菩提道次第廣論卷二十

第三明自宗所破分三，一　正明所破義，二　於餘所破加不加此之理，三　釋於所破應不應加勝義簡別。

1.3.2.1.3 How our system identifies the object of negation.
This has three parts:
1. The actual identification of the object to be negated
2. When to add qualifications to other objects of negation
3. Whether to add the qualification "ultimate" to the object of negation

今初

1.3.2.1.3.1 The actual identification of the object to be negated.

◎總所破事略有二種，謂道所破及理所破。

In general, with regard to objects of negation, there are objects negated by the path and objects negated by reason.

初如《辨中邊論》云﹕「於諸煩惱障，及以所知障，此攝一切障，盡此得解脫。」

As to the first of these, Maitreya's 《Separation of the Middle from the Extremes》 says:
There are teachings on afflictive obscuration
And on cognitive obscuration.
We hold that all obscurations are among these,
And when they are gone, you are free.

謂煩惱及所知二障，此所破事於所知有，此若無者，應一切有情不加功用而得解脫故。

Thus, there are afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations. These objects of negation do occur among objects of knowledge, for, if they did not exist, then all embodied beings would escape cyclic existence without exertion.

理所破者，如《迴諍論》云﹕「又有於化女，起實女邪執，以化而破除，今此亦如是。」

As for objects negated by reason, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
Someone thinks that an emanated
Woman is a woman.
Another emanation stops this wrong conception—
This is like that.

自釋中云﹕「若有士夫，於自性空變化婦女，謂是實女而起邪執，邪執彼故遂起貪愛。次有如來或如來弟子變一化身，以此化身遮彼邪執，如是我語空如變化，於一切法無性本空，等同化女，遮遣邪執為有自性。」

In his 《Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"》 he says:
A woman emanated by some being is empty of the nature of being a woman, but someone else wrongly thinks, "This is ultimately a woman." Therefore, due to that wrong conception, attachment arises. The Tathāgata or a śrāvaka of the Tathâgata emanates another emanation, and thereby stops that person's wrong conception.
Similarly, my words, which are empty like an emanation, stop any apprehension that anything exists intrinsically. All things, like the emanated woman, are empty and do not intrinsically exist.

此說邪執為所破事，及彼所執實有自性亦為所破，故有二種。

Thus he speaks of misconceptions as objects of negation and he also treats the intrinsic nature that they apprehend as an object of negation, making two kinds of objects to be negated.

然正所破厥為後者，以破顛倒心須先破彼所執境故。

However, the primary object of negation is the latter. For, in order to stop an inaccurate consciousness, you must first refute the object which that consciousness apprehends.

如緣起因破人法上所有自性，故此所破須所知中無，有則不能破故。

For instance, dependent-arising refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of persons and phenomena. This latter object of negation cannot be among objects of knowledge because, if it did exist, then it could not be refuted.

雖如是無，然能發生增益執有，故定須破。破除之理，亦非如以錘擊瓶，是於無令起知無定解。

Still, there are mistaken superimpositions that apprehend it as existing, so you must refute it. This refutation is not like destroying a pot with a hammer; rather, it is a matter of developing certain knowledge that recognizes the nonexistent as nonexistent.

若定解無，即能遮遣執有亂識。

When you develop certain knowledge that it does not exist, the mistaken consciousness that apprehends it as existing will stop.

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如是以理成立，亦非如種發芽先無新生，是於如是法起決定智，知其如是。

Similarly, using reason to establish something is not a matter of newly establishing something that did not exist before, like a seed producing a seedling. Rather, it is the development of certain knowledge that recognizes a phenomenon as it is.

《迴諍論》云，「雖無能破語，其無亦成立，然此語云無，令解非令除。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
What use is it to establish the negation
Of what does not exist anyway, even without words?
To answer that, the words "does not exist"
Cause understanding; they do not eliminate.

自釋中云﹕「雖無汝語，若無之滅亦本成立，何為更說一切諸法皆無自性，汝說彼語有何作為。

In his Commentary on that Nāgārjuna says:
Qualm: If you are establishing the negation of something that does not exist even without words, without saying anything, then what is the use of your words, "All things lack intrinsic nature"?

此當為釋說一切法皆無自性，非由此語令一切法成無自性，然說諸法皆無自性，是令了解破無自性。

Reply: The words, "All things lack intrinsic nature," do not cause things to lack intrinsic nature, but, in the absence of intrinsic nature, they do make it understood that things lack intrinsic nature.

譬如天授原未在家，有云家有天授，有於無彼說云其無，此語非令天授成無，唯顯天授家中非有。

For example, even though Devadatta is not in the house, someone says, "Devadatta is in the house." Someone else, in order to show that Devadatta is not there says, "Devadatta is not there." Those words do not cause Devadatta not to be there, but merely indicate that Devadatta is not in the house.

如是說云，諸法無性，非由此語令其諸法成無自性，然一切法皆無自性。

Similarly, the words, "Things lack intrinsic nature," do not cause things to lack intrinsic nature. All things lack intrinsic nature, like creatures in a magical illusion.

諸愚眾生，為無明蔽增益自性，如於幻士愚其原無士夫實體，唯為令解自性非有。

However, childish beings are confused about the absence of real essence in all things, so we make them understand that there is no intrinsic nature in the things that they, confused by ignorance, reify as having intrinsic nature.

故汝說云，若性非有，即無語言，不假語言，自性非有亦極成立。說無自性此語何為。此諸言說皆不應理。」

Therefore, what you have said—that if there is no intrinsic nature, what use are the words, "There is no intrinsic existence," inasmuch as things would be established as without intrinsic nature even without any words, without saying anything—is not reasonable.

此說極顯，當如是知。

You should understand this in accordance with this very clear statement.

故有說云，有不能破，無不須破，離諸破立，以多破立正理觀察，唯練名言，此全未見正理及道破立影像相違亂言，自現宣說，有不能破無不須破之因，破斥他人破立觀察，而謂不應破立故。

Some hold that to conduct the extensive rational analysis required for refutations and proofs is to meander among mere conventional words, for all phenomena are devoid of refutation and proof, in that, if something exists, it cannot be refuted, and, if it does not exist, it need not be refuted. This is a nonsensical collection of contradictions, showing neither general awareness of how reason establishes and negates things nor general awareness of how the path establishes and negates things. For, you claim that refutation and proof should not be done, while you yourself are refuting your opponent's use of analysis that involves refutation and proof, citing as your reason, "If something exists, it cannot be refuted, and if it does not exist, it need not be refuted."

又以所立之因，破斥他許之破立，不應正理。有不能破無不須破故。

Furthermore, your stated reason is not an appropriate refutation of an opponent who holds that it is necessary to conduct refutation and proof because according to you, if something exists, it cannot be refuted, and if it does not exist, it need not be refuted.

以正理破者，是為遮遣顛倒錯亂之分別。

We carry out refutations with excellent reasoning so as to stop inaccurate and mistaken conceptions;

以正理立者，是能引發無倒定解之方便。故欲遣邪執及欲生正覺，定當隨行龍猛等之正理眾論，於無倒破立引生定解。

proof by reasoning is a technique for developing accurate and certain knowledge. Therefore, those who wish to stop the various inaccurate awarenesses and to develop the various accurate awarenesses should pursue the collections of arguments by authors such as Nāgārjuna and should develop minds that have accurate and certain knowledge of refutation and proof.

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◎如是以正理破，若是由破倒執，為欲引發無倒定解者，當以正理破何心之境耶。

Question: If, as you say, refutation by means of reasoning is done in order to develop accurate and certain knowledge by eradicating inaccurate cognitive processes, then reason will cancel out an object as it is apprehended by a certain kind of mind. What is that mind?

總所破分別，雖無邊際，然以何顛倒分別而為一切過失之根本，當先明彼破其所執之境。

Reply: In general, there are a limitless number of conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend the object of negation; however, you should carefully identify the incorrect conceptual consciousness that is the root of all faults and defects and you should eradicate its referent object.

若能破彼則一切過失悉遮遣故，經說貪等諸餘對治，是一分之對治，說無明對治是一切之對治。

For, if that is stopped, then all faults and defects will be stopped. Moreover, the remedies set forth in sutra for other afflictions, such as attachment, cure a portion of the afflictions, whereas the remedies set forth for ignorance cure all afflictions.

無明即是一切過失之根本，

Therefore, ignorance is the basis of all faults and defects.

如《明顯句論》云﹕「佛依二諦說，契經等九部，就諸世間行，於此廣宣說。其為除貪說，不能斷瞋恚，為除瞋故說，亦非能盡貪，為斷慢等說，彼不壞餘垢，故彼非廣徧，彼皆無大義。若為斷癡說，彼盡壞煩惱，諸佛說一切，煩惱皆依癡。」

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
The teachings of the buddhas—the sets of sutras and so forth— are based on the two truths.
In nine types they rightly proclaim the vast remedies which correspond to worldly behavior.
Among these, those said to eliminate attachment do not extinguish hostility,
Those said to eliminate hostility do not extinguish attachment,
And those said to extinguish pride and so forth do not overcome other defilements.
Therefore they are not broadly effective, and those scriptures are not of great significance.
Those said to extinguish delusion overcome all afflictions;
The conquerors have said that all afflictions are based upon delusion.

何者為癡，謂執內外諸法由自相生，增益自性之心，此為無明。

What is this delusion like? It is ignorance, which in this context is an awareness that mistakenly superimposes intrinsic nature; it apprehends internal and external phenomena as existing by way of their own intrinsic character.

如《四百論釋》云﹕「若識增益諸法自性，由彼染污無知增上貪著諸法，是為流轉生死種子，於一切種永滅除故，即便安立生死還滅。

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says: It is said that one becomes attached to things by the power of an afflictive misunderstanding, a consciousness that superimposes an essence of things, and that one stops cyclic existence by totally stopping that which serves as the seed for the process of cyclic existence.

為顯此義故說頌云，『三有種為識，境為彼行境，若見境無我，三有種當滅。』

In order to indicate this, the 《Four Hundred》 says: The seed of worldly existence is a consciousness; Objects are its sphere of activity. When you see that objects lack self, You negate the seed of worldly existence.

此顯由見境無自性，於一切種破除貪因三有種識，安立聲聞獨覺及得無生法忍菩薩生死還滅。」

Hence, Aryadeva holds that by seeing objects as lacking intrinsic nature, you totally stop the seed of cyclic existence, the consciousness that causes attachment. This stops cyclic existence for Śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have attained forbearance with regard to the teaching of non-production.

又即說彼是為實執，如身根於身，愚癡徧安住，故壞癡能壞一切諸煩惱。

This is also called the conception of true existence. For Aryadeva's Four Hundred says: Just as the tactile sensory faculty pervades the body, Delusion lies within all the afflictions. Therefore, by destroying delusion You will destroy all afflictions.

