensory perception is included among "all things," and is therefore empty.

能緣法者，此亦是空，故量無所緣。若無所緣，破亦非理。故彼說云一切法空不應道理。」

That which perceives things would also be empty. Therefore, there would be no perception by valid cognition. What cannot perceive also cannot refute, and hence the claim that all things are empty is not valid.

《四百論》說「有無及二俱，」等者，釋說，「於說空者，雖經長時，不能破責。」

As for the lines from Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas, "You can never rebut...," Candrakirti's commentary teaches us that one cannot refute the advocates of emptiness, no matter how long one tries.

汝說雖空亦復不許，云何能於全無許者，而資左證。

Since you claim that you do not even assert emptiness, how can you cite this passage in support of having no assertion at all?

《入中論》云﹕「於說假有此二邊論皆不應理。故依二邊，若破若答，於中觀師畢究無難，」如聖天云﹕「有無等」引此四句，謂引此證於破自性所成實物許假有者，諸實事師許有自性，及無事師斷遮色等一切諸法所有作用二不能破，故亦不成無宗之據。

Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 quotes those four lines in the following passage:
It is incorrect for those who advocate the position that things exist only as designations to advocate dualism.Therefore those who advance critiques and responses grounded in dualism against the Madhyamaka never find the slightest foothold. As Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas says,

Hence, Candrakirti uses this passage to explain that neither the essentialists, who hold that things exist essentially, nor the nihilists, who believe in the total repudiation of the functioning of things such as form, can refute those who accept imputed existence while repudiating essential or substantial existence. Consequently, that passage cannot be used as a source for the claim that Mādhyamikas have no position of their own.

又有無等宗，是二邊論宗，最極明顯，如前破四句生及破有無論時所說。

It is quite clear that the positions of existence, nonexistence, and so forth refer to instances of dualistically advocated positions. Hence, they are to be explained just as they were previously in our treatment of the refutation of the tetralemma and the way to refute the advocates of existence and nonexistence.

六十正理論所說者，如其釋云﹕「若時由見無事無自他宗，爾時見者當斷煩惱。」

Candrakirti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" passage, "Mahātmas have no positions...," states:

無宗之因說為無事，此以自相或以自性安立為事，若以作用為事，說見無彼能滅煩惱成相違故。

This commentary gives the nonexistence of real things as the reason for having no position. Moreover, "real thing" here must be taken to refer to intrinsic character or intrinsic nature, for to construe it as referring to functionality would contradict the statement that seeing its nonexistence stops the afflictions.

故以不許自性法宗，說為無宗。

Therefore, insofar as Mādhyamikas have no positions in which they accept intrinsically existing things, this text says that they have no positions.

即彼論前文，《六十正理論釋》云，諸未測此緣起法性徧計諸事，有自相者，「若許有實事，決定生貪瞋，執怖暴惡見，從彼起諍論。」說於諸法增益自相，為許事故。

This is because Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》, in the passage preceding this verse, identifies the assertion of real things as the reification of intrinsic character in things. Candrakirti's Commentary and its root text say:
As for those who have not fathomed this reality—dependent-arising—and who believe completely in the intrinsic character of things:

故此諸教，非顯中觀全無自宗。

Therefore, these scriptural passages do not teach that the Mādhyamikas have no system of their own.

故《顯句論》中引《迴諍論》及《四百論》「不許他宗故」之義，當如是知。

Hence, this is also how you should understand the meaning of the 《Clear Words》 passage that says, "...because we do not accept others' positions...," citing the 《Refutation of Objections》 and the 《Four Hundred Stanzas》.

又云「所破無所有，故我全無破」者，所破有二，若以增益有性境界所破，以彼為因說不破者，不應正理。

"To be refuted" in the Refutation of Objections passage that states, "Since there is nothing to be refuted, I refute nothing," might be interpreted in two ways. If we take "what is to be refuted" as referring to the object of the reification of things as intrinsically existent, it makes no sense for Nāgārjuna to say that because intrinsic existence does not exist, he refutes nothing.

故以能增益之心為所破。

Hence, we must take it as referring to the reifying consciousness that is refuted.

其釋又說「能破亦非
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有。」彼二無者，是說無自相之能破所破。

Candrakirti's commentary on that passage says that even the refuting agent does not exist; hence the nonexistence of both what is refuted and the refuting agent refers to the nonexistence of a refuted object and a refuting agent that exist by way of intrinsic character.

汝妄執有，謂以彼破此而興誹謗，然非不許彼二如幻。

[The 《Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"》] states that the essentialist, taking the refuting agent and object of refutation to existin that way, that is, by way of their intrinsic character, insults us by saying that we do that kind of refutation. Nāgārjuna does assert that both the refuted object and the refuting agent are like illusions.

如《迴諍論》云﹕「如以化破化，及諸幻士夫，以幻破其幻，此破亦如是。」

Why? His 《Refutation of Objections》 states:
An emanation can send out an emanation,
And an illusory being can use illusion
To stop illusion.
This refutation works in the same way.

又云﹕「此執若有性，應非從緣起，若執是緣起，即此豈非空。若執有自性，誰能遮其執，餘執理亦然，故我無彼難。」此說執陽焰為水，若有自性不應依自因緣而生，此執任誰不能遮故。

It also states that if the apprehension of a mirage as water intrinsically existed it would not occur in dependence upon its causes and conditions, and no one could overcome that apprehension:
If that apprehension intrinsically existed,
It could not arise dependently.
Can any apprehension that arises dependently
Help but be empty?
If an apprehension intrinsically existed,
Who could overcome it?
The same procedure works for everything else.
That is why there is no reply to it.

《明顯句論》說「自無宗故，」亦非全無自宗之據，此是說無自續之宗故。

The 《Clear Words》 passage that states, "The opposite of the absurd consequence in a reductio pertains to the opponent, but not to ourselves, for we have no theses," can also not be taken as a source to prove that Madhyamikas have no system of their own, for that passage means that they have no autonomous theses.

◎《入中論》說「無宗」者，是說自宗能破所破，俱許無性，汝許因果由自性有，故以正理推察徵破因能生果為會不會，故其能破不於我轉，未許能堪理推察故。

What about the 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 passage in which Candrakirti says that he has no positions? In his own system Candrakirti holds that neither his refutation nor the position he is refuting exist intrinsically. Therefore, when he uses reasoned analysis to refute the other party's belief that causes intrinsically give rise to their effects, asking whether causes give rise to effects through contact with them or without contact with them, this refutation does not apply to Candrakirti himself because he does not have to assert things that can withstand rational analysis. This is what that passage means.

故全非說無有自宗，即彼釋云﹕「於我宗中過不同轉，何以故，以我宗中能破所破，會亦不破，能破所破未會亦不破，能破所破俱無性故。故會未會俱不應思。」

It does not at all imply that we have no system of our own, for Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary comments on that passage:
We do not fall into a similar absurdity in our own system because, from our perspective, the refutation does not refute what it refutes by contacting it, nor does the refutation refute what it refutes without contacting it. This is because neither the refutation nor what it refutes intrinsically exist. Therefore, we do not consider whether they make contact.

謂實事師所設正理推徵不轉之理，是無自性，未立無許故。

Why is the rational analysis proposed by the essentialists not applicable to the Madhyamaka refutation? He says it is because the refutation and what it refutes do not intrinsically exist; he does not say that it is because Madhyamikas have no assertions.

又為證此引佛母經舍利子問須菩提云﹕「生無生法，由何而得證無生法。」雙破以彼二得。

In support he cites the 《Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra in Twenty-five Thousand Lines》 where Sariputra investigates and asks Subhuti about what kind of phenomenon, produced or unproduced, brings about the attainment of an unproduced phenomenon. After Sariputra has refuted that either kind brings it about,

次舍利子問云﹕「若爾無得證耶。」

he then asks, "Is it that there is no attainment and no clear knowledge?"

次如前引彼二雖有，然非由二邊。

and Subhuti says, as in the earlier citation," that these two do exist, but not dualistically.

又是名言，非於勝義，引此為喻自如是許。《入中論釋》云﹕「此顯墮二邊過，俱破以生法或無生法得，然彼二無亦不應理，故未推察於世名言而許有得。如是能破與所破非會未會，
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然於名言應知能破破其所破。」

Using this as an example, Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 gives this explanation: Because it would lead to such dualistic absurdities, the sūtra denies that a produced or unproduced phenomenon brings about attainment. Moreover, as dualistic analysis is inappropriate in the absence of real things, attainment is accepted without analysis, according to the conventions of the world. Likewise, it is neither that a refutation and what it refutes come into contact nor is it that they do not come into contact. Nonetheless, you should realize that conventionally a refutation refutes what is to be refuted.

此顯然說，以會未會正理觀察，於彼二中雖俱無破，然彼不能遮其有破，故於名言許破他宗。

This clearly states that when analyzed in terms of contact or noncontact, refutation does not exist in either way. But since this analysis does not deny the existence of refutation, Mādhyamikas must accept that conventionally there are refutations of the positions taken by others.

又非唯此，亦許以因成立所立，即前所引無間又云﹕「復次如日輪上有差別，蝕時汝能見於影，日影會否皆非理，唯依緣有名言生。

What is more, Candrakirti also accepts the fact that a syllogistic reason establishes the probandum. How so? In another passage that immediately follows the one cited above, his 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 and 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 state:

如為淨相雖無實，有用如是亦應知，能淨慧面諸正因，離實而能證所立。猶如影像全非有故，觀察其生為與日輪會與未會，於一切種雖全非有，然由色緣現前影像可得，決定能令達所樂義。如是以性空之能破破其所破，及以性空離實能立之因，成其所立，無二邊過，故於我語謂過同等當知非理。」

This is how it should be understood: Since a reflected image does not exist in the least, it is totally impossible to consider whether it is produced through contact or without contact with the orb of the sun. Nonetheless, when you see in a reflection a nearby form that is a causal condition for that reflection, you ascertain the object that you are seeking to understand. Likewise, a refutation that is empty of intrinsic nature refutes what is to be refuted, and a reasoning that is "improper" and is empty of intrinsic nature proves the point that is to be proven. Since this does not lead to absurdities of a dichotomizing analysis, it is incorrect for you to claim that our own words suffer from absurdities similar to that which we find in your position. This is how you should understand it.

