◎又唯識師云﹕「一一極微非根識境，不顯現故，眾多積聚亦非彼境，無實體故，如現二月。」
Furthermore, the Cittamātrins say that individual, minute particles are not the objects of the sensory consciousnesses because they do not appear to them; an aggregation of many minute particles is also not an object of the sensory consciousnesses because it does not substantially exist. They say that this is like the appearance of two moons.
《分別熾然論》答云﹕「若成未積單位極微非諸根境，是成已成。」
In answering the first proposition, Bhāvaviveka's 《Blaze of Reasons》 says:
If you are proving that a minute particle alone, not in a composite, is not an object of a sensory consciousness, then you are proving that which is already established.
答後難云﹕「若以積聚一種極微為宗，說此非因，無實體故，而立因者，其因是他不極成，謂一種類極微體性，彼彼皆有益境功用，故彼皆為境體支分。於極微塵生起現似積相之覺，從其積聚一類極微而成瓶等，我等亦許彼為實有，猶如極微，何以故，猶如極微亦是八微積聚為體，許其實有，故和合體所有瓶等，亦是實有，單不可成。」
As an answer to the latter position, he says:
Are you claiming that an aggregation of minute particles of one type in one place is not the cause of a sensory consciousness, giving as your reason, "because such aggregations do not substantially exist"? If you are, then I simply do not accept your reason. Why? It is as follows. Various minute particles of a single type coalesce and contribute to that aggregation, thus constituting the parts of an object. From this there arises a mind to which an image appears, the image of an aggregation of minute particles. We hold that, like minute particles, pots and such are also Substantially existent, for they are composites of minute particles of a single type.
It is the nature of a minute particle to be an aggregation of eight substances, yet you explicitly assert that it is substantially existent. Likewise, therefore, pots and such—which have natures of being aggregations—are also substantially existent. A nonaggregate singularity does not exist.
此說積聚一一極微皆是根識之因，復是實有。
Thus it appears that he asserts that each of the minute particles of a composite is a cause of a sensory consciousness and is substantially existent.
又許彼是微塵究竟，故許無分極微是所緣緣。
Since he evidently asserts that each of these is the ultimate of minute particles, he implicitly accepts that partless particles are the perceptual condition for the arising of a sensory consciousness.
是故根識，若無前說內外亂緣之所損害，許為無亂，許於名言是所緣緣，與經部同。
Therefore, Bhavaviveka asserts that sensory consciousnesses are non-mistaken if they are affected by neither the internal nor the external causes of error explained earlier. At the conventional level, he agrees with the Sautrāntikas in his assertions about the perceptual condition for the arising of a consciousness.
◎《入中論釋》云﹕「有說經部師宗說為勝義，中觀諸師即許彼法而為世俗。當知此說是未了知中論真實。有說婆沙諸師所說勝義，中觀諸師許為世俗，此亦未知論之真實。說出世法與世間法而相同等，不應理故。故諸智者決定當知此宗非共，此顯彼諸部宗，不共假
- p.438 -
立無有方分能所取等，雖於名言亦不受許。」
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Some say that the Mādhyamikas accept in conventional terms exactly what the Sautrāntikas advocate ultimately. You should understand that those who say this speak out of sheer ignorance of the reality explained in Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》. Also, there are those who think that Mādhyamikas accept in conventional terms what the Vaibhāsikas advocate ultimately. Those who think this understand nothing at all of the reality set forth in the 《Fundamental Treatise》. For supramundane teachings cannot be likened to worldly teachings in this manner. The learned should know that our system is unique. Thus he does not accept even conventionally the partless subjects and objects that are posited by the distinctive tenets of these schools.
《四百論釋》云﹕「自部諸師如勝論師，許實極微不應正理。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
It is not right for Buddhist schools to assert substantially existent minute particles as do the Vaiśesikas.
此說不許無分極微，前二部師許為勝義，中觀諸師雖於世俗且不許者，謂無方分等事，非說彼二所許實法，中觀諸師於世俗中皆悉不許。
Thus he says that he does not assert partless particles. Candrakirti is referring to things such as partless particles when he says that the Mādhyamikas do not assert in conventional terms what the two schools, Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika, assert ultimately. He does not mean that Mādhyamikas reject, even conventionally, everything those two assert as true,
如色聲等彼許實有，中觀諸師許為世俗。
for while Vaibhāşikas and Sautrāntikas assert that things like forms and sounds are true, Mādhyamikas do accept the mere existence of these conventionally.