《四百論釋》云﹕「癡於諸法分別諦實極愚蔽故，遂於諸法增益實性而轉。」

Commenting on this verse, Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas" says:
Because of confusion brought on by the thought that things truly exist as they appear, delusion acts to superimpose upon things an essence of true existence.

◎如是若無明是生死根本，則《入中論》與《顯句論》，說薩迦耶見為生死根本不應道理，主
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要之因無容二故。

Qualm: If, as you say, ignorance is the root of cyclic existence, then it would be incorrect for Candrakirti to explain in the 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 and in the《Clear Words》 that the view of the perishing aggregates as "I" and "mine" is the root of cyclic existence. For, there cannot be two primary causes of cyclic existence.

其無明與薩迦耶見，餘師所許中士道時已宣說訖。

Reply: In the section on the person of medium capacity, I have already explained what other masters say about how to assert ignorance and the view of the perishing aggregates.

此說月稱論師所許，餘中觀師許為所知障之執法諦實，此許為無明，且是染污無明。

Therefore, here I will explain the assertions of the master Candrakirti. Other Mādhyamikas consider the conception of things as truly existent to be a cognitive obscuration; he asserts that such a conception is ignorance and, what is more, he asserts that it is afflictive ignorance.

如前所引《四百論釋》，說為染污。

For, as cited above, his 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 explains that the conception of true existence is afflictive.

《入中論釋》云﹕「由此能令諸有情類，於觀如所住事而起愚蒙，故愚癡無明，法非有性而強增益，於見自性障覆為性，名曰世俗。」

Also, his 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Because this causes living beings to be confused in their view of the actual state of things, it is delusion; ignorance mistakenly superimposes upon things an essence that they do not have It is constituted so as to block perception of their nature. It is a concealer.

又云﹕「如是由有支所攝染污無明增上力故，建立世俗諦。」

Also: Thus, conventional truths are posited through the force of the afflictive ignorance which is included within the factors of cyclic existence.

說為十二緣起初支，故是染污非所知障。

Thus, because he explains that it is the first of the twelve factors of dependent-arising, it is an affliction and not a cognitive obscuration.

若爾，何為所知障耶，此後當說。

What are the cognitive obscurations? This will be explained below.

故十二支中初無明支，是生死根本，又說薩迦耶見為生死根本者。

Therefore, he explains that the ignorance which is the first of the twelve factors is the root of cyclic existence and, within that, he also explains that the view of the perishing aggregates is the root of cyclic existence.

以無明是總，薩迦耶見是別，故不相違。

Since ignorance is the general category and the view of the perishing aggregates is an instance, there is no contradiction.

其無明者，謂明相違品，其明亦非任隨何明，是了無我真實義慧。

Ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, and this does not refer to just any knowledge, but to the wisdom that knows the reality that is selflessness.

其相違品，非唯無慧及所餘法，是須與彼相違執者，即增益有我。

The opposite of that cannot simply be the nonexistence of that wisdom, nor can it simply be something other than that wisdom; therefore, it is a conception that is that wisdom's contradictory equivalent. This is the superimposition of self.

此復有二，謂增益法我及增益補特伽羅我。

There are two types: the superimposition of an objective self and the superimposition of a personal self.

故法我執與補特伽羅我執，俱是無明。

Thus, both the conception of a personal self and the conception of an objective self are ignorance.

是故宣說薩迦耶見為餘一切煩惱根本，非不宣說無明為本。

Therefore, when he indicates that the view of the perishing aggregates is the root of all other afflictions, this does not mean that ignorance is not the root.

「乃至有蘊執，爾時有我執，」

Also, [Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》] says, "As long as you conceive of the aggregates, you will conceive of them as 'I'."

此說法我愚之無明，為補特伽羅我愚之因，顯示無明內中二執因果之理。

This means that the ignorance that is confusion in regard to an objective self causes confusion with regard to a personal self. Since this places the internal divisions of ignorance in a cause-and-effect relationship,

故說薩迦耶見除無明外，為餘一切煩惱根本，皆無相違。

it does not contradict the teaching that the view of the perishing aggregates is the root of all afflictions other than ignorance.

若不了知如是解釋論師意趣，則說生死有二根本，其相違過極難斷除。

If you do not understand this way of explaining what the master Candrakirti intended, then it is very difficult to dispel the false impression that he contradicted himself by explaining the root of cyclic existence in two different ways.

如是明無明之理，乃是龍猛菩薩所許。

Nāgārjuna the Protector also accepts this system of identifying ignorance.

如《七十空性論》云﹕「因緣所生法，若分別真實，佛說為無明，彼生十二支，
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見真知法空，無明則不生，此是無明滅，故滅十二支。」

For, his 《Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness》 says:
The Teacher said that ignorance
Is the conception that, in reality,
Things are produced from causes and conditions.
From this, the twelve factors arise.
Through seeing reality, you know
That things are empty; ignorance does not arise.
This is the cessation of ignorance.
Because of this, the twelve factors cease.

《中論》二十六品云﹕「若永滅無明，諸行當不生，能滅無明者，由知修真實。由前彼彼滅，後彼彼不生，純一大苦蘊，皆當如是滅。」

Also, the twenty-sixth chapter of his 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
When ignorance is stopped
Compositional activity will not arise at all.
That which stops ignorance
Is knowing and meditating on reality.
By stopping this and that earlier factor of dependent-arising,
This and that later factor will not arise.
In this way you thoroughly stop
The whole mass of suffering.

又與「乃至有蘊執」說執蘊為生死根本，極相符順。

This and the other passage just cited are in agreement and fit together very well with the line in Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》, "As long as you conceive of the aggregates...," which says that the root of cyclic existence is the conception of the aggregates as intrinsically existent.

又是聖天所許，如前所引「如身根於身」等，及「生死本為識」等，顯了宣說。

The noble Aryadeva also asserts this, as is clearly indicated by the passages cited earlier, "Just as the tactile sensory faculty pervades the body..." and also, "The root of cyclic existence is a consciousness...."

又阿闍黎於《中論》等盡其所說，破除所破，所有正理，一切皆為破除愚癡，於諸法上增益自性，而顯諸法皆無自性。

When the master Nāgārjuna refutes the object of negation in the 《Fundamental Treatise》, he gives all of his diverse arguments so as to refute an intrinsic nature—delusion's reification of phenomena as essentially existent—and to show that phenomena lack essence.

故所說種種正理，皆是唯為破無明執。

Thus, Nāgārjuna gives a wide range of arguments only for the sake of eradicating the way that ignorance apprehends things.

如《佛護論》云﹕「為何義故宣說緣起，

Buddhapalita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 says: What is the purpose of teaching dependent-arising?

答云，阿闍黎耶大悲為性，見諸有情為種種苦之所逼切，為解脫故，欲顯諸法真如實性，隨說緣起。

The master Nāgārjuna, whose very nature is compassion, saw that living beings are beset by various sufferings and assumed the task of teaching the reality of things just as it is so that they might be free. He therefore began teaching dependent-arising.

故云，見非真繫縛，見真實解脫。

For, it is said: Seeing what is not real, you are bound; Seeing the real, you are free.

何為諸法真實性，答曰﹕謂無自性。

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence.

諸不智者，由愚癡闇障蔽慧眼，而於諸法分別自性。

Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence in things

由是彼等遂起貪瞋，若時了知緣起，發慧光明除愚癡闇，由智慧眼照見諸法無自性性，爾時無所依處，貪瞋不生。」

and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them. When the illumination of the knowledge of dependent-arising clears away the darkness of delusion and the eye of wisdom sees the absence of essence in things, then there is no foundation for the other afflictions, and attachment and hostility do not develop.

第二十六品結合文云﹕「問云，汝已宣說以大乘數，轉入勝義，汝今當說以聲聞教轉入勝義，答曰﹕無明覆後有」等。

Also, in the transition to the twenty-sixth chapter, that same text says:

第二十七品結合文云﹕「問云，汝今當依順聲聞乘契經邊際，顯示惡見行相非有，答曰﹕說過去時生」等。

And, in the transition to the twenty-seventh chapter Buddhapālita says:

故佛護論師，亦許增益諸法自性，為十二支初支無明，及許聲聞獨覺證法無我，極為明顯。

These statements make it clear that the master Buddhapālita also asserts that the ignorance which is the first of the twelve factors of dependent-arising is the superimposition of intrinsic nature on things and that even Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know the selflessness of objects.

是故聲聞獨覺證法無性，最
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大能立，當知即此以法我執為十二支無明之理。

Therefore, you should understand that the great proof for showing that Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know that objects lack intrinsic nature is the fact that the conception of an objective self is counted as the ignorance that is among the twelve factors of dependent-arising.

《四百論》云﹕「縛為分別見，彼是此所破。」

Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says, "Conceptuality sees and you are bound; it should be stopped here."

其分別者，非說一切分別，是說增益諸法自性之分別。

Even the conceptuality mentioned in that statement does not refer to all conceptual consciousnesses whatsoever, but rather to conceptual consciousnesses that superimpose essential existence on phenomena.

《釋論》云﹕「分別者，謂增益非真自性之義。」

For, commenting on that passage, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says, "A conceptual consciousness superimposes an incorrect sense of intrinsic existence."

又許彼是染污無明，若說凡是「念此為此，」一切分別之境，皆是正理所破者，是全未詳細觀察。

Further, he asserts that it is afflictive ignorance. Hence, while there are those who claim that reason refutes the object of every conceptual consciousness that thinks, "This is such and such," they have done no detailed investigation of this matter.

若不爾者，其真實義，於諸異生非現見故，除分別外無餘方便能解空義。

If it were otherwise, then, since for ordinary beings the meaning of reality is hidden, they would have no way of apprehending the meaning of emptiness with a non-conceptual consciousness.

若謂一切分別之境，皆理所違害，則定智之境，亦如增益自性錯亂邪識。

Also, if the objects of every conceptual consciousness were contradicted by reason, then even the objects of certain knowledge would be like the intrinsic nature superimposed by a mistaken, wrong consciousness.

若爾，應無正見導赴涅槃，於中觀等論勤聞思等一切無果。

This would imply that there is no correct view leading to the state of nirvâna, whereby it would be pointless to do any study or reflection on the Madhyamaka texts.

《四百論》云﹕「言我般涅槃，非不空見空，如來說邪見，不能般涅槃。」

For, Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas says:
Seeing what is not emptiness as if it were emptiness,
Some say, "I will attain nirvâna," but they will not.
The tathâgatas said that
You do not reach nirvâna through wrong views.

又以前說無明所執之境為根本，自他宗部諸師，而更增益眾多差別。

Based on just this [intrinsic nature], the referent object of the way that ignorance apprehends things as explained above, essentialist schools—Buddhist and non-Buddhist—reify many different things.