此說破他之理，於自不能同等俱轉，作如是答，未說無宗。

Thus, this is how Candrakirti explains his answer that the arguments we used against others cannot be turned around and used against us. He does not say that we have no system of our own.

又許因果有自性者，因生果為會未會觀察破除，其過於自不能轉者，亦以自許無性為因而離其過，非謂無宗而能遠離。

Moreover, while analysis of whether a cause produces an effect with or without contact refutes those who accept intrinsic existence, Candrakirti gives our assertion of the absence of intrinsic existence as the reason why this fault does not apply to us. This is how he avoids that fallacy. He does not avoid it by saying that we have no system of our own.

《入中論釋》云﹕「汝云何許，謂此等法俱如幻化，故我無過亦有世法，若如誰宗能生所生是有自相，則此觀察於彼可轉。若如誰宗諸法如幻，徧計所生是無生性，雖無自性是分別境無可思察，如眩翳者見毛輪等，故我非有所說過咎。諸世間法未加觀察，亦是有故，一切皆成。」

For, the 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 states: How do we explain production? It is because both cause and effect are like illusions that this is not a fault for us; the things of the world exist. That analysis is applicable to those who maintain that cause and effect respectively are intrinsically characterized as the producer and the produced thing. But what about someone who maintains that since things are generated by false imputation, they are like illusions in that it is not their intrinsic nature to be produced? What about someone who holds that things lack intrinsic nature but are the objects of mental construction—like the falling hair that may appear to a person with eye disease? That person has no conception of intrinsic production. Therefore, there is no opportunity to fault us in the way just explained. Also, since the things of the World do exist when left unanalyzed, everything is established.

此說過失於他轉之理，謂許自相，自無過理，謂許如幻。

He gives the acceptance of intrinsic character as the reason why the fault applies to the other position, and the belief that things are like illusions as the reason why we do not have this fault.

◎如是知已應當了悟，安立中觀離過之宗。>

Understanding this, you should realize how to present the Madhyamaka system as being free from fault.

了義諸經中觀諸論，凡說此為如是此非如
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是，此及此無，此及此有，總有無邊，此等皆是造者所許，無須特外引教成立。

In general, there are innumerable instances of definitive scriptures and Madhyamaka treatises that make statements such as, "This is that way and not this way," or "Such things exist and such things do not." Hence, why should it be necessary to cite special scriptural passages to prove that these statements represent the assertions of their authors?

若不爾者，則諸教中未說受許，如彼之處，釋彼義時，則不能辨此是造者所宗所許，此非宗許，

If it were necessary, then when explaining the meaning of passages where expressions like, "I accept such and such," and, "I believe such and such," are absent, it would be impossible to distinguish whether or not something represents the system and belief of a certain author.

設若定須云許云受及云所宗差別語者，亦多宣說。

But if you insist upon actual instances of expressions like, "I believe," "I accept," and 'I posit," these are abundant.

如《迴諍論》云﹕「若不許名言，我等不能說。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 states:
Apart from asserting conventions, We offer no explanations.

《六十正理論》云﹕「如於法生滅，假名之為滅，如是諸善士，亦許如幻破。」

And also, Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 states:
A thing that arose and was destroyed
Is labeled as having ceased; likewise,
Excellent beings accept cessation
That is like an illusion.

又云「若法依緣生，猶如水中月，許非真非倒，此不被見奪。」

And: Everything that arises dependently,
Like a reflection of the moon in water,
Is neither real nor unreal.
Those who accept this are not seduced by dogmatic views.

《出世讚》云。「若法從因生，無因則非有，顯同影像性，何故而不許。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Praise of the Transcendent One》 states:
What arises from causes
Cannot exist without them—
And so is like a mere reflection.
How can you not accept something so obvious?

又云，「無所受無受，故受性無我，佛意許此受，自性全非有。」

And again from that same text:
Since it does not exist without what is felt,
Feeling itself is selfless.
You [Buddha] also accept that feeling
Does not exist intrinsically.

又云﹕「作者及業性，佛依名言說，互觀待為性，是為佛所許。」

And also: You have taught action and agent
In a conventional way.
You accept that they exist
In mutual dependence.

又云「且從已壞因，生果不應理，從未壞亦非，佛許生如夢。」

And also:
An effect cannot arise
From a cause that has been destroyed,
Nor from a cause that has not been destroyed.
You assert that effects are produced as in a dream.

又云﹕「若是緣起生，佛即許是空。」

And also:
You hold that whatever arises Dependently is empty.

《入中論釋》云﹕「諸聰智者，當思此宗無過有德，定當受許。」

Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 also states:
Experts are of the opinion that this position has no flaw and is highly beneficial. You should accept it without hesitation.

又云﹕「是故如許緣起唯有此緣，如是唯許依緣假立，故於我宗一切名言無斷滅失，他亦應當受許此宗。」

And also: Consequently, because we accept that things are dependently imputed, just as we accept dependent-arising—the merely conditional nature of things—our position does not face the absurdity of annihilating all conventions. Others should also accept the same.

說定須許，如是等類餘尚繁多。

These passages state that it is definitely necessary to accept a variety of positions, and there are many more like them.

《入中論釋》云﹕「已說四宗，次以正理為成彼故，頌曰﹕此非自生豈從他，亦非由俱豈無因。」

Again, the 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 explains four theses: After stating those four theses, we explain how to establish them through reasoning: "This does not arise from itself, so how could it from something else? Nor does it arise from both itself and something else, and how could it arise without a cause?"

此說四宗，明顯句論亦同彼說，故龍猛菩薩及月稱宗中，是有自許自受自宗。

As the 《Clear Words》 also makes similar statements, the system of Nāgārjuna the Protector and Candrakirti does have its own beliefs, assertions, and theses.

◎破第四家，此於名言許有自相，然於名言亦破自相堪理觀察，非為善哉，前已廣說。

(4) Refuting the fourth misinterpretation
This fourth system apparently accepts that intrinsic character exists conventionally, but refutes the conventional existence of intrinsic character that withstands rational analysis. We have already explained that this is wrong.

又
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說月稱論師宗中，許諸中觀師對實事師，以他比量成立宗時，許有兩宗極成三相之因，不應正理。明顯句論於如是因分別破故。

It also maintains that in the system of the master Candrakirti, when Madhyamikas use other-centered arguments to prove something to essentialist opponents, they use reasons that meet the three criteria and that are established for both systems. This is incorrect because (1) the 《Clear Words》 specifically refutes this view,

若許此因，雖未立名事力轉因，然是自續之因，無可遮故，此等且止，後當廣說。

and (2) if you hold such a view, even if you do not call that "a reason based on real fact," it is inevitably an autonomous reason. I have yet to explain these points, so that is all I will say at this point.

第二安立自宗。述應成派破自續宗而立自宗，二宗俱解，當如是說。明顯句論多說此事，然恐文繁，今於此中略顯宗要。

1.3.2.2.1.2 Setting forth our own position
Explaining how Prasangikas set forth their own system via a refutation of Svatantrika brings about an understanding of both systems, so this is how I will proceed. Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 has a great deal to say on this matter, but I am wary of excessive verbiage, so I will teach only the main points here.

此中分二，一　正破自續，二　自不同破之理。

There are two divisions:
1.3.2.2.1.2.1 The actual refutation of autonomous argument
1.3.2.2.1.2.2 Why the faults we find in autonomous arguments do not apply to us

初又分二，一　顯示所依有法不極成之宗過，二　由此過故顯示因亦不成。

The actual refutation of autonomous argument has two divisions:
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1 Demonstrating a fault that pertains to the position— namely, that the basis or subject of an autonomous syllogism is not established
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.2 Demonstrating that, because of that fault, the reason is also not established

初又分二，一　出計，二　破執。　　

The subject of "an autonomous syllogism is not established" has two parts:
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.1 stating what Bhavaviveka believes, and
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 refuting it.

今初

1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.1 What Bhavaviveka believes

◎明顯句論所說此事，極難通達，當引彼文而為解說。

The passages from Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 on these points appear to be exceedingly difficult to understand, so let me explain by citing and explaining a passage from the 《Clear Words》.

如云﹕「若謂如說聲是無常，是乃取總法及有法，非取差別。若取差別能比所比名言皆無，若取四大所造聲者，於他不成，若取空德，於佛弟子自不極成。如是勝論立聲無常，取所作聲於他不成。若取顯聲於自不成，隨其所應壞滅亦爾。若有因者，於佛弟子自不極成。若無因者，他不極成，是故於彼唯應取總法及有法，如是此中亦捨差別，唯取有法。」

It says: How? In the thesis "sound is impermanent," both the subject and the predicate are construed only in a general sense, not with specific qualifications. If they were taken under specific qualifications, the conventions "inference" and "what is inferred" would cease to exist. For example, if the subject were construed as "sound that evolves from the four great elements," it would not be established for the other party in the debate, the Vaiśesikas. And if it were taken as "a quality of space," the subject would not be established for us, the Buddhists. Likewise, when Vaiśesikas advance the thesis "sound is impermanent," to Samkhya opponents, if sound is construed as "produced sound," then it would not be established for the Sámkhyas. On the other hand, if sound is construed as "something that becomes manifest," then it would not be established for the Vaiśesikas themselves. Likewise, however it is placed in an argument, destruction, when qualified as something that requires some other cause than production itself, is not established for us Buddhists; whereas qualified as something that is causeless, it is not established for the other party, the Vaiśeşikas. Therefore, just as the subject and predicate are taken only in a general sense in the above cases, likewise, in the present case, it is the mere subject, without particular qualification, that is to be understood. This is what Bhāvaviveka says.

此中義者，謂佛弟子對勝論師立聲無常，若取大種造聲為有法者，勝論不成。若取空德聲為有法，於自不成。

This means that when the Buddhists advance the thesis "sound is impermanent" to the Vaiśesikas, if "sound that evolves from the elements" is taken as the subject, it will not be established for the Vaiśeṣikas; if "sound as a quality of space" is taken as the subject, it will not be established for us.