《四百論釋》，就諸根微塵積聚位，破許一一是根識因。
In the 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》, Candrakirti refutes the assertion that each minute particle within a collection of minute particles in a sensory faculty is a cause of a sensory consciousness.
又即諸根與諸微塵，若即若離皆不得成。
He argues that the sensory faculties are not established either as being just those minute particles or as being something other than them.
故依彼假立為識所依。如是諸境亦依他立而為假有，是根識境。
Thus, the bases of the sensory consciousnesses are sensory faculties that are ascribed in dependence upon those minute particles. Likewise, in the case of objects, he says that the objects of sensory consciousnesses exist as constructs that are contingently constructed.
此許諸識是假現，諸境是真現，故此論師與清辯論師雖二同許諸外境義，然其安立根境道理，極不相同。
He also asserts that the consciousness is designated as direct [in the sense of perceiving], but the object of consciousness is actually what is direct [that is, directly before consciousness]. Therefore, although the master Candrakirti and the master Bhāvaviveka are alike in accepting external objects, they seem to differ in how they posit the sensory faculties and their objects.
前破根識於自相境為量之時，說「住餘相事現餘相故」，謂色聲等境，於根識前現似有自相，
Earlier, while refuting that the sensory consciousnesses are valid with regard to intrinsic character, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 said that the object of a sensory consciousness is deceptive "because it exists in one way but appears in another." Thus, things like forms and sounds appear to sensory consciousnesses as though they existed by way of their own intrinsic character,
然如所現，雖於名言亦定非有，故此論師雖於名言亦許諸識皆是錯亂。
but the intrinsic character that appears to them does not exist even conventionally. Therefore, Candrakirti asserts that these sensory consciousnesses are mistaken even conventionally.
然諸根識於名言中，是能立色聲等境之量，無不應理。
Still, it is not impossible for sensory consciousnesses to be valid cognitions that posit objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth conventionally. The reason why those sensory consciousnesses are posited as mistaken is that there is no object that exists by way of intrinsic character such as appears to them.
立彼諸識錯亂之因，謂如所現無自相義，此乃觀察有無自相之理智所能成立，非名言量之所能成，故待名言量，非為錯亂。
The nonexistence of such an object is established by a reasoning consciousness analyzing whether things exist intrinsically; it is not at all established by conventional valid cognition. Therefore, in terms of conventional consciousnesses, they are not mistaken.
現第二月及現影像等諸識，如所現義無第二月及本質等不待理智，即名言量便能成立。
As for consciousnesses that perceive things such as a double moon or a reflection, objects such as those which appear to them— two moons, a reflected face, and the like—do not exist; this is established by conventional valid cognition itself without relying on a reasoning consciousness.
故此諸識與前諸識為正倒世俗之差別，亦皆應理。
Thus, it is appropriate that these wrong sensory consciousnesses and the five valid sensory consciousnesses be differentiated as incorrect conventional consciousnesses and correct conventional consciousnesses.
◎若謂由依理智及名言量，通達錯亂雖有差別，然如實無現似本質等義，如是亦無現
- p.439 -
似自相之義。如有自相所空之色等，如是亦有本質所空諸影像等，是故諸識觀待通常之名言覺是倒非倒悉無差別。
Qualm: We allow that it makes a difference whether a consciousness is known as mistaken in dependence upon reasoning consciousness or conventional valid cognition. However, just as the referent of a perception of a reflected image as a face does not exist, so also the referent of a perception of anything as having intrinsic character does not exist. Just as forms and such which are empty of intrinsic character do exist, so also a reflection that is empty of being a face exists. For this reason, one cannot differentiate those perceptions in terms of their accuracy even in relation to ordinary conventional awareness.
若爾反問，自相之體與現似本質之義，於名言中二者同無，色等像等於名言中二者同有。
Reply: Indeed, something that exists by way of its intrinsic character and an object in a reflection that exists in accordance with its appearance as a face are alike in not existing conventionally. Also, forms and reflections are alike in existing conventionally.
則《入中論釋》云﹕「緣起影像及谷響等略為虛妄，具無明者亦可現見，然青等色及心受等略現諦實，其真自性具無明者一切不現，是故此性與於世俗現虛妄者非世俗諦。」
However, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says: Some dependently arisen things—such as reflections and echoes— are false and appear to be false even to the ignorant. Somethings— blue and other forms as well as minds, feelings, etc.—appear to be true. The final nature of things [that is, emptiness] does not appear in any way to those who are ignorant. Therefore, that nature [i.e., emptiness] and whatever is false even conventionally are not conventional truths.