若拔無明所執之境，如拔樹根，則由邪宗一切假立一切俱斷，故具慧者當知俱生無明所執之境，為所破之根本，不應專樂破除宗派妄計分別。

When you negate the referent of ignorance's cognitive process, you completely stop all of these tenet-driven reifications, as though you cut a tree at its root. Therefore, those who have the faculty of wisdom should understand that the referent object of innate ignorance is the basic object of negation and should not devote themselves merely to refuting imaginary constructs that are imputed only by the advocates of philosophical tenets.

以破所破者，非無事而尋事，是見邪分別心執所破事，繫縛有情流轉生死，故破其所境。能於生死繫縛一切有情者，是俱生無明故。

Refuting the object of negation in this way is not an idle pursuit. You see that living beings are bound in cyclic existence by a wrong conceptual consciousness that has the object of negation as its object and you then refute its object. What binds all living beings in cyclic existence is innate ignorance;

分別無明唯邪宗方有，為生死本不應理故。故能於此分別決定，極為切要。

acquired ignorance exists only among those who advocate philosophical tenets, so it cannot be the root of cyclic existence. It is extremely important to gain specific and certain knowledge of this point.

◎如是計執所破究竟之邪分別，即十二支之初支，俱生無明。

Hence, the ultimate wrong conceptual consciousness that conceives the object of negation is the innate ignorance which is the first of the twelve factors of dependent-arising.

分別所破，亦以彼為根本，唯是增益。故根識等無分別識，一切行相，終非正理之所能破。

Acquired objects of negation are merely superimpositions based on this. Thus, it is not at all the case that reason negates all of the cognitive processes through which non-conceptual consciousnesses—e.g., sensory consciousnesses—apprehend things.

故正理所破之心，唯屬分別
- p.462 -
意識。

Therefore, only conceptual mental consciousnesses have cognitive processes that are negated by reason;

後以二種我執或於我執所計之境，增益差別諸分別心，非謂一切分別。

more specifically, reason refutes the cognitive processes of the two conceptions of self and the cognitive processes of those conceptual consciousnesses that superimpose further attributes on objects that have been imputed by those two conceptions of self. It is not that reason refutes the cognitive processes of all conceptual consciousnesses of any kind.

由彼無明如何增益自性之理者，

Question: How does ignorance superimpose intrinsic nature?

總此論師之論中，雖於諸世俗義，亦云自性或自體等，設立多名。

Reply. In general, there appear in Candrakirti's texts many usages of verbal conventions such as "nature" or "essence" with regard to objects that exist only conventionally.

然此中者，謂於諸法或補特伽羅，隨一之境非由自心增上安立，執彼諸法各從自體，有本住性即是其相，如彼取境之諸法本體，或名曰我或名自性，是就假觀察而明。

However, here in the case of reification by ignorance, there is, with regard to objects, be they persons or other phenomena, a conception that those phenomena have ontological status—a way of existing—in and of themselves, without being posited through the force of an awareness. The referent object that is thus apprehended by that ignorant conception, the independent ontological status of those phenomena, is identified as a hypothetical "self" or "intrinsic nature",

如云「此皆無自性，是故我非有，」

For, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
All of this is without its own power;
Therefore there is no self.

《四百論釋》云，「若法自性自體自在，不仗他性。」

Commenting on this, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
It is that which exists essentially, intrinsically, autonomously, and without depending on another....

此說彼諸異名，不仗他者，非謂不仗因緣，是說有境名言之識為他，非由彼增上安立為不仗他。

Thus, he says that those are synonyms. "Without depending on another" does not mean not depending on causes and conditions. Instead, "other" refers to a subject, i.e., a conventional consciousness, and something is said not to depend on another due to not being posited through the force of that conventional consciousness.

言自在者，謂彼諸境各本安住不共體性，即彼亦名自性自體。

Therefore, "autonomously" refers to the nature of an object that has its own unique ontological status or manner of being. It is just this that is called "essence" or "intrinsic nature."

此如計繩為蛇，其蛇唯就妄執之心假計而立。若觀何為彼蛇自性，則於境上蛇全非有，故彼差別無可觀察。

Take, for example, the case of an imaginary snake that is mistakenly ascribed to a rope. If we leave aside how it is ascribed from the perspective that apprehends a snake and try to analyze what the snake is like in terms of its own nature, since a snake is simply not present in that object, its features cannot be analyzed.

如是諸法，亦唯於名言識，如所顯現觀察安立，若於境上觀察諸法本性如何，全無所有，

It is similar with regard to these phenomena. Suppose that we leave aside analysis of how they appear—i.e., how they appear to a conventional awareness—and analyze the objects themselves, asking, "What is the manner of being of these phenomena?" We find they are not established in any way.

不如是執，謂非唯名言識增上安立，執彼諸法各由自體有可量見本安住性。

Ignorance does not apprehend phenomena in this way; it apprehends each phenomenon as having a manner of being such that it can be understood in and of itself, without being posited through the force of a conventional consciousness.

如《四百論釋》云﹕「唯有分別方可名有，若無分別則皆非有，此等無疑如於盤繩假計為蛇，定非由其自性所成。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
Without any doubt, what exists only through the presence of conceptual thought, and does not exist without conceptual thought, definitely does not exist essentially—as in the case of a snake that is imputed to a coiled rope.

此說自性所成之相。

Thus Candrakirti states how phenomena do not essentially exist.

故若非由內心增上安立，於其境上就自性門有所成就，說彼為我或名自性。

Therefore, what exists objectively in terms of its own essence without being posited through the power of a subjective mind is called "self" or "intrinsic nature."

若於差別事補特伽羅境上無此，名補特伽羅無我。

The absence of this quality in the person is called the selflessness of the person;

若於眼等法上無者，名法無我。

its absence in phenomena such as eyes, ears, and so forth is called the selflessness of objects.

由此當知，若於法上
- p.463 -
及補特伽羅執有此性，是二我執。

Hence, one may implicitly understand that the conceptions of that intrinsic nature as present in persons and objects are the conceptions of the two selves.

如《四百論釋》云﹕「所言我者，謂若諸法不依仗他，自性自體。若無此者，是為無我。此由法與補特伽羅有差別故，當知有二名，法無我及補特伽羅無我。」

It is as 《Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
"Self" is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The nonexistence of that is selflessness. Because of the division into objects and persons, it is understood as twofold: a "selflessness of objects" and a "selflessness of persons."

◎若謂執補特伽羅有自相，為補特伽羅我執，不應道理。

Qualm: The conception of persons as existing by way of their intrinsic character cannot be a conception of a personal self.

若不爾者，緣他補特伽羅執有自相，亦應是補特伽羅我執。

For if it were, then even observing persons other than oneself and conceiving of them as existing by way of their own intrinsic characteristic would be a conception of a personal self.

若爾應成薩迦耶見，彼不執我薩迦耶見，不應理故。

If you admit this, then, while it must be a view of the perishing aggregates, it cannot be a view of the perishing aggregates insofar as it is not a conception that thinks, "I."

執補特伽羅有自性者，理應許為補特伽羅我執，如前說補特伽羅有性，為補特伽羅我故。

Reply. As explained earlier, Candrakirti says that an intrinsic nature in persons is a self of persons, so one must accept that a conception of the person as intrinsically existent is a conception of a self of persons.

然非補特伽羅我執，皆是薩迦耶見。

However, a conception of a self of persons is not necessarily a view of the perishing aggregates.

若爾何為薩迦耶見我執，薩迦耶見分別我執。如正量部一分說緣蘊執我，雖無決定，

What is needed in order to have a conception of self that is a view of the perishing aggregates? In the case of the conception of self that is an acquired view of the perishing aggregates, there is no definite rule, as there are many—including some among the Sammitiya schools—who do, as a result of their philosophies, apprehend a self when they observe the aggregates.

然俱生我執，《入中論》中破蘊為所緣，釋說緣依蘊假立之我，故非緣蘊，唯緣補特伽羅。

However, in the case of the innate view of the perishing aggregates, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 refutes that the aggregates are the observed object and his 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says that the dependently imputed self is the observed object. Hence, an innate view of the perishing aggregates does not take the aggregates as its object of observation, but rather observes the mere person.

復須可執為我之補特伽羅，故他補特伽羅亦非所緣。

Moreover, it must be a person who is a basis for the arising of the thought "I." Thus, a person of another continuum of mental and physical aggregates is not the object of observation.

於此所緣執相云何，《入中論釋》云﹕「薩迦耶見執我我所行相而轉。」

With regard to how that object of observation is apprehended, Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Concerning that, a view of the perishing aggregates operates within thoughts of "I" and "mine."

謂非但執有自相，須執為我。

Thus, it is not simply a conception of intrinsic existence, i.e., existence by way of intrinsic character; it must be a conception thinking "I."

《入中論釋》云﹕「唯薩迦耶見是所應斷，此由悟入無我之我，即能斷除。」

The Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary also says:
Just the view of the perishing aggregates is to be eliminated, and it is eliminated upon understanding the selflessness of the self.

此說通達所緣之我，無其實我或無自性，由其行相相違而斷，故是執著慧相違品，此後是執補特伽羅有自性，即是執有自相之我，執有我所薩迦耶見，亦當了知。

Thus Candrakirtisays that you eliminate the view of the perishing aggregates by knowing the selflessness—the non-intrinsic existence—of the self that is its object of observation, thereby contradicting the way that it is apprehended by the view of the perishing aggregates. Hence, the view of the perishing aggregates must apprehend the opposite of that wisdom which knows selflessness. Moreover, since a view of the perishing aggregates is a conception of the person as essentially existent, it is a conception of an "I" that exists by way of its intrinsic character. Using this as an example, you should be able to understand the view of the perishing aggregates that is a conception of "mine."

若不執為我及我所，唯執實有補特伽羅，即愚補
- p.464 -
特伽羅我之無明，非不染污。

Even when they do not conceive "I" or "mine," conceptions of the person as substantially existent are still cases of ignorance that misconceives a self of persons, so it is not the case that they are not afflictions.

由是因緣，以有自性所立之我及念我心取境之我，二中初者是正理所破，後者許名言有，故非所破。

As in the passage just cited, "self" refers to mere essential or intrinsic existence and also refers to the object of an awareness that simply thinks, "I." Of these two, the former is the object negated by reason, whereas the latter is accepted conventionally, so it is not refuted.

此顯不破薩迦耶見俱生所緣，然非不破彼執行相自性之我。

Therefore, this passage indicates that you do not refute the object which is observed by the innate view of the perishing aggregates. However, the way that its aspect is apprehended is as an essentially existent "I," so it is not that you do not refute that way of apprehending.

譬如不破執聲為常所緣之聲，然破彼執境之聲常，無有相違。

For example, you do not refute the sound that is the object observed by a conception that sound is permanent, but you do refute the permanent sound that is the referent object of that conception. It is not a contradiction; this case is similar.