如是勝論對聲顯論立聲無常，若取所作聲為有法，聲顯不成。

Likewise, when the Vaiśesikas themselves advance the thesis "sound is impermanent" to those Samkhyas who are manifestationists; if "sound as something produced" were taken as the subject, it would not be established for the manifestationists;

若取先有由緣顯聲而為有法，於自不成。

if "sound as something that previously exists and comes to be manifested through certain conditions" were taken as the subject, it would not be established for Vaisesika proponents.

故不應取不
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共別許而為有法。

Therefore, it is impossible to use as a subject something that is incompatible with one's own individual belief system.

有法乃是立敵二家，觀察能別法之所依，必須兩家共極成故。

For, given that the subject is the basis that both parties analyze in order to see whether a specific quality is present, it has to be something established as appearing in common to both.

如其有法必須共許，如是其法亦須共許，取總無常莫取差別。又於成立所立之前，於所立喻先須極成，

Just as they must establish a commonly appearing subject, so too both sides must establish the predicate, "impermanent," only in a general sense, without particular qualifications. Also, they must commonly establish any example that they cite, and this must take place before they prove the probandum.

如是中觀諸師，成眼等內處或色等外處，對他部宗立不自生及對自部實事諸師立無他生，取實眼等以為有法於自不成，取妄眼等以為有法於他不成。捨此差別唯將眼色立為有法，是中觀師與實事師，觀察有無自生等能別法之所依，須二共許故。

The situation is similar when we Mādhyamikas prove to non-Buddhists the nonexistence of something that is produced from itself—whether it is an internal sensory source, such as the visual faculty, or an external sensory source, such as a form—and when we prove to Buddhist essentialists that there is no production from other. If we were to use "a real eye," for instance, as the subject, it would not be established for us, but if we used "an unreal eye" as the subject, it would not be established for the other party. Hence, giving up such specificity, we must use the mere eye or mere form as the subject. Why? Because it must be established as commonly appearing to both parties, inasmuch as it is the basis that both Madhyamikas and essentialists analyze in order to see whether there is a specific quality, such as "being produced from itself."

共成之義，謂於敵者以何量成立，則於立者亦以比量而為成立。

This is what Bhavaviveka thinks. "To establish as appearing in common" means that the proponent and the opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it.

第二破執分二，一　義不應理，二　喻不相同。　　

1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2 refuting what Bhavaviveka believes
This has two parts:
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2.1 showing that the meaning is incorrect
1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2.2 showing that the example cited is not appropriate.

今初

1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2.1 showing that the meaning is incorrect

◎《顯句論》云﹕「此非如是，若許破生為所立法，爾時真實所依有法，唯是顛倒所得我事，悉皆失壞是此自許，倒與非倒互相異故。是故若時，如眩翳者見毛輪等，由顛倒故非有執有，爾時豈有少分實義是其所緣。若時如無眩翳見毛輪等。無顛倒心，不妄增益非真實事，爾時由何而為世俗，此非有義，豈有少分是其所緣。

This is not like that, and is instead as follows. Insofar as one accepts the refutation of production as the probandum in this [demonstration that eye, etc. are not ultimately produced], the subject — the basis of that probandum and something found to have its own existence by an inaccurate consciousness — breaks down in reality, and therefore, it will be argued, there would be no commonly appearing subject. He [Bhavaviveka] himself must accept that this is so. Inaccurate and accurate consciousnesses are different. Therefore, when an inaccurate consciousness takes what is nonexistent as existent, as in the case of someone with eye disease seeing falling hair, it does not perceive even to the slightest degree an object that exists. When an accurate consciousness does not reify what is unreal, as is the case of someone without eye disease looking for the imaginary falling hair, it does not perceive even to the slightest degree objects that are nonexistentinsofar as they are merely conventional.

以是之故，阿闍黎云，『若由現等義，有少法可緣，應成立或破，我無故無難。』

That is why the master Nāgārjuna himself states in his Refutation of Objections:
If sensory perception and so forth
Could actually perceive something
Then there would be something to prove or to refute.
But as they do not, I cannot be faulted.

何以故，如是顛倒與不顛倒而相異故，無顛倒位其顛倒事，皆非有故。豈有世俗眼為有法，是故宗不成過及因不成過，仍未能遣，此不成答。」

Since inaccurate and accurate consciousnesses are different in this way, inaccurate consciousness cannot exist when accurate consciousness is present. So how could the conventional eye, as the subject of a syllogism, exist for an accurate consciousness? Therefore, since there is for Bhāvavivekano avoiding the fallacies of a nonexistent position and a nonexistent reason, the response he has given is no answer at all.

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此若例云﹕「色處無自生，有故，如現前瓶。」易於領解，當就此上而為宣說。

I will explain this passage based on the following syllogism, since using this example makes it easier to understand:
Subject: Visible form
Predicate: Is not produced from itself
Reason: Because it exists
Example: Like the pot that is right in front of you

此論答文，顯無極成有法之理。

The passages of the 《Clear Words》 that reply to Bhāvaviveka show that the subject is not established as appearing in common to the two parties in this debate.

此復云何，謂顯極成有法與諸敵者不得成立。不能極成之敵者，明顯句論謂爾時是破自生之敵者，然總許諸法勝義有性諸實事師，及於名言許彼諸法有自相性自續諸師，皆是敵者。中觀自續，雖亦名為無自性師，然此論中為刪繁故，言無性師當知是說應成派師，言有性師當知是說實事諸師及自續師。

How do they show this? Here, in this section, the 《Clear Words》 states that those to whom it demonstrates how one cannot establish a subject in common with an opponent are those who refute production from self—that is, the Svātantrikas. But in general, the opponents of the 《Clear Words》 are both (a) to essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature. Svātantrika-Madhyamikas are called "non-essentialists". However, so as to simplify the terminology in this discussion, "opponents of intrinsic existence" will refer to the Prāsangikas, and "advocates of intrinsic existence" will refer to both the essentialists and the Svātantrikas.

若立色處以為有法，成立彼者，須以取彼眼識現量而為成立，此若不以無錯亂識而成立者，則非能立實義現量，故須無亂。

According to the advocates of intrinsic existence, visible form, the stated subject of the syllogism, must be established by the valid perceptual cognition of the visual consciousnesses that perceive it. Moreover, if those consciousnesses did not establish visible form in a non-mistaken way, then they could not be perceptions that establish their objects.

彼等宗中，成無分別無錯亂者，謂於何處成不錯亂，定須觀待現彼自相，如現而有。由是因緣，敵者何量成其有法，而於立者不許彼量。因於名言任隨何法，皆無自相所成自性，故無能成彼性之量，此阿闍黎以此密意破自續師。

Hence, they must be non-mistaken. Do non-conceptual perceptions establish their objects in a non-mistaken Way? In non-Prasañgika systems, an object's existence by way of its intrinsic character appears to any consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect to that object; moreover, the object must exist just as it appears to that consciousness. As this is the case, we Prāsangikas say that the kind of valid cognition that establishes the subject for the essentialist opponent will not work for the Madhyamika proponent. Why? Since no phenomenon can, even conventionally, have a nature that is established by way of its intrinsic character, there is no valid cognition that establishes such a thing. It is with this in mind that the master Candrakirti refutes the notion of autonomous syllogism.

此復是說，令他新生通達諸法無性正見支分之中，破說必須自續之理。若是中觀應成諸師，自內互相為生通達盡所有義比量支中，觀察須否自續之理，暫置未說。

This also explains how to refute the need for an autonomous syllogism as part of the process of initially instilling in others the view that knows that things lack intrinsic nature. I leave aside for the time being the analysis of whether Prasangikas need to use autonomous syllogisms among themselves as part of the process of developing inferential knowledge of certain objects amongst the diverse conventional objects.

◎此與論文合而釋之，從曰「若許」至曰「自許，」義謂所立法之所依有法，或眼或色等，失壞實有而不極成，此是清辯論師自許。

Now let me explain this by tying my analysis to Candrakirti's text. The meaning of the passage, "Insofar as one accepts the refutation of production... himself must accept that this is so," is as follows. "The basis of the probandum"—a subject such as the eye or form—"breaks down," that is, is not established, "in reality." This is something that Bhāvaviveka himself accepts.

何等有法，謂唯由無明損害顛倒所得我事，
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即眼識等名言諸識所立之義。

What are those subjects [eye and form] like? "Something found to have its own existence by inaccurate consciousnesses" affected by ignorance; this means that conventional consciousnesses, such as the visual consciousness, establish these objects.

彼自許者，謂若已破於勝義生，其所立法，可依有法。

How is it that "[Bhāvaviveka] himself must accept this?" He must accept it "insofar as," i.e., because the refutation of ultimate production, as the predicate of the probandum, is based upon those subjects;

言爾時者，謂以是故，若真實有為彼所依，成相違故。

if they did exist in reality it would contradict that relationship between subject and predicate granted that he accepts things in this way,

若謂縱許爾當有何過，謂彼色等非真實有，非真實義，非無亂識所得之義。是虛妄心名言諸識之所得境，故彼皆是無明錯亂。

what does that entail? Those subjects—form, etc.—that neither exist in reality nor are reality itself cannot be considered objects found by non-mistaken consciousnesses. Hence, they are found by conventional consciousnesses, or subjects, that apprehend false objects. And thus those consciousnesses are mistaken; that is, affected by ignorance.

故無亂識所得之義，於錯亂識則不顯現，於錯亂識所現境義，無錯亂識則非能得。

Therefore, objects found by non-mistaken consciousnesses do not appear to mistaken consciousnesses, and objects that appear to mistaken consciousnesses are not found by non-mistaken consciousnesses.

顛倒亂識與無顛倒不錯亂識，自境互異，趣異境故，即彼論說「倒與倒相異」之義。

This is because "the inaccurate" mistaken consciousnesses "and the accurate" non-mistaken consciousnesses "are different," which is to say that each engages its object by excluding the object of the other. This is the meaning of Candrakirti's statement that "inaccurate and accurate consciousnesses are different."

又釋此義，從曰「若時」至曰「是其所緣」。

The explanation of that occurs in the passage, "Therefore, when an inaccurate... are nonexistent insofar as they are merely conventional."

言顛倒者，謂眼等名言諸識被無明亂。言由彼等非有執有者，謂色聲等無自性相根識執有。

There, "inaccurate" refers to a conventional consciousness that is affected by ignorance, such as the visual consciousness. That such consciousness "takes what is nonexistent as existent" refers to the fact that while form, sound, etc. have no essential or intrinsic character, the sensory consciousnesses apprehend them as having such a character.