故聖父子及此二論師之論中，「若自性有，若自體有，若自相有，若是實有。」

The noble father Nāgārjuna, his spiritual son Aryadeva, and the two masters [Buddhapālita and Candrakirti] preface their refutations by saying, "If things existed intrinsically," "If things existed essentially," "If things existed by way of their own intrinsic character," and "If things existed substantially."

其自性等應知如前所說。

You should understand that the "intrinsic nature" and so forth mentioned in those texts is as indicated above.

顯無彼之句義，當知亦是顯示無明所執之義無。

Also, you should understand that the words indicating that those various things do not exist mean that they do not exist as they are conceived by ignorance.

◎第二於餘所破加不加之理。

1.3.2.1.3.2 When to add qualifications to other objects of negation

若石女兒及兔角等，諸畢竟無直可云無，不須簡別。

When you say that utter nonexistents such as the horns of a rabbit and the son of a barren woman do not exist, you need not attach a qualification such as "intrinsically."

如是雖於所知有，然依時處，有有，有無，若說彼時處無，亦不須簡別。

Similarly, there are things that, although existent among objects of knowledge, exist at sometimes and places and do not exist at other times and places. When you say that these do not exist at a particular time or place, there is also no need to add that qualification.

若中觀師雖於名言不許彼有，唯由自他實事諸宗，不共增益，破彼等時雖就意樂，有時須加，然實無須新加自性簡別，以彼諸宗已許彼義故。

Furthermore, when refuting imaginary constructs from the unique assertions of Buddhist or non-Buddhist essentialists—things that Mādhyamikas do not accept as conventionally existent—there is no need to newly attach the qualification "essentially" or "intrinsically" to the objects, except in the occasional situation when you should add it, taking into account the opponents' perspective. This is because those proponents of tenets have already asserted the essential existence of those objects.

除彼所餘中觀諸師，於名言中所立諸義，任破何義皆須簡別。

In any other case whatsoever, where Mādhyamikas do conventionally posit the object, if you fail to add a qualification when refuting it, then the fallacies you adduce will equally apply to your own critique, and hence it will be only a sham of a refutation. Thus, it mustbe added.

若不簡別，則於能破之正理，過失同轉唯成似破，又如前說中觀諸師，於名言中所立諸義，必須觀察有無自性之正理及名言量所不能害。

Moreover, as explained earlier," neither a reasoning consciousness which analyzes whether something exists intrinsically nor a conventional valid cognition can contradict what the Mādhyamikas posit conventionally.

若不爾者，則於名言不許大自在等，而許色聲等所有差別全不得成。

For, if either did, it would be utterly untenable to make the distinction that we do not conventionally assert things such as a divine creator and yet we do assert forms, sounds, and such.

云此是道此是非道。此宗應理此不應理等，世出世間，皆無安立之方便。

Hence, there would be no way to make presentations of the mundane or supramundane such as, "This is the path; that is not the path," or "This tenet is correct; that is not correct."

於自性空生死涅槃一切建立，皆應正理之特法不可成故。

Consequently, the distinguishing feature that all the presentations of cyclic existence and nirvāna are tenable within the emptiness of intrinsic existence would be impossible.

若量無害而欲破彼，是為
- p.465 -
智者輕笑之處，故破彼時定當簡別。

To a skillful philosopher, it is ridiculous to claim that something is refuted even though such valid cognitions do not contradict it. Therefore, when stating that you refute those phenomena such as forms, you should be sure to add a qualifying phrase.

《四百論釋》及《六十正理論釋》，破所破時有極多處，加彼簡別。

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 and 《Commentary on "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》very often add a qualifying phrase when refuting the object to be negated.

中觀本論及佛護釋，明顯句釋，并入中論本釋等中，亦多處加，因見文繁及多已加，意其未加亦易通達。

Such phrases frequently appear in Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》, in Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》, and in Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 and 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 along with his 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》. Thus, those authors regard the repetition of qualifying phrases as excessive verbiage, and they thought that the significance of their having added them at certain points would make it easily understood even when they did not.

故未加處亦定須加，由彼無少加與不加差別理故。

You should add it even where they did not because there is not the slightest difference between the places where they did add it and the places where they did not.

又云「觀察非有」，亦有多加觀察之簡別者，此如前說，若有自性，須許觀察實性正理之所能得，由未得故則無自性當知與說無有自性，同一宗要。

Furthermore, they frequently add the qualification of analysis, saying, "When analyzed, it does not exist." As explained above, this means that if something existed essentially, it would have to be found by a reasoning consciousness which analyzes the way it exists; however, it is not found, and therefore, an essentially existent object does not exist. Hence, you should realize that this makes the same point as saying, "It does not exist essentially or intrinsically."

如《四百論釋》云﹕「設此諸法，非如火輪及變化等，唯現欺誑而無實事，爾時若以正理觀察，定如金等自性可緣最極顯現，然彼唯由顛倒因生，若以觀察慧火燒煉，其性非有。」

For, it is as Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
since they are deceptive—like the wheel of a firebrand, an emanation, or such—these things become non-things. If they did not, then under exacting rational analysis their essences would be very clearly observable, as in the case of a goldsmith analyzing gold. However, their causes are strictly erroneous, so that when the fire of analysis burns them, they can never be anything but essenceless.

◎第三釋於所破應不應加勝義簡別。

1.3.2.1.3.3 Whether to add the qualification "ultimate" to the object of negation

說於所破加勝義簡別，唯是中觀自續派者，極不應理。

It is quite unreasonable to claim that adding the qualification "ultimate" to the object of negation is the procedure only in Svatantrika-Madhyamaka.

《入中論釋》引佛母云﹕「長老須菩提，豈無所得無所證耶，須菩提曰﹕長老舍利子，雖有所得亦有所證，然非二相之理。長老舍利子其得證者，是依世間名言而立。預流一來不還阿羅漢獨覺菩薩，亦依世間名言而立，若勝義中無得無證。」

Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 cites the 《Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra》 [in Twenty-five Thousand Lines] :
"Venerable Subhuti, is it that there is no attainment and no clear knowledge?"
Subhuti answered, "Venerable Sāriputra, there is attainment and there is also clear knowledge, but not in a dualistic sense. Venerable Sãriputra, attainment and clear knowledge exist as worldly conventions. Also stream-enterers, once-returners, never returners, arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas exist as worldly conventions. Ultimately, however, there is no attainment and there is no clear knowledge."

須如是許，豈謂《入中論釋》所引為自續派之經耶，

Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says that you should follow this statement. Do you claim that this is a Svātantrika Sūtra?

如是諸了義經加勝義簡別者，實亦繁多。

It is evident that there are a great many such cases where definitive sutras add the qualification "ultimate."

《七十空性論》云﹕「住生滅有無，劣等或殊勝，佛依世間說，非是依真實。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness》 says:
Through the force of worldly convention,
And not through the force of reality,
The Buddha spoke of duration, production, and cessation;
Of existence and nonexistence; of what is low, moderate, or Supreme.

《寶鬘論》云﹕「言有我我所，此於勝義無。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》says:
It is said that both the self and that which belongs to the self exist.
They do not exist in an ultimate sense.

又云
- p.466 -
「若種子虛妄，其生豈諦實。」

Also:
How can something be true
When he seed that produces it is false?

又云「如是世如幻，雖現有生滅，然於勝義中，生滅皆非有。」

Also:
Similarly, production and disintegration
Appear in this illusory world,
But ultimately there is no production
And no disintegration.

於所破加勝義諦實真實者極多，未加彼時亦多加無自性自體自相等簡別。

Thus, such texts often make statements in which they attach "ultimately," "truly," or "in reality" to the negation; even when they do not add those, they very frequently add a qualification that something "does not exist essentially," "does not exist intrinsically," or "does not exist by way of its intrinsic character."

《佛護論》云﹕「諸佛說正法，正依於二諦，世間世俗諦，及以勝義諦。」

Also, Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 says:

若以世間世俗諦故，可說有瓶有席，即以此故，亦可說彼無常瓶壞席燒。

Thus, with the truth of worldly convention, you say, "A pot exists," or "A bamboo mat exists"; and with that same conventional sense you indicate that they are impermanent—"The pot broke," "The bamboo mat burned."

若時意依真實，爾時瓶席唯是假名且不應理，況其壞燒云何應理。

When you begin to contemplate reality, pots and bamboo mats are untenable in that they are dependently imputed objects. In that case, how can it be tenable to regard them as broken or burned?

復次，如來若以世間世俗增上可說無常，謂如來老及說如來已般涅槃。

Furthermore, you indicate the impermanence of even the Tathâgata through the force of the worldly conventions: "The Tathâgata has grown old," and "The Tathâgata has passed from sorrow."

若時意樂依於勝義，爾時如來且不應理，况老涅槃云何應理。

When you contemplate the ultimate, even the Tathāgata is not tenable; in that case, how can his growing old and passing from sorrow be tenable?

月稱論師說破實生，非破有生，

Also, the master Candrakirti says that he refutes true production put does not refute mere production.

如《六十正理論釋》云﹕「若於何相影像可得，緣生虛妄，我不說彼現可得者，名為無生，然於何性立為無生，即於彼性說為無生。為於何性立無生耶，謂許實自性非虛妄性，以許彼於妄性為緣起故。」

His 《Commentary on "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》 says:
We do not propound that an apprehension of a reflection—dependently produced and seen strictly as false—is not produced in any way. However, we say that it does not occur in terms of the nature, and we do propound that it is not produced in that sense. What is the nature in terms of which we say that it is not produced? A nature that you can clearly hold as a truth. However, it is not that it is not produced as something false, because we do assert that it arises as that dependently.

此說不破虛妄幻生唯破實生，故說緣生與性無生二不相違，

Thus, he does not refute production that is false, like an illusion; he does refute true production. He says that it is not contradictory to be both produced dependently and not produced intrinsically.

即前論云﹕「生與無生二境異故，有何相違。」

That same text says:
Therefore, in this way production and non-production have a different scope, so how can they contradict one another?

又云，「若時我說緣生，即性無生，猶如影像，爾時何有攻難之處。」

Also:
We contend that dependently produced things are, like reflections, not produced intrinsically. As this is the case, how can your objection stand a chance?

此答緣生與性無生相違之諍。

He says this in reply to an objection that it is contradictory for something to be dependently produced and yet not produced intrinsically.

《入中論》云﹕「由此次第，當知法實性無生，世間生，」此於無生加實性簡別。

Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:

Thus he attaches the qualification "in reality" to "not produced."

又云﹕「如此瓶等實性無，而於世間許為有，如是一切法皆成，故無過同石女兒。」

The Commentary on the "Middle Way" also says:
Just as these things—pots and such—do not exist in reality
But do exist in terms of what the world understands,
So it is for all things.
Therefore, it does not follow that they are like the son of a barren woman.

此說內外一切諸法，於真實無，於名言有，故非於所破不加勝義之
- p.467 -
簡別。

Thus he says that all internal and external things do not exist in reality but do exist conventionally. Hence, he does not omit the qualification "ultimately" in the negation.

總於所破，若全不許加勝義簡別，則不可立二諦差別，謂於勝義如此如此，及於世俗如此如此，全未說有如此之中觀師，故唯邪分別。

In brief, if you in no way accept the addition of the qualification "ultimately" to the negation, then you will have no way to distinguish the two truths, and you will not be able to say, "Ultimately, it is such and such; conventionally, it is such and such." There is no explanation of such a Madhyamaka anywhere, so it is simply a wrong idea.

《明顯句論》破「於所破加勝義之簡別」者，是就破自生，非唯破生，釋中極顯。

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 refutes the addition of the qualification "ultimately" to the negation in the context of refuting production from self, not in the context of refuting mere production. This is very clear in that commentary.

《入中論》云﹕「阿闍黎耶未加簡別，總云『不自』而破其生，若簡別云，『諸法勝義不自生，有故，如有思，』當知其勝義之簡別，全無義利。」

Also, as Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
The master Nāgārjuna refutes production from self in general without using a qualification, saying, "There is no production from self." There is someone [i.e., Bhāvaviveka] who uses the qualification, "Things are not produced from self ultimately because of existing, like a living being." I think that this use of the qualification "ultimately" is senseless.

故中觀自續師與應成師，非就於所破加不加勝義簡別判之為二，然於名言破不破自性則有差別。

Consequently, we do not distinguish Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prasañgika-Madhyamaka by way of whether they add the qualification "ultimately" to the negation. Instead, they differ in whether they refute essential or intrinsic existence conventionally.

若於內外諸法破自性時，如應成派則不須新加或勝義或真實或諦實之簡別，以有自性，即已成為勝義等故。

Hence, when refuting the essential or intrinsic existence of internal and external phenomena, Prasañgikas say that it is unnecessary to add on new qualifications such as "ultimately," "in reality," or "truly." This is because if there were essential or intrinsic existence, it would have to be established as an ultimate, etc.

若自續派於彼不加勝義等者，則不能破，故加勝義或真或諦。然於生滅及繫縛解脫等，若不簡別或云勝義或自性等而說能破，兩派中觀俱所不許。

Svātantrikas say that if you do not attach "ultimate" or the like to them then they cannot be refuted, so they add "ultimately," "in reality," or "truly." However, neither Madhyamaka system asserts that you can refute [conventionally existent things, such as] production, cessation, bondage, release, and so forth without adding some qualification such as "ultimately" or "essentially."

◎若爾何為勝義無之義，此中義謂所知，勝謂第一，二同一事。

What is the meaning of "does not exist ultimately" (don dam par medpa)? Here, "object" (don) means something knowable, and "highest" (dam pa) means supreme; an ultimate (don dam) is a common locus of both.

又勝謂無分別智，彼智之義或境故名勝義。

In another way, "highest" refers to a non-conceptual sublime wisdom and the ultimate is the object of the highest (don dam) because it is the object or domain of that.

又無分別智現證勝義，順彼之慧說名勝義。

In yet another way, the wisdom concordant with the non-conceptual sublime wisdom tha' directly knows the ultimate is called the ultimate.

如云「此中諸地等，於勝義無生。」

[Bhavaviveka's Heart of the Middle Way] says:
Earth and such Are not elements ultimately.

《熾然分別論釋》云﹕「言勝義者，是所知故名義，即所觀所了之增語。

Commenting on this, his Blaze of Reasons says:
Regarding the term "ultimate" (don dam pa, paramārtha), it is an "object" (don, artha) because it is something to be known; it is synonymous with "something to be examined" and "something to be understood."

勝是第一之異名，略云勝義。謂此是義復是最勝故名勝義。

"Highest" (dampa, parama) is a term that means "supreme." Joined in the compound "highest object" (don dam paramartha), this means that because emptiness is an object and also the highest, it is the ultimate.

又勝之義，以是無分別勝智之義故名勝義。

In another way, ultimate means "object of the highest" (dam pa'i don, paramasya artha). Because emptiness is the object of the highest—a non-conceptual sublime wisdom—it is the ultimate.

又順勝義，謂於隨順能證勝義之慧，有彼勝義故名順勝義。

In another way, it means that which is "concordant with the ultimate." Because that ultimate exists for a wisdom that is concordant with direct knowledge of the ultimate, it is said to be concordant with the ultimate.

如云於勝義非有。或說云無彼說
- p.468 -
之勝義，即最後者。

When they say that something "does not exist ultimately" or "is nonexistent ultimately," it has the last of these three meanings,

如此論云﹕「若爾，勝義超一切心，破法自性是文字境，是故豈非無可破耶。勝義有二，一謂無作行轉，出世無漏無諸戲論，二謂有作行轉，福智資糧隨順清淨，名世間智有諸戲論。此中立宗取彼差別故無過失。」

because that same text says:

此取聞思以上，如理觀察真實義慧，不應唯取聖後得智。

Take this as referring to wisdom based on study and reflection that properly analyzes reality and to consciousnesses above that; it does not refer only to a noble being's post-equipoise condition.

《中觀光明論》云﹕「言勝義無生等，其義通許一切聞思修所成慧，皆名勝義，無倒心故。是此之勝義故，現與不現而有差別。由彼增上知一切法，皆唯無生，故說勝義無生者，是說彼等由正知故生皆不成，」與前說同。

Also, Kamalaśīla's 《Illumination of the Middle Way》 says:
The meaning of a statement such as "Production does not exist ultimately" is as follows: All consciousnesses that arise from study, reflection, and meditation on reality are accurate subjects. They are therefore called "ultimate" in that they are the ultimate of those consciousnesses. They differ in whether they work directly or indirectly, but the force of their thought makes it understood that all these things are strictly not produced. Therefore, we explain the phrase, "Production does not exist ultimately," as meaning that knowledge of reality does not establish that these things are produced.
This seems to agree with what is stated [in Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasons].

中觀莊嚴論釋難云﹕「何為無自性性，謂於真實。言真實者，謂隨事勢轉，比量所證真實義性，真實義相觀察即空。由此宣說真實及勝義等。

Also, Kamalaśīla's 《Commentary on the Difficult Points of [Śāntaraksita's] "Ornament for the Middle Way"》 says:
To the qualm, "In what way is it that things do not exist intrinsically?" Śāntaraksita said, "In reality." The term "reality" refers to the status of things just as they are, something that is known by an inference based on facts. This is the same as saying that things are empty when you analyze them just as they are. This explains the phrases "in reality," "ultimately," and so forth.

又唯真智說名真等，是彼所緣故。由此真智意樂增上，名無自性，非由世俗無智增上。」

In another way, terms such as "reality" may refer only to knowledge of reality because that is what it observes. Knowledge of reality, not conventional knowledge, provides the understanding that allows us to say that things do not exist intrinsically.

於無自性加真等簡別，般若燈論熾然分別，二論多說。

Both Bhavaviveka's 《Lamp for [Nāgārjuna's] "Fundamental Treatise"》 and his 《Blaze of Reasons》 often add qualifications such as "in reality" to the absence of intrinsic existence.

猶如《般若燈論釋》十五品云﹕「若無自性，云何是事，若是事者應非無性，故以彼語有謗自宗。」

In particular, the 《Lamp for the "Fundamental Treatise"》, commenting on the fifteenth chapter of the 《Fundamental Treatise》, says:
Objection: If things have no essence, how can they be things? If they are things, then they are not without essence. Thus, you have the fallacy of mistakenly denying those objects with the very words within your thesis.

謂立宗云事無自性，則有自語相違過失，

The objection is that within the thesis, "Things do not have essence," Bhāvaviveka contradicts his own words.

即前論中答此諍云﹕「非許勝義諸事有性，次立宗說彼無自性，故無謗宗義。非因不成，故此無過。」

In that same text he replies:
We did not claim that things ultimately have essence and then advance the thesis of essencelessness. Therefore, we do not on that account mistakenly deny the object of our thesis. Thus, since this is not a case where the meaning of the reason is not established, we have no fault.

謂許諸法勝義無性，非毀謗故。若於名言謂無自性，許為毀謗極為明顯。

He holds that he does not mistakenly deny things due to his assertion that things lack essence ultimately, so it is clear that he asserts that it would be a mistaken denial to say that they lack essence— that is, do not essentially exist— conventionally.

又彼論云﹕「勝義諸內法皆無自性性，所作性故，殊勝言說待所依故，譬如幻師
- p.469 -
所化人等。」

That same text also says:
Ultimately, internal things lack essence because they are produced and also because this distinctive statement of their being produced indicates that they are contingent upon the dependent. For example, they are like the human beings, etc. that a conjurer has emanated.

此破自性決定當加勝義簡別。

Thus he definitely adds the qualification "ultimately" in the refutation of intrinsic existence.

言勝義無者，義謂若以如理觀察之正理，觀實性時見彼非有。

With regard to this, all of these masters agree that something's not existing ultimately means that when a reasoning consciousness properly analyzing its ontological status places it under scrutiny, that consciousness does not establish its existence.

此諸論師一切皆同。故清辨論師論中，立世俗時，亦說不以順見真實觀察，破自性時，多說以理觀察為無，此與前說諸師皆同。

Therefore, even the texts of Bhavaviveka, in positing conventionalities, say such things as, "Without engaging in analysis that accords with perception of reality..."; when refuting intrinsic existence they often say, "...does not exist under rational analysis." Thus, these statements and those of the former masters are similar.

然凡有性，堪忍觀察實性正理推察，許否不同，此二論師若有自性，則定須忍觀察實性正理推察，故亦定成勝義中有，如前數說。

However, these masters do not agree as to whether something that exists essentially must be held capable of withstanding scrutiny by rational analysis of its ontological status. As I have explained at length above, the two masters Buddhapalita and Candrakirti hold that something that exists essentially must be able to withstand scrutiny by rational analysis of reality, and hence must also be established ultimately.

破所破時應成自續，以誰而破分二，一　明應成自續之義，二　身生正見當隨誰行。

1.3.2.2 Whether to carry out that refutation with a Svātantrika Procedure or with a Prāsangika procedure.
This has two parts:
1.3.2.2.1 The meaning of Svātantrika and Prāsangika
1.3.2.2.2 Which system to follow so as to develop the right philosophical view in your mind-stream

今初

1.3.2.2.1 The meaning of Svātantrika and Prāsangika

◎佛護論師釋中，未明分別應成自續，建立應成。

It is not clear that the commentary of the master Buddhapālita sets up a Prāsaṁgika system, distinguishing Prāsangika from Svātantrika.

然於解釋「非自非從他，非共非無因，諸法隨何處，其生終非有」時，唯依說擧他宗違害而破四生。

Nonetheless, consider his commentary on the opening lines of the 《Fundamental Treatise》:

Here he negates the four types of production by pointing out the faults of other systems.