無分別識之所執者，是顯現義，謂即色等現似自相。

The way that non-conceptual consciousnesses apprehend their objects is in terms of mere appearance, and that is why form and such appear to sensory consciousnesses to exist by way of their intrinsic character.

又言爾時豈有少分實義，是其所緣者，義謂如是實無自相，妄顯現故。

The words, "it does not perceive, even to the slightest degree, an object that exists," mean that because intrinsic character appears, despite its nonexistence,

此等諸識，豈能成立有微少義由自相有。

there is no way for those consciousnesses to establish even the slightest object that exists by way of its intrinsic character.

無自相義妄現之喻，謂如毛輪等。

The falling hair is an example of an object that does not exist by way of its intrinsic character, yet appears as though it did.

此等是說，彼諸根識現色聲等，是錯亂故，不能成立境有自相。

These sentences mean that the sensory consciousnesses to whichthingssuch as formand sound appear are mistaken, and are therefore not suited to attest that an object exists by virtue of its intrinsic character.

次為顯示無錯亂識全不少執有色聲等，說云若時無眩翳等。

The passage that begins, "When an accurate consciousness." indicates that non-mistaken consciousness does not at all apprehend form, sound, and such.

不顛倒者，謂無亂識，此於現證真實乃有，餘者皆無。

The word "accurate" refers to non-mistake consciousness. Noble beings who perceive reality possess such consciousness, and no one else.

此不增益非真實者，謂色聲等非真實義，而不增益不執為有。

That non-mistaken consciousness "does not reify what is unreal." This means that it "does not reify," or take as existing, such things as form and sound—which cannot be final reality.

譬如清淨離翳眼識，則不能見毛輪亂相。

For example, it is like the fact that the visual consciousness of someone without eye disease does not see an image of falling hair.

言為世俗者，謂色聲等虛妄之義。

In that same sentence, the phrase, "insofar as they are merely conventional," refers to false objects, like form and sound.

言非有者，謂無自相緣真實義無錯亂識，不能成立彼等少分，義謂色等非彼見故。

"Nonexistent" means not existing by way of intrinsic character. Such conventional objects are not established even in part by non-mistaken consciousnesses, that is, by consciousnesses that have final reality as their object. This is because non-mistaken consciousnesses do not see such conventional objects.

證此諸義，次
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引龍猛菩薩論云「若等」，此說現量等四，不成少分有自相義，以此為據。

On these points, Candrakirti cites a proof-text by Nāgārjuna the Protector: "If sensory perception and so forth...." This supporting citation states that the four [direct, inferential, scriptural, and analogical] valid cognitions—sensory perception and so forth—do not at all establish an object that exists by way of its intrinsic character.

次云「何以故如是」等者，攝前說義。

The sentence that begins, "Since inaccurate and accurate...," summarizes the point Candrakirti has already explained.

次言「豈有世俗眼為有法」者，非為顯示全無世俗眼等有法。

The sentence, "So how could the conventional eye, as the subject of a syllogism, exist," is not claiming that subjects such as the conventional eye are nonexistent.

義如前說，由自相有或無錯亂現量所立色等有法，名言亦無。

Instead, as explained above, it means that a form that exists by way of its intrinsic character, or is established by non-mistaken perception, cannot be the subject of the syllogism even conventionally.

言「是故」等者，義謂無自性師與實事師安立色處為有法時，無亂現量不得極成，於二宗中無量能立極成有法，故自續因於諸敵者，不能安立無過之宗。

The meaning of "Therefore, since..." is that when both the opponents of essential or intrinsic existence and the essentialists posit visible form as the subject of a syllogism, non-mistaken perception does not establish it as appearing in common to both parties in the debate. Therefore, since there is no valid cognition attesting to a subject that is proven to appear in common for both systems, there will inevitably be a fault in any position that you try to prove to an opponent using an autonomous reason.

若作是念，於名言中不許自性之宗，雖則如是，然我於名言，不許如是有無過宗，許有自續有法等故。

Objection: What you say is true in regard to a position that has no essential or intrinsic nature even conventionally. However, since this is not what we [who follow Bhavaviveka] assert at the conventional level, the subjects and such in autonomous syllogisms do exist. Therefore, the position is free from fallacy.

於名言許有如是性不應道理，前已廣說，後亦當釋。故汝此答不應正理。

Reply: The existence of such an intrinsic nature is inadmissible conventionally. Since we have already explained this above, and will explain it again below, your answer is unreasonable.

◎第二喻不相同。

1.3.2.2.1.2.1.1.2.2 showing that the example cited is not appropriate.

《顯句論》云﹕「喻亦非等，於彼二者不說差別，許有總聲及總無常。如是總眼性空諸師與不空師，世俗不許，亦非勝義，故喻不同。」

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 states:
The example [i.e., the syllogism proving the impermanence of sound] is also inappropriate. Whereas in this example, neither party wants to qualify the general sense of "sound" or the general sense of "impermanence," here in the case of the syllogism proving that the eye is not ultimately produced, the advocates of emptiness and the advocates of non-emptiness do not both accept that eye, as a generality, exists only conventionally, nor do they both accept that it exists ultimately. That is why the example is inappropriate.

此中義者，非是顯示可有總聲，非大種造及非空德亦非所作先有緣顯，有總無常，俱非觀待不觀待因，而無實妄俱非眼等，

Do not misread this passage to say that the example fails because an eye that is neither true nor false does not exist, but there does exist a sound that is neither evolved from the elements nor a quality of space, as well as a sound that is neither produced nor a causal manifestation of something that already exists; and that there does exist something that is impermanent in a general sense, yet neither relies on causes nor fails to rely on causes.

此是立敵俱不許故。如是法喻，誰亦不能成非等故。

For (1) those [i.e., sound that is neither evolved nor a quality of space, etc.) are things that neither of those two parties accept, and (2) if they were to accept such things, no one could ever demonstrate that the analogy fails.

若爾云何，謂或曰大種所造之聲，或曰虛空功德之聲，不以隨一差別簡別而定有聲，立者敵者彼二宗中，皆可容有。

Well then, what does this passage mean? In the systems of both of the parties in the example, it is possible to ascertain the existence of sound, unspecified as to whether it is "sound that is evolved from the elements" or "sound that is a quality of space."

性空諸師性不空師二者宗中，若非不亂識所成立，亦非錯亂識所成立，無量能成總眼或色。

But in the systems of the advocates of emptiness of intrinsic existence and the opponents of emptiness of intrinsic existence, there is no such thing as an eye or a form as a generality that is established by a valid cognition that is neither a non-mistaken consciousness nor a mistaken consciousness.

若由錯
- p.489 -
亂識所成立，敵者不成。

Its being established by a mistaken consciousness is not established for the opponent,

由無錯亂識所得者，則為立者量所不成，故說其喻非可相同。

and the Prasañgika-Mādhyamika proponent's valid cognition does not establish its being found by a non-mistaken consciousness. Hence, the analogy fails. This is the meaning of that passage.

無錯亂者，總謂現量緣勝義諦諸根本智。

The word "non-mistaken" generally refers to the equipoise that directly perceives the ultimate truth.

然此俱說於顯境自相無亂現量，及於著境自相無亂比量，能成有法及因三相，如此之量畢竟非有。故無亂識所得境義非是有法。

But here, it must refer both to a perceptual valid cognition that is non-mistaken with respect to an intrinsically characterized appearing object and to an inferential valid cognition that is non-mistaken with respect to its intrinsically characterized conceived object. Since there are no such valid cognitions that establish the three criteria, the subject cannot be an object that is found by a non-mistaken consciousness.

此言自相者，非同因明師所許有作用法。

Here the term "intrinsic character" is not used, as the logicians use it, simply to mean something that performs a function.

是如前說，隨於有事無事許各各自性之性，故有性師雖緣無事之比量，亦許於如是性所著之境，為無錯亂。

Instead, as previously explained, it refers to something's own intrinsic nature, which any functioning thing or non-functioning thing is believed to have. That is why the advocates of intrinsic nature claim that even an inference that comprehends a non-thing is not mistaken regarding a conceived object that has such an intrinsic nature.

若於彼性無錯亂識，隨於現境或於著境無有錯亂，則於真實須無錯亂，故許自宗無如斯量。

Every consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect to such an intrinsic nature must also be non-mistaken with respect to its appearing objects and conceived objects; and since this makes such a consciousness non-mistaken with respect to ultimate reality itself, our own system does not hold that such a valid cognition establishes the subject, etc.

成有法等，非說立敵二者身中無名言量緣眼色等。

However, we do not deny that there are, in the mind-streams of both parties, conventional valid cognitions that perceive things like eyes and forms.

敵者身中如前所說，無損根識所引定解，略有色等此定智境，理無違害。

In fact, even in the mindstream of the opponent, the forms, etc. that are elicited by sensory consciousnesses that are unimpaired—in the sense previously explained—are ascertained simply as existing, and there is no rational fault in regard to the object of such knowledge.

此若細釋，如執有芽，總有三種執取道理，一執芽實有自性，是執實有，二執芽無性如幻而有，是執妄有，三俱不執取實妄差別，唯執總有。

To explain this in greater detail, we can say that there are three ways of apprehending the existence of, for instance, a seedling: (1) apprehending a seedling as truly existing, which means apprehending it as having an essential or intrinsic nature; (2) apprehending it as existing in a false way, which is the apprehension that the seedling lacks essential existence, but exists like an illusion; and (3) apprehending it as merely existing in general, without specifying whether it is true or false.

雖尚執芽常無常等，然若不執此三隨一，則無執取，故於此中不說彼等。

You might also apprehend the seedling as permanent or impermanent, etc., but since there is no apprehension that does not involve one of these three ways of apprehending, there is no need to explain those other ways here.

若有情身未生正見，通達諸法無自性者，唯有二執，一執總有，二執實有，不起如幻無性之執。

Living beings who have not developed within their mindstreams the view that knows the absence of intrinsic nature posess the third and first modes of apprehension, that is, the apprehension of mere existence and the apprehension of true existence, but they lack the apprehension of things as like essenceless illusions.