清辨論師出過破，謂全無能力成立自宗及破他宗。

The master Bhavaviveka refutes him, claiming that Buddhapalita's arguments have no power to establish his own position or to repudiate the positions of others.

然佛護宗無如是過，月稱論師廣為解釋，謂中觀師自身發生中觀方便，須用應成，自續非理，破他宗已顯應成宗。

Now the master Candrakirti extensively comments on why Buddhapālita's own system does not suffer from such faults, and in so doing he states that Màdhyamikas should employ reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) arguments, not autonomous (svatantra) arguments, as their method for instilling the Madhyamaka view in others. In this way Candrakirti elucidates the Prasañgika position through a refutation of autonomous argument.

安立應成自續兩派分二，一　破除他宗，二　安立自宗。

This section on how to posit such a Svātantrika/ Prāsaṁgika distinction has two parts:
1.3.2.2.1.1The refutation of others' positions
1.3.2.2.1.2 Setting forth our own position

初又分二，一　出計，二　破執。

The refutation of others' positions has two parts:
1.3.2.2.1.1.1 Stating what others believe
1.3.2.2.1.1.2 Refuting those positions

今初

1.3.2.2.1.1.1 Stating what others believe

◎雖有多種安立應成自續之理，然彼一切孰能盡說，故當於中略說少分。

There have been many ways of defining reductio arguments and autonomous arguments; who could explain all of them? That is why I focus on only a few of them.

其慶喜師所說《入中論疏》云﹕「有作是言，若許應成因，其因為量成耶抑未成耶，若謂已成，爾時俱成，云何他許，若謂未成，則他不許，云何他許。

[(1) The first misinterpretation]
Jayananda advocates the following position. In his Explanation of [Candrakirti's] "Commentary on the 'Middle Way" (Madhyamakavatarațīkā) he says:

當答彼曰﹕凡量所成應是俱成，此非我知，諸立論者
- p.470 -
立能立時，其所立因自雖量成，然他量成自何能知，他心差別非自現量，比量境故。又自量成亦何能知，錯謬因緣長夜攝持，有欺誑故。故唯由其立論對論，許量之力，許諸法性，故依所許破除他宗。」

此說因於敵者量成不成，立者不知，以彼無樂，俱非立者二量成故。

The proponent of any syllogism does not know whether the opponents have established the reason for themselves by means of a valid cognition. This is because neither of the two types of valid cognition [valid sense-type cognition and valid cognition based on a reason] give the proponent access to what the opponent is thinking.

自亦不知因是量成，自雖決斷是量所成，亦有欺誑，故無雙方量成之因。

You cannot be certain that valid cognition establishes the reason even for yourself, for even when you determine that you have established it by valid cognition, it is possible that you have been deceived. Therefore, since there are no validly established reasons, the debate is founded on what the parties accept as valid.

就許為量量雖未成，然就所許破亦應理。

Hence, it is proper to refute opponents in terms of what they accept, even though valid cognition does not establish anything for either party. This is how he explains it.

又於自續之因宗云﹕「若因與所立以量成徧，（即同品定有異品遍無也）爾時當許自續之能立，然徧不成，謂能成徧之量或現或比，現且不能成其為徧，謂於灶房由現可緣不可緣故，遂謂火煙，此有則彼有，彼無則此無，通達無則不生，然非於一切境，亦非由比。

And again, this same 《Explanation of [Candrakirti's] "Commentary on the Middle Way"》 continues:
According to the partisans of autonomous reasoning, what makes something an autonomous probative reason is that valid cognition establishes the pervasion between the reason and the probandum. Yet that pervasion is not established. A valid cognition that establishes a pervasion is either a perception or an inference. Let us take them one at a time. A perception cannot establish the pervasion. Through what is perceived and what is not perceived, you can know that there is a necessary conditional relationship between fire and smoke in a kitchen, so that if one exists, the other will also, and if one does not exist, neither will the other. However, you cannot deduce the existence of fire from the existence of smoke in all places.

彼境定故，謂比量境非通一切，何以故，若有所立相屬之因，唯於彼生無常等智，非一切時處，故唯依世許，成立為徧非以量成，故應成因破除他宗，如何非理。

Nor can you use inference to establish the pervasion, for that too is limited to certain domains. The domain of inference is not universal because knowledge that something is impermanent, for example, will arise only when there is a reason related to the probandum and not in all places and times. Therefore, the pervasion is established only by way of what the world accepts, and not by means of a valid cognition. Hence, how can it be wrong to use reductio syllogistic reasoning to refute the opposition?

此說有火，徧於有煙。及無常性遍於所作，若以量成則自續應理，然非量成。

So if valid cognitions did establish pervasions—such as the presence of fire wherever there is smoke or the impermanence of all that is produced—then autonomous arguments would be acceptable, but they do not.

若以量成，應須成立一切時處有火無常徧煙所作，然以現比於灶瓶等成其為徧，是一分故。故徧亦唯就許而成。」

If valid cognitions established pervasions, then the pervasions concerning the existence of fire wherever there is smoke and impermanence wherever there is production would have to be established in all places and times. However, since perception and inference establish those pervasions only in relation to specific domains, such as kitchens and pots, the scope of those pervasions is limited. Therefore, mere acceptance and not valid cognition must establish even the pervasions.

此說若用量成三相是自續派，畢竟唯用他許三相是應成派。

This is what Jayananda says. Evidently he believes that if a proof uses a reason for which valid cognition has established the three criteria, then it is an autonomous argument; if a proof is made just on the basis of the parties accepting the fulfillment of the three criteria, then it is a reductio argument.

◎彼之弟子諸譯師云﹕「中觀師者，唯破他許餘無自宗。

[(2) The second misinterpretation]

Some translators, students of that scholar [Jayananda], argue as follows: Mādhyamikas have no theses of their own. They only refute what others believe.

其有法等二無共許故，自續非
- p.471 -
理正理之果亦唯令捨他宗，除彼之餘，自無所許，故一切種不應宣說自續之因，唯用應成。

Since the elements of a syllogism such as the subject are not agreed upon—that is, accepted by both parties—autonomous arguments are not tenable. The only result of reasoned analysis is that others give up their tenets. Apart from this, since Mādhyamikas have no beliefs of their own, the autonomous syllogism should not be used under any circumstances. Therefore, only reductio arguments are permissible.

又能立應成，即自續究竟，故唯應許能破應成。其因及徧就現前許或究竟許，非由量成。

Indeed, since those reductio arguments which establish a positive position ultimately derive from autonomous syllogisms, only reductios that negate the position of opponents are permissible. Since this latter type of reductio is a reductioin which both the reason and the pervasion are merely accepted by both parties or derived from the mere assertions of the parties, correct valid cognition does not establish the reason and pervasion.

依此因緣略有四門，斷他所許或斷戲論。

It is based on such a reductio that they eliminate the claims or elaborations of others, and they do this with four types of arguments.

一，擧唯應成，謂他所許生有盡有義，若許自生，擧相違云，若從自生是有而生，生應無義及無窮盡，故許有義有盡不應正理。若許彼者，而云自生不應道理，令他知已捨宗為果。

Of these, the "reductio argument expressing a contradiction" works in the following way. The opponents accept that production, for example, is purposeful and finite, and they also believe that things are produced from themselves. But if a thing is produced from itself, since that would mean that something that already exists is being produced, production would be purposeless and endless, and it would be incorrect to hold that it is purposeful and finite. If they accept that, then it would be incorrect for them to accept that things are produced from themselves. When the contradictions are assembled in this way, the only result is that the opponents understand them and abandon this tenet.

二，他許比量，如云許自生芽應不自生，自體有故。擧說他許有法因等，而反破他。雖云無自生，亦唯破他許之自生，非自成立無自生義，故自無宗。

"Inference based on what others accept" refutes the opponent using a subject, a reason, and so forth that are accepted by that opponent. For example, the seedling that you accept as produced from itself is not produced from itself because it is its own very self. Even though the Mādhyamikas state that it is not produced from itself, this is merely are futation of the others' claim that things arise from themselves; it does not establish for the Mādhyamikas themselves the nonexistence of production from self, and hence the Mādhyamikas have no theses.

三，能立同所立，他為成立自所宗故，所立因喻一切如前皆不極成。

The argument called "the similarity of probative reason and probandum" involves showing how none of the examples or signs that the opponents state in order to prove their position can be proven relevant to that position.

四，因相相等，謂若許彼，即當許此因相無別，令其相等。

The "argument from the parallelism of similar reasons" involves parallelism between indistinguishable reasons, such that if you accept one, you accept the other.

若爾汝有無欲破他所許，有即是宗，應有立彼自續之因，無則不應宣說正理，破他所許。

Objection: Well then, do you or do you not believe such refutations of what the opponent accepts? If you do, then that in itself constitutes your thesis and there would be an autonomous reason proving that position. If you do not, it is pointless for you to give arguments that refute what the other party accepts.

答，觀勝義時，若許無性或以無生為所立者，則須受許自續宗因，然不許彼故無過失。

Reply by the followers of Jayānanda: When you analyze the ultimate, if you accept a predicate such as "lacks intrinsic existence" or "is not produced," then you have to accept autonomous theses and reasons. However, since we do not accept such predicates, we have no fault.

若略有欲即有所宗，則一切欲皆應有宗。」

If simply believing something means that you have a thesis, then everyone would have theses about everything.

此說自己無所立宗唯破他宗，雖有所欲亦無所宗。

That is how [the followers of Jayānanda] explain their position. Evidently they believe that even though they have nothing to prove from their own side, they can merely refute others' positions; that even though they have beliefs, they have no theses;

又自無宗，是就觀察勝義之時，謂不立宗無自性等，非說一切全無所許。故於觀察勝義之時，若許無性為所成立，而於自宗成立無性是自續派，若自無許唯破他欲是應成派。

and that they have no position of their own, avoiding theses such as the absence of intrinsic existence when analyzing the ultimate. Apparently, they consider as Svātantrikas those who do not believe that there is nothing at all that can be asserted and who therefore, when analyzing the ultimate, assert the predicate "lacks intrinsic nature" and establish that as their own position. Those who do not assert such predicates, but engage only in the refutation of what others accept, they consider Prāsangikas.

◎現在自許是應成中觀者，作如是說隨依勝義及依名言，雖於名言自宗無許。

[(3) The third misinterpretation]

According to those who today consider themselves Prāsangika Mādhyamikas, there is nothing to accept even conventionally in one's own system, neither as regards the ultimate nor as regards the conventional.

若有彼宗，亦須許有能立因喻成自續派，故應成派全無自宗。

If you have such a thesis, then you have to accept the examples and reasons that prove it, and in that case you are a Svātantrika.

如《迴諍論》云﹕「若我有少宗，則我有彼過，然我無所宗，故我唯無過。若以現量等，略見有少法，或立或破除，無故我無難。」

Therefore, Prasañgikas have no system of their own at all. For, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 states:
If I had any thesis,
Then I would suffer from that fault,
But as I have no theses,
I alone am without faults.
If sensory perception and so forth
Could actually perceive something
Then there would be something to prove or to refute.
But as they do not,
I cannot be faulted.

《六十正理論》云﹕「諸大德本性，無宗無所諍，彼尚無自宗，豈更有他宗。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:"
Mahātmas have no positions,
They have no arguments.
How can those who have no positions themselves
Have positions vis-à-vis others?

- p.472 -

《四百論》云﹕「若有無二俱，誰全非有宗，雖長時於彼，不能擧過難。」

Also, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
No matter how long you try
You can never rebut
Those who have no position
In regard to existence, nonexistence, or both.

說中觀師無宗無立故。

All of these are sources showing that a Madhyamika has no position or thesis.

《明顯句論》云﹕「凡中觀師，理不應用自續比量，不許他宗故。」

The 《Clear Words》 states:
If you are a Mādhyamika, it is not right to make an autonomous argument, for we do not accept the positions of others.

又云﹕「應成破義亦唯屬他，非屬我等，自無宗故。」

And also: The opposite of the absurd consequence in a reductio pertains to the opponent, but not to ourselves, for we have no theses.

《入中論》云﹕「能破所破不會破，及會而破所說失，若定有宗彼成過，我無彼宗故無失，」說自無宗過不轉故。

Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
Does a refutation work to refute by contacting what it refutes? Or does it refute without making contact?
This problem is inevitable for those who have positions, But since I do not, this reductio argument does not apply to me.
These passages state that because Mādhyamikas have no position, those faults do not apply to them.

故中觀師一切建立皆唯就他而立。

Therefore, all Madhyamaka expositions are put forward only in terms of the perspective of the other party.

《入中論》云﹕「如汝依他事，我不許世俗，果故此雖無，我依世說有。」

For, as Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
While you accept real dependent entities
I do not accept them even conventionally;
For effect, I say they exist even though they do not.
Taking the perspective of the world, I speak of a self.

《迴諍論》云﹕「所破無所有，故我全無破，是故云能破，是汝興毀謗。」說破他宗亦非有故。

What is more, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
Since there is nothing to be refuted,
I refute nothing.
Therefore, in saying that I refute something,
You insult me.

◎又昔西藏中觀智者，隨行月稱論師善破諸宗，說中觀師自無所宗及無能立之量。

[(4) The fourth misinterpretation]

Some earlier Mādhyamikas, Tibetan scholars who follow the master Candrakirti, argue as follows: We completely reject these systems that claim that Mādhyamikas have no positions of their own and no valid cognitions to establish them.

次自宗時破以正理，觀擇自相所許能量所量建立及事力轉現比二量，然許名言不加推察，世間共許能量所量。

Our own system is as follows. We refute both the perceptual and inferential "valid cognitions based on real fact" of those who put forward presentations of valid cognition and the objects it cognizes in terms of intrinsic character that can withstand rational analysis. Accepting conventionally, without analysis, the valid cognitions and cognized objects familiar to the world,

次中觀師自於敵者建能立言，以真正因立無實義，然非自續，以就世
- p.473 -
間共許之量，未加推察而安立故。

we Mādhyamikas demonstrate that things lack true existence with sound reasoning by making a proof statement to the opponent. Even so, we are not Svātantrikas, for we posit the lack of true existence by means of valid cognitions that are familiar to the world, unanalyzed.

◎第二破執分四。

1.3.2.2.1.1.2 Refuting those positions

破第一家，入中論疏派，說因徧非由量成，說因非以量成之理，且不應理。

1.3.2.2.1.1.2.1 Refuting the first misinterpretation
In the system of Jayānanda's 《Explanation of [Candrakirti's] "Commentary on the 'Middle Way'"》, valid cognition does not establish the reason and the pervasion. Jayānanda claims that valid cognition does not establish the reason, but his justification is deficient for the following reasons:

以許因須由立敵俱用量成之家，非由立者未知敵成便不許因，故汝彼理不能破，須敵者以量成故。

(1) Even in a system that holds that both proponent and opponent must have previously established the reason with valid cognition, something does not cease to be considered a reason simply because the proponent is not certain that the reason is established for the opponent. Hence, Jayānanda's rationale does not vitiate against the necessity of the opponent's establishing the reason by means of a valid cognition.

又以未知敵者他心，立為不知他用量成者，亦不應知他許彼義，則以他許而破他等，亦非理故。

(2) If you claim that you do not know whether a reason is established for an opponent because you do not know the mind of the opponent, then it follows that you cannot even be certain that the other party has accepted a particular point; therefore, it would be impossible to refute opponents in terms of what they accept, etc.

他雖說云，我如是許現可決定，然如所說非定許故，及不知他心故。

Why? Even if you have perceptual certainty about the opponents' words when they say, "This is what we accept," following your logic you would not have certain knowledge that they actually accept what they have stated because you do not know the minds of other beings.

說徧非以量成之理亦不應理，以於灶上成立有火徧有烟時，灶是所通達處，其上所達之義，唯取有火徧於有烟，非取灶中有火徧灶有烟，豈取時處一分之徧。

The justification that Jayānanda gives for why valid cognition does not establish the pervasion is also inadequate. The kitchen is the object based upon which you understand the pervasion, "in the kitchen, when there is smoke there is fire." The thing understood with respect to that basis is the bare pervasion, "when there is smoke, there is fire." It is certainly not that you are to apprehend the pervasion, "where there is kitchen smoke, there is kitchen fire." Hence, how could it be that you apprehend a pervasion limited to a particular time and place?

若不爾者，灶非此徧已定之處，須更顯示已定之處。

Or else, if the pervasion were limited in that way, since kitchen would not work as the basis for ascertaining such a limited pervasion, you would have to adduce some other basis in relation to which ascertainment of the limited pervasion is needed.

如於聲上，所定無常所成立法，須於聲瓶二事隨轉，非立聲上一分無常。

For example, impermanence—a predicated quality that is ascertained with respect to sound—must apply to both sound and pots. A form of impermanence that is sound's alone cannot be posited as the predicated quality.

由此道理，許無比量成立能徧，亦當了知不應正理。

This same line of reasoning demonstrates that it is incorrect to hold that the inference establishing the pervasion is not a valid cognition.

如是有說非由量成，唯由立敵所許而成，亦不應理。

He also claims that only the proponent's and opponent's acceptance of the pervasion establishes it inasmuch as valid cognition does not establish it. This also is incorrect.

唯以彼許為因，不能破他。以他所許其義不成，量於自他俱非有故。

Why? If you treat the mere acceptance of a position as justification for it, then you cannot refute the opponent, for the opponent's assertion of a point would establish it, and neither side has any valid cognition that can refute it.

若謂所許而分差別，如此則成，此則不成者，如是分別。

Question: But what if you were to distinguish between different types of acceptance, wherein one type could and the other could not establish the reason, pervasion, etc.?

若以所許為因等同所立，若以量有無而分，失量無欲。

Reply: If you justify such a distinction by the mere fact that it has been asserted, then your argument resembles what you are trying to prove and you have not advanced your position. If, however, you make the distinction on the basis of whether there is a valid cognition to back up an assertion, then you have strayed from your belief that there are no valid cognitions.

◎破第二家，觀真實時以不許無自性宗。

(2) Refuting the second misinterpretation. You hold that avoiding autonomous theses means that when analyzing reality you do not assert the thesis that there is no intrinsic nature.

謂不立自續宗之義者，為以理智觀有無自性，
- p.474 -
不能立宗，故不許彼宗耶，抑以觀真實時故為因，不許彼宗耶。

But in not accepting that thesis, is it because the thesis is not established by the reasoned knowledge analyzing whether there is intrinsic nature? Or, in not accepting that thesis, do you adduce the reason that this is an occasion in which reality is being analyzed? Which do you hold?

如初說者，若以理智不能成立無性宗義，則以理智亦不能破有性宗義，因相等故。

In the first case, if reasoned knowledge does not establish the referent of the thesis, the lack of intrinsic nature, then reasoned knowledge could also not refute the referent of the thesis "intrinsic nature exists," for similar reasons.

若謂觀察真實義時，亦不能破有性宗義，極不應理。

And it is utterly incorrect of you to think that the referent of the thesis "intrinsic nature exists" is not refuted when reality is being analyzed, for the following reasons:

前說以諸正理觀察破他宗故，無觀察心不能破他宗故。

(1) You claimed previously that reasoned analysis refutes the others' systems. (2) Non-analytical [i.e., conventional] knowledge cannot refute others' systems.

若不爾者，何須別說自宗無立，即破他宗亦不許故。

(3) Otherwise, if analysis did not refute the thesis "intrinsic nature exists," then why would you have to specify, "We accept no thesis in our own system"? For in that case you would not even accept reductio arguments that refute the others' systems.

若許應成破他宗者，則破有性即立無性，如前《迴諍本釋論》說，於此更無第三聚故。

When you use a reductio argument to eliminate the tenets of the other party, then the refutation of the existence of intrinsic nature should itself establish the absence of intrinsic nature. I made this point above in regard to a previously cited passage from the 《Refutation of Objections》 and its commentary. There is no third alternative.

若不爾者，則翻說云，是立無性非破有性，有何答難，若謂決斷無性定遮有性，則遮有性定成無性，理相等故。

Were this not the case, someone might claim just the opposite of your position, saying, "I am establishing the absence of intrinsic nature; I am not refuting the existence of intrinsic nature." What response could you give? If you think that affirming the absence of intrinsic nature must, without a doubt, negate intrinsic nature, then it should also be the case that negating the existence of intrinsic nature must, without a doubt, similarly affirm the absence of intrinsic nature.

若謂是觀真實義時，故不可立無性等宗，更當宣說其中因相，若謂觀真義時，有所立者即勝義有，故不應許，此不應理。

If you think that theses such as the absence of intrinsic nature are improper because this is an occasion in which reality is being analyzed, give your justification for this now. You may suppose that one cannot accept such beliefs because something that exists when reality is being analyzed must ultimately exist, but this conclusion is incorrect.

若亦不許觀真義時，應許全無以中觀理觀察時位。

If you reject the very occasion during which reality is being analyzed, then you will have to accept the impossibility of a time period during which a Madhyamika analyzes things with reason.

若立彼時，亦定須許能觀之人，觀察之理，所觀之事，與誰同觀之敵者等。

But if you admit to such an occasion, then you definitely must also accept the existence of the analyzer, the analyzing reasoning, the basis of the analysis, the opponent with whom you are analyzing, etc.

爾時所有，何須一切皆勝義有。

Hence, why is it necessary for everything that exists at that time to exist ultimately?