未見諸法如幻有情，凡執為有諸分別心，說彼一切皆執實有，於一切種不應道理。

It is completely wrong to claim that before living beings find the view that phenomena are like illusions, any conception they have of something as existing is a conception of true existence.

於前解釋名言量時，及辨有無與性有無四差別時，已數宣說。

This is something that I have already explained above, in the section that discusses conventional valid cognition and in the section in which I differentiate the four—intrinsic existence, lack of intrinsic existence, existence, and nonexistence.

若不爾者，未解無性正見之前，謂分別所設，一切名言皆是實執，如前所說。

Suppose that this were not the case—that is, suppose that those who have not yet understood the view that there is no intrinsic nature did apprehend everything as truly existent whenever they thought of any conventional thing.

未為錯亂因緣所壞世間名
- p.490 -
言所建立義，中觀諸師於名言中所許一切，皆被正理之所違害，與大自在有無無別。

There would ensue a complete logical breakdown of the need for Mādhyamikas to accept, conventionally, the objects that are posited by the world's ordinary conventional consciousnesses, insofar as those consciousnesses are not affected by the previously explained circumstances that cause error. Therefore, since there would be no way to distinguish the ontological status of conventional objects from the ontological status of a putative divine creator,

此顛倒見，是證中觀義最大障礙故。

this erroneous view would be a great impediment to understanding the meaning of the Madhyamaka.

由彼等門邪解空性，所有相狀即先由分別所修行品眾多善行，後自妄為得正見時，見前一切皆是執相，生死繫縛。

There are many who show indications of having misunderstood emptiness in this way. They initially engage in many virtuous activities that require conceptual thought. But later, when they systematize the philosophical view that they have found, they see all of their previous activities as grasping at signs and thus as binding them to cyclic existence.

次生倒解，謂彼善行是為未得如此了義正見者說。

They reflect, "Those virtuous activities were taught for those who have not found this definitive view."

遂於一切分別，妄見過失，由邪分別誹謗正法，現見多如支那堪布。

Developing such an understanding, they repudiate the teaching in many ways with this misconception that regards all conceptual thought as faulty. In this sense they resemble the Chinese abbot Ha-shang.

◎又諸補特伽羅未得無性正見以前，不能判別唯是總有與自相有二者差別。

Before they find the view that things lack intrinsic nature, it is impossible for them to distinguish between mere existence and existence by way of intrinsic character.

凡是有者，即如前引四百釋說，徧計執為由自性有。

This is because—as indicated in the passage from Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 cited above—they think that anything that exists must exist essentially.

由是因緣，於無自性執為徧無，故於性空起多攻端，謂因果等不可安立。

As result of this, they take everything that lacks intrinsic nature to be nonexistent, making it impossible for them to posit cause and effect for that which is empty of intrinsic nature. There are many who argue in this way.

若於相續已生通達無性正見，此身可生三種執取。

Those who have developed in their mind-streams the view that knows the absence of intrinsic nature may apprehend things as existing in all three ways.

然生見已，乃至未失正見功力，若以正理觀察思擇自性有無，許有自性妄執實有，則暫不生，非彼不起俱生實執。

When that view has been developed, and while its influence has not diminished, the conception of true existence that believes that things essentially exist is temporarily absent. This lasts as long as they are rationally analyzing something so as to determine whether it exists essentially. However, this does not mean that they do not have an innate conception of true existence.

以是正見通達無性，生已未失，其相續中執有芽心，非此一切皆執如幻。

Therefore, even those who have developed the view that knows the absence of essential or intrinsic nature, and who have not let that view degrade, do not always apprehend a seedling as existing like an illusion whenever they apprehend a seedling as existing.

若不爾者，彼等心中實執現行，應不生故。

Why? If they did, it would lead to the absurdity that they would never again develop a manifest form of the conception of true existence with regard to those seedlings and such.

於名言中，許諸法有自性自相，清辨師等諸中觀師，於自宗中許自續之因者，亦因於名言許有自性自相，故於自宗安不安立自續因者，亦是至此極細所破。

There are Madhyamikas—such as the master Bhāvaviveka—who accept that, conventionally, phenomena have essential or intrinsic character. The conventional existence of essential or intrinsic character is their reason for accepting autonomous reasons in their own system. Whether one posits autonomous reasons in one's own system finally depends upon what one posits as the extremely subtle object of refutation.

以是彼宗顯現自性無損根識，許於名言中對所現境不為錯亂。

Therefore, in their Svätantrika system, unimpaired sensory perceptions to which essential or intrinsic nature appears are, conventionally, non-mistaken with respect to their appearing objects.

又執芽等，有如是性諸分別心，於所著境亦非錯亂。

The conceptual consciousness that conceives of a subject such as a seedling as having that kind of nature is also non-mistaken with respect to its conceived object.

若不爾者，許彼錯亂，與實事師二宗何有極成之量。

Otherwise, if they accepted that those consciousnesses are mistaken, then what valid cognition would establish the elements of a syllogism as appearing in common for both their system and that of the essentialists?

若
- p.491 -
如月稱論師所許，對實事師成立實無自性，現有自相妄現根識。若時有法已得成立即成無性，則自續因復何所為。

If the sensory perceptions to which essential nature appears establish the elements of a syllogism for the essentialist even though, as Candrakirti holds, there is no intrinsic nature such as the essential character that appears, then how can one use an autonomous reason? For, one would have already proven the absence of intrinsic nature to the essentialist while establishing the subject.

若謂於他自成即可，不須中觀與彼共成，

Opponent: Let the essentialist opponents establish the subject, etc. as they may; it is not necessary for the subject, etc. to be established as appearing in common to both the Madhyamikas and to them.

此非自許，亦非正理。

Reply: But that is something that Bhavaviveka himself does not accept, nor is it correct for him to do so,

若如是者，一切因式唯就他許，是則隨順應成轉故。

for if he did it would entail that all probative reasons and syllogisms are offered simply in terms of what the other party accepts, and that would make him a follower of the Prāsangikas.

靜命師等，許諸外境名言都無，

There are [Yogācāra-Svātantrika] masters such as Śāntaraksita who assert that external objects do not exist conventionally.

然於名言許青等色，以識為體，同實相師，顯現青等所有根識，觀待青等是取自相義，故待青相是不錯亂。

However, like those Cittamātrins who are Satyākāravādin, they assert that blue and such conventionally exist in the substance of consciousness. Therefore, since the sensory consciousnesses to which blue, etc. appear do have a view of them, apprehending them as existing by way of their intrinsic character, Sãntaraksita and other do not consider the sensory consciousnesses mistaken in their view of blue itself.

若立眼等，不顯見事為有法時，雖彼不為現量親成，然其究竟根本能立，必至現量。

When hidden objects, such as the eye, are posited as the subjects of a syllogism, perception cannot explicitly establish them. Still, if we work back to the fundamental establishing agent, we must arrive at a perception.

是一切宗諸師共許，以諸比量，如盲相牽，故其根本能立，亦許至於現量為境。

This is a belief of all Buddhist philosophical schools. Why? Because inference is like a blind person who is guided by perception. So Śāntaraksita and his followers accept that, even in the case of hidden things, the fundamental establishing agent is, in the end, perception.

爾時所許根本現量，或是無亂見分，或是無亂自證，復如前說，於所顯現自相之義，須於境上如現而有，是彼所許。

At that point, they believe that the fundamental perception is either a non-mistaken cognition of something else or a non-mistaken auto-cognition. Also, as I have already explained, they believe that an object that exists by way of its intrinsic character does appear and must objectively exist as it appears.

故彼諸師與無性中觀二宗之中，無立極成不亂現量。

This being the case, there can be no non-mistaken perception that establishes anything as appearing in common both to them and to Mādhyamikas who maintain that there is no essential or intrinsic nature.

未至現量亦能答難，未許自性師，隨於有為無為量所成義，是須成立於諸境上有彼諸法各各實性，以諸正理能破彼義，故能立量不應道理。

Even in the case of objects that cannot be traced back to perception, it is still possible to reply. The proponents of intrinsic nature claim that valid cognitions establish all objects, compounded and non-compounded. What do they mean by this? Is it necessary for those valid cognitions to establish objects whose ontological nature is to exist objectively? If so, then since reason can refute them, they cannot be valid cognitions that establish their objects.

◎第二由此過顯因亦不成。

1.3.2.2.1.2.1.2 Demonstrating the reason is also not established.

《顯句論》云﹕「即此所說所依不成宗過之理，亦當宣說其有故因不成之過。」

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 indicates this in the passage that states: The same method that was used to show that the position is defective insofar as its basis is not established should be used to show the defect that the reason, "because it exists," is also not established.

此顯前說性空不空立敵兩宗，無量能成極成有法，故自續因中色處之有法及無自生之法，二合總宗或名所立皆悉非有。

Previously, Candrakirti explained that because there is no valid cognition that establishes a commonly appearing subject for the systems of both parties—the proponents and the opponents of emptiness of essential or intrinsic existence—the thesis, or probandum, which combines the autonomous argument's subject, "visible form," with its predicate, "is not produced from itself," also does not exist.

即以此理於兩宗中，亦無正量成其有
- p.492 -
故。

On this account, the reason, "because it exists." also is not established, for there is no valid cognition that can attest to its being established as appearing in common to both parties.

極成之因立因不成之理，如前當知。

You should understand this on the basis of what has been explained above.

《顯句論》云﹕「如是彼過如所說義，此分別師自己許故。

At this point, the 《Clear Words》 states:
This is so, for this logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself accepts implicitly the points we have just made.

如何許耶，謂他安立諸內六處，唯有能生因等，如來如是說故。

How so? Another party offers him this proof: "The causes that serve to bring about the internal sensory faculties and such are existent, without qualification; this is the case because the Tathâgata said they are;

凡如來說，即應如是，如說涅槃寂靜，此於他之能立，擧過難云，汝所許因為於世俗如來說耶，於勝義如來說耶。

for whatever the Tathâgata has said is accurate, as in the case of his teaching that nirvâna is peace." [Bhāvaviveka replies,] "What do you believe the import of the reason to be? Is it that such causes exist because the Tathâgata has said so in terms of the conventional? Or is it because he said so in terms of the ultimate?

若於世俗，則其因義於自不成。」

If it is true because he said this in terms of the conventional, the import of the reason would not be established for you.