又說應成，唯就他許或究竟許，雖無量成而能出過，非能滿意，如破初家而當破除。

Nor is it satisfactory to claim that insofar as a mere reductio involves only what is asserted by the opponent, or what can ultimately be derived from those assertions, you are constructing a reductio even though there are no valid cognitions. Therefore, I refute your view just as I refuted the first system above.

又若立云，觀真實時無所受許，名言有許。亦不應理。

Moreover, it is not appropriate to claim that you have no assertions while reality is being analyzed, but that you do have assertions conventionally.

其觀真實時，非於勝義須於名言，此相違故。

This is because the occasion during which reality is analyzed cannot be an ultimate thing; hence, it must be a conventionality, and that contradicts your thesis.

又若觀真義時無，即勝義無之義，凡中觀師全無受許勝義有者，非應成派殊勝法故。

Also, if not existing while reality is being analyzed means not existing ultimately, then having no assertions while reality is being analyzed could not be a distinguishing characteristic of Prasangika—for no Madhyamikas of any sort hold that they have assertions ultimately.

◎破第三家，

(3) Refuting the third misinterpretation

說中觀師雖於名言亦無許者，是如前說未善明了正理所破。

As previously explained, those who claim that the Madhyamikas have no theses, even conventionally, have not properly identified the object that reason negates.

以彼理性破
- p.475 -
除他宗，翻難自時便見自宗，亦如是轉，不知安立自宗離過，生死涅槃一切緣起與大自在，有無相同，是故此乃謗中觀師最鄙惡心者，破除此執前已廣說。

Hence, they refute the opponent with arguments that refute intrinsic nature, and then, when the situation is reversed, they see those arguments as applying in exactly the same way to their own system as well. In setting forth their own system they have no idea of how to avoid error. Hence, all dependent-arisings—whether of cyclic existence or nirvāna—end up having an ontological status like that of non-Buddhists' fabrications such as a divine creator. Therefore, that interpretation slanders the Mādhyamikas and merits utter contempt. I have already explained at length the refutation of that position.

觀中觀師有許無許，由具何事，名中觀師，則彼中觀定當受許。

Those who analyze whether Madhyamikas assert anything must agree that a Mādhyamika is posited as one who has the "middle way."

須許通達全無塵許勝義中有及許名言緣起之義，一切如幻，故有所許。

Hence, they will have to accept that a Mādhyamika understands the meaning of dependent-arising—that ultimately not even a particle exists, while conventionally all is like illusion. So there is something to assert.

又安立此，亦須破除彼二違品，許勝義有及名言無諸惡言論。

Moreover, you must posit this by refuting the vile claims that are the reverse of those positions, namely, the belief that things ultimately exist and the belief that they do not exist even conventionally.

故有正量通達立破，如自所證，以中觀語無倒教他，亦可得故。

Therefore, there is valid cognition that knows what is proven and what is refuted, and there is a discourse in which Madhyamikas, based on their own knowledge, accurately teach others.

建立此等，無一敵者而能如法求少分過，是故此宗最極清淨。

Because of this, and because the opponents have no philosophically coherent response to the points that they set forth, this system is exceedingly pure.

由是因緣，若自不知安立離過智中觀宗，莫謗為無，應當受許緣起正理，斬斷一切諸惡見網。

Accordingly, even if you do not know how to set forth the perfect system of Mādhyamika scholars, you should at least not slander it by claiming that it does not exist. The very acceptance of the reasoning of dependent-arising cuts through all of the entanglements of wrong views.

賢正慧者，應立中觀宗離一切違，不應專求抵賴為能。

The intelligent who heed this will avoid all Contradiction in setting forth the Madhyamaka system and will not trust those who spread such lies.

《明顯句論》云﹕「如是我宗最極清淨，一切建立無違而住，與彼自宗具粗近過，有相違時，愚蒙不見功德過失如何而住，汝自諸過失」等。

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 states:
Thus, our position is completely pure of any logical flaw and definitely does not contradict any traditional presentation of conVentional or ultimate reality, while your position has obvious and severe flaws and does contradict those traditional presentations. Through utter foolishness, you do not see these faults and good points accurately. Those faults that you attribute to me are yours.

如前所引，此說於中觀宗，由決擇勝義之量及名言量道所興建立，無過可設，最極清淨。生死涅槃一切建立，皆可安立，當得定解。

The Madhyamaka system mentioned in this previously cited passage is an irrefutable presentation deriving both from valid cognitions that determine what is ultimate and from conventional valid cognitions. Hence you can be certain that it is completely pure of logical flaw and that it allows you to make a complete exposition of cyclic existence and nirvāna.

若不爾者，謂中觀師全無自宗無過可設，則說一切語言皆是妄語，亦全不能破，以一切因相悉相等故。

Or else, if the claim "Mādhyamikas have no system of their own" were considered irrefutable, then the claim "Everything that you say is a lie" could also not be refuted even to the slightest degree, for similar reasons.

又不可說，於無所許不可以有許徵察，故無過設，無所許故。

Objection: Those who claim to assert nothing are not subject to analysis as to whether or not they have any assertions. So, because we accept nothing at all, no one can refute us.

若如是者，則說一切語言皆虛妄者，亦說一切語言皆妄，不當觀察彼言為實，不能顯其自語相違。

Reply: This too is untenable. For if it were tenable, then even in the case of those who claim, "All claims are false," one could not show that they have contradicted their own words because their claim that all words are false would by your logic preclude analysis of the veracity of those very words.

《入中論》云﹕「若我少成實有
- p.476 -
事，如心應非不可說。」

It is also not tenable because Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states: If there were some self that existed in reality, then it would be something That exists with the body, as does the mind; it would not be ineffable.

如犢子部許有實我，而不可說與蘊一異。

In response to the Vatsiputriyas' belief that there is a substantially existent self that cannot be described as either the same as or different from the aggregates,

破云，若是實有，當說與蘊或一或異，云於此中俱不可說不應道理，則不能破。

this passage says that if the self exists substantially, it must be susceptible to description either as the same as or as different from the aggregates. But if you are right, then it would be possible for the Vatsiputriyas to answer, "You cannot engage in an analysis of that kind."

彼可答云，我說實我，若一若異俱不可說，不可推察或一或異，令有說故。若言，「若說實有補特伽羅，不可說與蘊若一若異，則成相違，俱不可說不應正理，故此觀察可於彼轉。」則云無許，已漸有許，亦不可說全無所許，理相等故。

Suppose you argue that you can engage in analysis as follows: "If the Vatsiputriyas claim that the person substantially exists, it is incorrect for them to hold that the person cannot be described in terms of those aggregates, as this would contradict their view that the person is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them." If you do make this argument, then by the same token the very statement, "If I assert nothing, I have no assertion," constitutes a sincere claim.

若作是言，「云我無財，乞云願施無財之財，我說無許教許無許，二說相等。」

You might argue that the following two situations are similar: (1) saying, "We have no wealth," and receiving the reply, "Give me that wealth which is no wealth"; and (2) saying, "We accept nothing," and receiving the reply, "The acceptance of nothing is itself accepting something."

此乃未解敵者之意，我非總說令許無許。

However, in making this argument you misunderstand our position. We are not claiming that not having assertions is itself an assertion.

若爾云何，汝云無許實漸有許，顯示汝言須許無許，故不能斷自語相違。

Well then, what are we saying? We are demonstrating that by sincerely claiming that you assert nothing you necessarily assert that you assert nothing. As a result, you inevitably cancel out your own words.

若汝此說非中觀宗，則引聖父子等正教成立，而成相違，不可立為月稱師宗。

If claims like the ones you make do not belong to the Madhyamaka system, then you contradict yourself by proving them through the citation of passages from the works of the noble Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Āryadeva.

又非所餘佛弟子宗，故汝已出此法之外。

Also, such claims cannot be considered the system of Candrakirti, nor the system of any other Buddhist. Thus, they fall outside of the teaching.

若是中觀，尤是月稱宗者，許自無宗則成相違。

Those who claim to advocate the Madhyamaka system, and in particular the system of Candrakirti, contradict themselves by claiming to have no system of their own.

如是意欲解脫有許，云諸建立唯就他立亦不應理。

Likewise, it is also incorrect to claim that everything that you set forth is posited only in terms of the perspective of others, in this way hoping to free yourself from asserting anything.

說唯就他許有色等，此縱未許色等是有，然就他立定須受許，故終不能免脫有許。

When you say that you must assert the existence of things such as form only in terms of the perspective of others, you may not be asserting the existence of things such as form, but you certainly must be asserting that you posit form and such in terms of the perspective of others, so you have not freed yourself from all assertions.

爾時就誰安立之他及能安立之自等，皆須受許。

You have to assert that at that time there is (1) another person in terms of whose perspective you posit things, and (2) yourself, the one who posits them.

故說唯就他許，於自無宗非但無益，且有違害。

Therefore, the claim that you accept things only in terms of the perspective of others not only fails to imply that you have no system of your own, it actually vitiates against such a notion.

若云﹕「我全未說無有自宗，唯就他許，唯汝自現。」

Objection: We do not even claim that we have no system or that we assert theses only in terms of the perspective of others. However, from your point of view it appears that we make these claims.

順世外道，尚所不能抵賴現事，汝全抵賴，汝自所說自無所覺，由我聽聞汝乃了知，實為希有。

Reply: This position denies sensory experience that even the Lokayatas cannot deny. When you do not even experience what you yourself claim, how surprising that you should know what we have heard.

若如是者，何須定說無許等言，隨說何事後抵即足，無過難故。

If you do deny the evidence of sensory experience, then why do you need to insist that you have no assertion? For no matter what you claim, you can deny it later and thus never be faulted.

若說應成
- p.477 -
亦說他立，自宗不許，

Opponent: We posit even reductio arguments only in terms of the perspective of others. We do not accept them in our own system.

則亦何須破自續派，樹應成教，信月稱宗。

Reply: Then what does it mean for you to repudiate the Svātantrika system and to have faith in the system of Candrakirti, the textual founder of the Prasangika system?

如於自宗不許自續，如是應成亦不可許。

For, just as the autonomous syllogism is inadmissible in your own system, so too reductio arguments are inadmissible;

如就他前可許應成，如是就他所須增上，亦須許自續故。

just as reductio arguments are admissible in terms of the perspective of others, you also end up using autonomous syllogisms, as needed, in terms of the perspective of others.

如於自宗不許唯識，唯就他許不可立彼為唯識師，如是自若不能立，以應成理決擇中義，唯就他立，則亦非是應成派人，亦非自續，顯然自說非中觀師。

We cannot call those persons Cittamātrins who accept mind-only philosophy in terms of the perspective of others, but who do not accept it in their own system. Likewise, we cannot call those persons Prasañgikas who, while not allowing in their own system reductio arguments that establish the meaning of the middle way, nonetheless posit them in terms of the perspective of others. And since those who advocate this position are also not Svātantrikas, this clearly shows that they are not Mādhyamikas.

◎ - p.478 -

菩提道次第廣論卷二十終