又云，「若於勝義，則彼能立不極成故，因犯不成及相違過。

If you take it that the Buddha made this statement in terms of the ultimate, since neither the probandum nor what proves it are established in terms of the ultimate, the reason would not be established and would in fact contradict the thesis."

如是此師，自以此理許因不成，故凡立實事法為因，一切比量因等於自皆不成，故一切能立自皆破壞。」

This is how [Bhāvaviveka] states the fault in that proof. Since it is through such considerations that he asserts that the reason is not established, the reason and so forth are not established for him in any argument that posits a reified thing as the reason, and hence all probative arguments would fall apart.

釋此義中，有諸自許隨月稱行者，作如是說，分別熾然論等立量說云，地於勝義非堅硬性，是大種故，如風。

Some Tibetans who consider themselves followers of Candrakirti interpret this passage in the following way: Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of Reasons and other Svätantrika texts put forward the following syllogism:
Subject: Earth
Predicate: Is not ultimately of the nature of solidity
Reason: Because it is an element
Example: Like wind

若於勝義立大種故，自所不成。

They say that Candrakirti refutes this approach as follows: If you posit "because it is an element ultimately" as the reason, then it is not established for us.

若於世俗立大種故，於實事師敵者不成。

If you posit "because it is an element conventionally" as the reason, then it is not established for the opponent, the essentialist.

若不由此立因不成，則說由此二門不成，因定不成自許相違。

If this argument does not induce you to accept that your own reason is not established, then you contradict your belief that a reason that is not established from either of those two points of view [i.e., conventionally and ultimately] must be a reason that is not established.

又有說云，立唯大種，以理智未成而破。

And there are those who say that [Bhāvaviveka] is refuted because when he states just being an element as the reason, without any specification, reasoned knowledge does not establish it.

以此理破，全非論意，清辯論師非如是許。故於兩派，俱成倒說。

But [Candrakirti's] refutation [of Bhāvaviveka] does not proceed in this way, This is not at all the purport of the 《Clear Words》, nor dos, [Bhāvaviveka] accept any such thing. Hence, these individuals misrepresent both systems.

若爾云何，其「如所說義，此分別師自己許」文，如前說者，謂前所說有法不成及因不成，以前論無間說彼義故。

Well then, how is the passage to be interpreted? In the passage that states, "for this logician himself accepts implicitly the points we have just made," the phrase "the points we have just made" refers to the previously explained method for showing that the subject is not established and also to the application of that method to the reason, for the text states this in the immediately preceding passage.

義謂成立有法及因所有現量，不出二類，謂錯不錯亂。

This being the case, it follows that the valid cognitions such as perceptions that establish the subject and reason are inevitably either mistaken or non-mistaken.

若以錯亂識所得義立為因等，於實事師不能極成。

If you posit an object found by a mistaken consciousness as the reason or as another part of the syllogism, then it will not be established for the essentialist;

若以無亂識所得義立為因等，自量不成。

if you posit an object found by a non-mistaken consciousness in that role, our own valid cognitions will not establish it.

故自續因及有法等，前已宣說不極成者，是「如所說義。」顯由此門立為不成。

Therefore, autonomous reasons and subjects are not established. This is what we explained above, and it is the meaning of Candrakirti's phrase, "the points we have just made." Bhāvaviveka himself asserts that this kind of analysis leads to positing that a syllogism's reason is not established.

清辯論師如何許者，謂於如
- p.493 -
來如是說故，由二諦門而為推察。

To show how Bhāvaviveka asserts this, Candrakirti cites Bhavaviveka's analysis in terms of the two truths [conventional and ultimate] of his opponent's reason, "because the Tathâgata said so."

有說此義，謂征難云如來是說世俗說故立為因耶，勝義說故立為因耶，全非論義。

Contrary to the interpretations proposed above, that analysis is not at all meant as an analysis of whether the stated reason is "because the Tathâgata has said so conventionally" or "because the Tathâgata has said so ultimately."

如前自立有法，謂不可加實妄差別，若異此者，便有立敵隨一不成，於因喻等亦許如是。

Why? As explained above, it is Bhāvaviveka's position that you must posit the subject without qualifying it either as real or unreal. Just as Bhāvaviveka accepts that subjects with such qualification would not be established for one or the other of the parties, he likewise accepts that such is the case for the reason, the example, and so forth.

於斯粗顯似破之理，巧慧圓滿，若此論師豈容錯誤。

Therefore, if Bhāvaviveka had faulted the essentialist's reason by applying qualifications such as "conventionally" and "ultimately," his argument would be a gross self-contradiction. How could this consummate scholar make such an error?

故是問云﹕「如來說故彼因之義二諦為何。」

Therefore, the correct interpretation of Bhavaviveka's argument is as follows: Which of the two truths is the referent of the reason "because the Tathâgata said so"?

若是世俗自不許爾，於自不成。

If it is the conventional one, it is not established for you, the essentialist, since you do not accept that the reason refers to a conventional object;

若是勝義，我於勝義，破果從其有因無因及二俱生，故我不成。

and if it is the ultimate, it is not established for me, since I refute the ultimate production of an effect from a cause that is existent, nonexistent, or both, as well as production that is causeless.

不許俱非二諦義故，無須明破。

Since neither party accepts that there is an object that is neither of the two truths, it is not necessary for Bhavaviveka to clear that up.

今自立云，是大種故。

You may interpret Bhāvaviveka's question to his opponent as, "When you say 'because it is an element,' which of the two truths is the element that is posited as the reason?" This interpretation is correct in that it is just like what we have explained above.

亦當如前反詰彼云，彼因大種，二諦為何，若問「二諦大種立何為因，」是全未解立者之意。

However, if you claim that Bhāvaviveka is asking, "In terms of which of the two truths [i.e., ultimately or conventionally] is the element stated as the reason?" then you completely misunderstand the position of the opponent [of the 《Clear Words》, that is, Bhavaviveka]."

如是詰問二諦為何，若是勝義雖自不成，然是世俗云何可說於他不成。

If that is what Bhāvaviveka meant, then how could he say to his opponent, "Of the two truths, which is it? If the ultimate, then it is not established for us, and yet, if conventional, it is not established for the other party?"

若不爾者，立諸內處為有法時，世俗有故，亦應敵者不極成故。

If it were possible to claim that Bhāvaviveka's analysis refers to things existing ultimately and conventionally, then since the internal sensory sources that he posits as the subject in his syllogism refuting ultimate production exist conventionally, that subject would not be established for those essentialist opponents.

若爾如所說過，清辯論師為如何許，以二諦理推求他因耶。

Well then, how can Candrakirti claim that Bhavaviveka accepts "the points we have just made" through his use of the two truths to analyze the reason given by the essentialist?

茲當宣說，此論師意以無錯亂識所得，名為勝義。

I shall explain. Here Candrakirti is of the opinion that what is found by a non-mistaken consciousness is the ultimate

以錯亂識所得名為世俗。

and what is found by a mistaken consciousness is the conventional.

問云「二諦為何」，與問二識何者所得，同一扼要。

This being the case, the question, "Which of the two truths is it?" is conceived of as a question regarding which of the two consciousnesses it is that finds the reason; it has to be one of these two options.

以所立因義，俱非真俗因即不成，與所立因義俱非錯不錯亂二識所得，因亦不成二理相等，故說是此自許，非親許也。

For, if the object stated as a reason is neither the conventional nor the ultimate, then that reason cannot be established; also, if the object stated as a reason is not an object found by either a non-mistaken or a mistaken consciousness, then the object stated as the reason cannot be established. In that the reasons are parallel, Candrakirti states that Bhavaviveka himself accepts that his reason, "because of existing," is not established, but he does not say that Bhavaviveka accepts this explicitly.

次說「故立實事法為因」別說實法，清辯論師自立因中，有是無錯亂現量親成，及有以無錯現量為究竟能立，然此論師正為破彼。

That is why Candrakirti, in his 《Clear Words》, specifies "reified thing" when he states, "in any argument that posits a reified thing as the reason." The master Bhavaviveka believes that, of the reasons he posits, some are directly established by non-mistaken perception, while others are not, but are proofs that finally derive from non-mistaken perception. This master [Candrakirti] refutes this.

如前引說中觀師不許他宗，謂理不應許自相之義，為證此故，
- p.494 -
引「若由現等義」等文，說無能量自相之量，是對清辯論師弟子而成立故。

To prove that it is incorrect to accept objects that exist by way of their intrinsic character, the earlier citation from the 《Clear Words》, "Mādhyamikas do not accept others' positions," —quotes passages such as the Refutation of Objections stanza that begins, "If perception and so forth...." By drawing from such citations the conclusion that there are no valid cognitions that perceive intrinsic character, Candrakirti aims to prove this point to the partisans of master Bhavaviveka's system.

◎第二自不同過。

>1.3.2.2.1.2.2 Why the faults we find in autonomous arguments do not apply to us.

若謂於他比量，說有有法及因不成等過。

Do our arguments not have the same faults that we find in others' arguments, such as the subjects and reasons not being established?

於自比量，豈非亦轉，是故於他不應征難。

And if they do, should we not refrain from finding contradictions in others' arguments?

答云，他有彼過，是因他許自續比量，我等不許自續比量，故無彼過。

The reason others have those faults lies in their acceptance of autonomous arguments. [The 《Clear Words》] states that since we do not accept autonomous arguments, we do not have those faults.

此中比量是說論式。

Here, the term "arguments" refers to syllogisms.

若許自續，則立自相之量先須立敵極成，次以彼量立敵二家成立三相再成所立。

If you accept autonomous syllogisms, then you must accept that both parties agree that there are valid cognitions that are valid in regard to intrinsic character. It is therefore necessary to prove the probandum by having both parties establish the three criteria with those non-mistaken valid cognitions.

若無比量，則有法等皆不得成。

But since such valid cognitions do not exist, the subject and the other parts of the autonomous syllogism cannot be established.

若不許自續，則依實事師他自所許比量而成，於自不須以比量成故。

If you do not accept autonomous syllogisms, then you may allow the essentialist to use that kind of valid cognition to establish the subject, etc., but you yourself do not need to establish the subject, etc. with those valid cognitions.

諸論中所說比量，亦皆唯為破除他宗是他彼量，非自續量。

Therefore, the arguments found in texts such as the 《Clear Words》 are "arguments based on what the other party accepts"; their sole purpose is to refute the other party's thesis. They are not autonomous arguments.

如中論第三品云﹕「此見有自體，於自不能見，若不能自見，云何能見他。」

For example, the third chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
Sight does not see
Its own self.
How can what does not see itself
See something else?

如以不能自見為因，成立眼等不能見他，自許此因宗之見他，無性中觀師亦許，此等量式名他比量。

This is like the argument that uses an eye's not seeing itself as a reason to prove that an eye does not see other things. In this case, the reason is accepted by the other party while Mādhyamikas also accept the thesis—that the seeing of other things lacks essential existence. Such a syllogism is called "an inference based on what others accept."

《顯句論》云﹕「我等不用自續比量，以諸比量唯破他宗而為果故。」

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 states:
We do not use autonomous arguments because the refutation of others' theses is the only effect of our arguments.

此許立量皆非自續，及許唯為破除他宗，故非全不立量。

This means that the syllogisms he uses are not autonomous syllogisms. He does not say that he does not use syllogisms, for he does accept those that have as their sole purpose the refutation of others' theses.

安立量式破他宗者，如彼又云﹕「謂他分別眼是能見，彼亦許眼是不自見法，若無見他法，則許不生。

The very next passage of the Clear Words states how he uses syllogisms to refute their theses: Those who think that the eye sees other things also hold that the eye does not see itself. They also believe that if the eye did not have the quality of seeing other things, it would not see.

是故破云，若彼彼法不能見自，則彼彼法不能見他，譬如瓶等。眼亦不能見自，故此亦不見他。故不見自，而見青等相違之他，違自比量，是以他已成比量而為破除。」

So we argue: "Anything that does not see itself does not see other things either, as in the case of a pot. The eye also does not see itself; therefore, it too cannot see other things. Therefore, its seeing other things, such as blue, contradicts its not seeing itself. Your position is contradicted by this argument based on what you accept." This is how an argument that is established for them refutes their position.

在敵者名自許，觀待立者諸中觀師名曰他許，二同一義，

When "what you accept" is addressed to the opponent, it is the same as saying "what others accept" from the point of view of the Madhyamika proponent.

立他許量破除邪執，極為切
- p.495 -
要，故當細說。

This is our procedure for refuting misconceptions by stating a syllogism based on what others accept. As this is very important, I will explain it in detail.

言「他已成」者，非謂有法眼同喻瓶不自見因，及所立法不見青等，自宗不許，唯是他宗，故因三相名唯他成。

The phrase, "that is established for them," at the end of that passage does not mean that we do not, in our system, accept (1) the subject-the eye, (2) the example-the pot, (3) the reason—that it does not see itself, and (4) the predicated quality—that it does not see blue, etc. Nor does it mean that the reason, pervasion, and so forth are established only for the opponent since they are simply what others assert.

若爾云何，彼等自宗亦許，然能成立彼等之量，若量自性雖於名言自宗亦無。

What does it mean? Even though we do accept these four in our own system, our system does not have, even conventionally, a valid cognition that establishes them and that understands its objects as existing essentially.

諸有性師成立彼時，定須彼量乃能成立，故無兩宗極成之量而量自性。

For proponents of intrinsic existence, the establishment of the subject, etc. definitely depends upon those being established by this kind of valid cognition. Therefore, there is no valid cognition which understands its object as existing essentially that can establish a common appearance of the subject, etc. for both parties.

故非共許，唯名他許或唯他成。

Hence, they are said not to be established for both parties; they are said to be based on what is accepted by, or established for, others.

若於名言亦無比量，則由彼所成，應如增益自性，為正理所害，則依彼等，云何能得中觀正見。

Query: If such valid cognitions do not exist even conventionally, then reason contradicts the acceptance of what they establish for the opponent, just as it contradicts the superimposition of intrinsic nature. How, then, could you find the Madhyamaka view in reliance upon their testimony?

若所依理為量所害，而能獲得無謬正見，一切邪宗亦當得故。

For, if it were possible to find an accurate philosophical view using arguments that valid cognition contradicts, then you could use all sorts of inaccurate tenets to find such a view.

謂彼敵者，許眼有法不自見因，如瓶之喻，并所立法不見青等，此執之境，自宗亦於名言許有。

Reply: In this case, even our own system accepts as conventionally existent the objects that the opponent apprehends as existing— namely, (1) the subject—the eye; (2) the reason—that it does not see itself; (3) the example—the pot; and (4) the predicate—that it does not perceive blue and such.

故以正理非能害彼。然由敵者未辨彼等有與有性二者差別，故執彼等由量自性量所成立。

So reason does not contradict these. Nonetheless, since the opponent fails to distinguish between their existing and their existing essentially, reason does contradict the conceit that valid cognition establishes objects that it understands as essentially existent.

於彼執境正理違害，豈以正理破他身中無損名言諸識所成。

Still, reason cannot refute what is established by the unimpaired conventional consciousnesses in the opponent's mind-stream.

故自他宗未能共許能量自性之量，故非自續所能成立，唯當顯他自許相違。

Therefore, since that essentialist system and our system do not agree as to whether there is valid knowledge which understands objects to be essentially existent, we do not prove things to them with autonomous arguments; rather, we simply expose the contradictions within their own assertions.

此如前立他許量式，眼有法上不能自見之因，於名言可有。

How is this done? Let us take the example mentioned above of a syllogism based on what others accept. The reason is that the subject, the eye, does not see itself—does exist conventionally,

其有自性能見青等，於有法上名言亦無，故前能破後。

but essentially seeing things like blue does not exist even conventionally. Therefore, the former can be used to refute the latter.

若於眼上因及所破，有則俱有，無則俱無，彼二豈成能破所破。

In the case of the eye, (1) the reason, not seeing itself, and (2) the predicate of the refutation, not seeing other things, are either the same in that both exist or the same in that both do not exist. So how could either contradict the existence of the other?

故他比量之有法及法因等須名言有，非唯由他許有便足，眼等有法他已許有，中觀論師何須更成。

Therefore, in a syllogism based on others' acceptance, the subject, predicate, and reason must be things that exist conventionally; the mere fact that an opponent claims that something exists is not adequate. The opponents themselves accept the existence of those subjects, such as the eye, as well as the reasons and examples. Therefore, why should the Mādhyamika have to prove them?

若強抵賴謂我不成，更當成者，是則全無不賴之事，與此辯論徒勞無果，誰有智者與斯對論。

If they dishonestly disavow what they actually accept, and say, "Since they are not established for us, please establish them," that would mean that there was nothing that they were not prepared to disavow, and it would be pointless to argue with them. Who could ever help them?
- p.496 -

◎此又有說，若由他許眼不自見及見青等有自性體，顯示相違，其相違義由何而知。

Objection: You claim to expose a contradiction between the opponents' assertion that the eye does not see itself and the opponents' assertion that the eye's seeing blue and such has an essential or intrinsic nature. But what kind of cognition understands the contradiction?

若相違義由量成者，須兩極成，則不應說是他所許。

If it is a valid cognition that establishes the contradiction, it would have to establish it for both parties, so it would not be "based on what others accept."

若由他許立相違者，則他自許不能自見及能見他，二不相違，故以他許而立相違不應道理。

If you posit the contradiction simply by its being asserted, since the opponents accept the eye's not seeing itself and its seeing something else as non-contradictory, it is untenable to use their assertion to posit a contradiction.

若由自許立相違者，太為過失。

If you posit them as contradictory on the basis of your own assertion, this leads to utter absurdity.

以於敵者云何可說，汝許此義不相違者不應正理，

How can you say to the opponents that it is incorrect for them to accept these two positions as non-contradictory because you assert that they are contradictory?

我等說此犯相違故。此過非有。若不自見而有自性，犯相違過是由量成，非唯他許而為安立。

Reply: Our position does not suffer from this fault. That the eye does not see itself contradicts its having an essential or intrinsic nature; valid cognition establishes this contradiction, so it is not posited through simply being asserted.

若爾，於他顯示彼量，令其了知相違便足，何須依止他所許耶。

Query: If it is possible to teach that valid cognition to the opponents and for them to then ascertain the contradiction, why is it necessary to rely on what they accept?

於實事師成立相違之量，須待彼許自性乃能成立。

Reply. As the essentialist sees it, for something to be a valid cognition that proves the contradiction, it must understand an essentially existent object.

若彼不許唯由自許，如何於彼能成相違。

But how can we prove the contradiction by accepting for our own part something that does not exist?

若他已許所量無性及立能量無相違過，則由彼量成立相違他已獲得通達諸法無性正見，何須更成，若不自見見有自性而為相違。

Once we have shown them that there is no contradiction in positing something as a valid cognition even though its object lacks essential or intrinsic nature, this type of valid cognition will prove it to them. They will then have found the view that knows that phenomena lack intrinsic nature. So at that point there would be no need to prove to them that if something does not see itself, this contradicts its seeing essentially.

故欲通達月稱師宗，當於彼等審細觀察而求定解。

Therefore, if you want to understand Candrakirti's system, you should analyze these points in detail and penetrate their meaning.

若爾云何依他自許，顯示若不自見定無見他性耶。

Query: But how do you use what they accept to demonstrate the workings of the pervasion—that what does not see itself does not essentially see other things?

若佛護論師說，「譬如有水見地滋潤，由有火故見水溫熱，由有蔻花見衣香馥，共見定須水等三上有潤等三，汝亦自許，如是諸法若有自性，自性於自理當先有，次於餘法乃見有彼。若先於自不見有者，云何於餘而見有彼。如於蔻花不見惡香，於彼香衣亦無惡臭。」

Reply: This should be explained as in Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》:
For example, through association with water, earth is perceived to be wet; through association with fire, water is perceived as hot; and through association with jasmine flowers, a clothis perceived as fragrant. We see that those perceptions of earth as wet, etc. are contingent upon perceptions of wetness, heat, and fragrance in water, fire, and jasmine flowers respectively. This is something that you yourself accept. Likewise, if things had some essential or intrinsic nature, you would have to perceive that intrinsic nature in regard to the thing itself, and only then could you perceive it in some other associated thing. If you did not first perceive that in the thing itself, then, when it is associated with something else, how could you see it there? For example, if you do not perceive a bad smell in jasmine flowers, then you will not perceive a stench in cloth that has been associated with them.

此就敵者自許正理，隨有逆無先令決定，次合法時，

Using examples that are acceptable and familiar to his opponents, he leads them to certainty about the pervasion and counter-pervasion and then applies them to the case at hand.

「是故於眼若有見性先於自見，次色等合而見色等
- p.497 -
乃應正理。

If the eye had some seeing-essence, then its sight of itself should be noticed first, and only then would it be possible to notice that it sees such things as forms, and to notice that it sees the component of form within composite things.

然由彼眼不見自故亦不見他。」

But since the eye does not see itself, it does not see other things. This is how we demonstrate the pervasion using what others accept.

《四百論》亦云﹕「若法有自性，先當於自顯，是則眼於眼，何故而不取。」

Also, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 states:
If the natures of all things
First appear within the things themselves,
Then why should the eye
Not also apprehend itself?

◎若謂如火不自燒而能燒他，如是眼不自見而能見他亦無相違。

Objection: Fire burns other things, even though it does not burn itself. Likewise, it is not contradictory for the eye to see other things, even though it does not see itself.

非是總破火能燒木，眼能見色，是破眼有見他之性。

Reply: We do not broadly refute that fire burns fuel or that the eye merely sees forms; instead we refute that the eye essentially sees other things.

若如是者，須以火有燒木自性而為同喻，爾時引喻等同所立，不應道理。

As this is so, your example will have to be that fire essentially burns fuel. Consequently, your example is wrong, just as what you are trying to prove is wrong.

謂火與木若有自性，自性不出或一或異。

If fire and fuel both had essential or intrinsic nature, then they would have to be either of one nature or of different natures;

二者為何，若是一者火當自燒，復云何成火是能燒木是所燒。

so which is it? If they are of one nature, then fire would burn itself; also, how could fire be the burning agent and the fuel the object that is burned?

若能成者，今我翻云，火是所燒木是能燒，當如何答。

Suppose that you insist that they could be. If someone were to argue that fire is the burnt object and fuel is the burning agent, what rebuttal could you give?

若性異者，則無木時火當可得，如無馬時可得其牛。

If they have different natures, fire could be present even without fuel, just as oxen can be present without horses.

《四百論》云，「火即燒熱性，非熱何能燒，是故薪非有，除彼火亦無。」

As Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 states:
Fire burns something that is hot.
If something is not hot, how can it be burning?
Therefore, there is nothing called "fuel" apart from fire,
And except for that fuel, there can be no fire.

如是於燒，若許自性，既不自燒不應燒他，如是若許眼有見性，既不自見不應見他，前過未移，由見如是為許自性所說過難，即能棄捨執有性宗。

So if you claim that burning has essential or intrinsic nature, it follows that what does not burn itself cannot burn other things. Likewise, if you claim that the eye has seeing as its intrinsic nature, you have to accept that if it does not see itself, it cannot see other things. Hence, the above faults do not budge. When one sees such critiques of the belief in intrinsic nature, one gives up tenets that conceive of the existence of essential or intrinsic nature.

次亦能知無自性中，能作所作皆悉應理，辨了無與無性差別，故亦能分有性與有。又能通達無性之量，而量無性所量事等。

One can then understand that objects and agents are tenable in the absence of intrinsic nature; hence, one distinguishes the absence of intrinsic existence from nonexistence. Consequently, one also distinguishes intrinsic existence from existence, so one knows that valid cognitions that have no intrinsic nature comprehend objects that have no intrinsic nature, and so forth.

通達火薪無性之量，彼非現量當許是比，若爾所依因為何等耶。

Query: The valid cognitions that know that fire and fuel lack intrinsic nature cannot be perceptions, and thus you have to believe that they are inferences. If that is so, what reasoning are they based upon?

由見有性不出一異，破一異性定無自性，即成二相。

Reply: If things like fire and fuel have intrinsic nature, they must be either the same or different. After you have seen this, you see that a refutation of both intrinsic natures that are the same and intrinsic natures that are different must entail the absence of intrinsic nature. This fulfills the first two criteria of a correct reason.

決定了解無一異性，即宗法性，故有三相之因。

Then, the ascertainment that there is no intrinsic nature that is the same or different fulfills the third criterion, the reason's presence in the subject. Therefore, it is a reason that fulfills the three criteria for being a correct reason capable of inducing inferential knowledge.

由此為依，決定火薪無自相者，即是比量。

Based on that reason, one ascertains that fire and fuel lack intrinsic nature; this ascertainment is an inference.

由此當知前立他許三相量式及正引生比量之理。

In the case of the previously posited syllogism based on what others accept, you should understood that we use this same method to develop the three criteria and the corresponding inference.

若
- p.498 -
有自性，性應一異，若一性者，火應自燒。

In reductio form, the argument works as follows: "If fire and fuel had intrinsic nature, they would have to be either the same or different," and "If they are the same, then fire would burn itself," and so forth.

此等皆以他許為因，出他非樂，如是等類是為應成。

This form uses something that the other party accepts as a reason, drawing implications contrary to the other party's beliefs.

以此為例，諸餘應成皆當了知。

This example should also allow you to understand how to construct other reductio arguments.

由是敵者乃至未捨事實宗時，必待量度自性所量而成能量。

So as long as those opponents do not give up their essentialist tenets, they continue to believe that valid cognitions establish the referent objects of the various parts of a syllogism in reliance upon knowledge of things that essentially exist.

若時以量達無少法由自性成，即便棄捨事實宗見。

The moment that they know with valid cognition the essencelessness of any thing, they give up their essentialist tenets.

《明顯句論》云﹕「有以隨一所成比量，即彼比量而破他耶。

The Clear Words states:
Query: Still, does the refutation of the essentialists use an inference in which the subject, etc. are inferentially established for at least one of the two parties, even if not for both?

答，有謂以自成因而反破自非由他成，即於世間亦現見故。猶如世間有時立敵以證為量，由證語斷或勝或負，有時唯由自語而斷，非由他語，或勝或負，如其世間正理亦爾。唯世名言，於正理論正適時故。」

Reply: Yes. It uses areasoning that is established for the essentialists themselves, and not one that is established for the other party [i.e., the Madhyamikas], for that is what is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes who wins and who loses a dispute is decided through the testimony of a witness whom both parties accept as reliable. Sometimes, however, this may be decided using only their own testimony, without the need for someone else's testimony to determine who wins and who loses. This is true as much in the realm of philosophical reasoning as it is in the world, for it is only worldly convention that is at stake in philosophical treatises.

此說可以他許為因，擧喻引證。

This gives an example and an explanation to show that reasons based on what others accept are appropriate.

諸分別師，說於敵者，以何等量成立三相，立者亦須比量而成，故許立敵二者極成。

The logicians claim that the three criteria and the subject, etc. must be established both for the proponent and the opponent, for they say that any valid cognition used to establish the three criteria, etc. for the opponent must also establish these for the proponent.

又破彼欲，即此論云﹕「設謂能立能破，皆須二家共許，非隨一成，或猶豫性。」

Candrakirti refutes that. That same text states:
Objection: One can prove or disprove a statement of something that is definite for both parties. But you cannot do this, as you claim that there is doubt as to whether the subject, etc. are established for either or both parties.

彼亦當許如所宣說，依世比量，以教破者，非唯二家共許之教。

Reply: Even you who think this way should accept the method that we advocate, namely, that inference is based on the world's view of things. This means that when you use scripture to refute a certain point, you need not use only scriptures that are acceptable to both parties.

若爾云何，亦以自許，自義比量，於一切種。唯以自許力強，非是俱成。

Why not? Because you can use those that only they accept. What we infer on the opponents' own terms will always be established for the opponents. This method is trustworthy, whereas attempting to establish something for both parties is not.

故分別師所說之相，非所必須。諸佛亦以自許之理，於諸未知真實眾生，興饒益故。

That is why the definitions of the logicians are superfluous, for the buddhas help disciples who do not understand reality by using what those individuals hold or accept.

由是因緣，若以前說之量，立敵共成之因，成立所立，名自續因。

So, when the reason that is used to prove the probandum is established for both parties with the kind of valid cognition explained previously, this is an autonomous [or "Svatantra"] reason.

若不以彼，唯由敵者所許三相，成立所立名為應成。此乃論師所有意趣最極明顯。

When the reason is not established in that way and the probandum is proven using the three criteria that the other party, the opponent, accepts as being present, this constitutes the Prasañgika method. It is quite clear that this is what the master Candrakirti intended.

◎第二身生正見當隨誰行。

1.3.2.2.2 Which system to follow so as to develop the right philosophical view in your mind-stream.

如是隨聖父子大中觀師。若有應成自續二派，應隨誰進行
- p.499 -
耶，

The great Madhyamikas who follow the noble father Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Aryadeva split into two different systems: Prasañgika and Svatantrika. Which do we follow?

此中是隨應成派行。

Here, we are followers of the Prasañgika system.

此如前說，於名言中破除自性，破自性後，須善安立生死涅槃一切建立，於彼二理，當獲定解。

Moreover, as explained previously, we refute essential or intrinsic nature even conventionally; yet all that has been taught about cyclic existence and nirvāna must be fully compatible with that refutation. Therefore, you should find certain knowledge both of how essential existence is refuted and of how cyclic existence and nirvāna are still possible.

此二論師，論中數說，若許諸法有自性者，則以觀察實性正理可推察轉，與聖父子諸論善順。由見是故，當許彼宗，故如前說，當許應成宗派。

The texts of those two masters often say that you should conduct rational analysis that scrutinizes what things would be like if they were accepted as essentially or intrinsically existent. Seeing that the texts of the noble father and his spiritual son are in complete agreement on this, I accept that system. Accordingly, it is apparent that you should accept the Prāsangika position as explained above. The texts of those two masters often say that you should conduct rational analysis that scrutinizes what things would be like if they were accepted as essentially or intrinsically existent. Seeing that the texts of the noble father and his spiritual son are in complete agreement on this, I accept that system. Accordingly, it is apparent that you should accept the Prāsangika position as explained above.

◎ - p.500 -

菩提道次第廣論卷二十一終