安立青等為世俗諦，不立像等為世俗諦，如此差別不應道理。當有何答。
He thus makes the distinction that blue and so forth are posited as conventional truths, while reflections and such are not. If someone were to challenge this distinction, how could we reply?
若謂此二，於名言識雖同顯現，然影像等由世間識能達為妄，故不立為世間俗諦，青等雖妄，然其為妄由世間識不能證知，故安立為世間俗諦。
This is what I think. Although forms and reflections are alike in appearing to conventional consciousnesses, even a worldly consciousness can know that reflections and such are false; thus, they are not posited as truths for the world, that is, for a conventional consciousness. Blue and such are falsities, but a worldly consciousness cannot understand them as falsities; hence, Candrakirti posits them as truths for the world, that is, for a conventional consciousness.
如彼二境待名言識諦妄應理，如是二心待名言識，是倒非倒亦應正理。
It is thus possible to distinguish objects as true and false in terms of conventional consciousness. It is likewise possible to distinguish subjects as accurate and inaccurate in terms of conventional consciousness.
若謂待名言識既不顛倒，於名言中錯亂相違。
Qualm: If a sensory consciousness is accurate in terms of conventional consciousness, this contradicts its being mistaken conventionally.
若於名言說為錯亂，錯亂之名言與待何識立不顛倒名言之識，二者是一，則犯相違，然彼二種名言各別，有何相違。
Reply: There is the "conventional" in terms of which the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken when we say that they are mistaken conventionally. Then again, there is the "conventional" consciousness in relation to which those unimpaired sensory consciousnesses are posited as accurate. If these two were the same, then there would be a contradiction. However, as these two usages of "conventional" are distinct, what contradiction is there?
謂以正理破除色等有自性體時，非就勝義，須就名言，於此名言識，則諸根識皆是錯亂，除此所餘，於諸通常名言識則非錯亂，故不相違。
How are they distinct? Reason refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of forms and such. It cannot do this ultimately [because nothing can be done ultimately in this system which refutes ultimate existence], so it must do it conventionally. For that kind of conventional consciousness, the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken. Apart from that, the sensory consciousnesses are not mistaken as seen by ordinary conventional consciousnesses; thus there is no contradiction.
譬如世間言說中，說幾人有及幾人無，說云幾者，其語雖一，然所有之幾與所無之幾，不立為同。
For example, it is like the worldly convention, "Some are here; some are not here." The term "some" is the same, but no one supposes that the some who are here and the some who are not here are the same.
又彼錯亂是待通常世識，非中觀師許彼不錯，如云「唯由世為諦」等，故中觀師立彼錯亂。
So also, the "non-mistaken" quality of the sensory consciousnesses is posited in terms of an ordinary worldly consciousness; Mādhyamikas do not assert them to be nonmistaken. It is like the statement by Candrakirti, "Those... are true for the world."
然以安立諸
- p.440 -
虛妄境，亦無相違，若立實境許以亂心而安立者，則成相違。
Therefore, the Mādhyamikas posit the sensory consciousnesses as mistaken. Nonetheless, it is not a contradiction that these sensory consciousnesses posit their false objects. Rather, if a true object were posited, it would be contradictory for us to claim that it was poisted by a mistaken subject.
又於名言，許一切法皆如幻化，故於名言皆是虛妄，然立彼等為世俗諦，亦不相違。
Conventionally, we assert that all phenomena are like a magician's illusion andare, therefore, false in conventional terms. Still, it is not contradictory to posit them as conventional truths.
如云無明障性故世俗，於無明世俗立為諦實，與破諸法有自性時，於彼世俗立為虛妄，二無違故。
[Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》] says, "Because ignorance obscures the nature of phenomena, we call it the concealer." Hence there is no contradiction in something being true for the concealer, that is, ignorance, and false for the conventional consciousness (kun rdzob, samvrti) with which we refute the essential existence in phenomena.
又說於世俗中現虛妄者非世俗諦，謂以名言量能達虛妄者，非說凡於名言為虛妄者。
The statement [in Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary] "whatever is false even conventionally is not a conventional truth" refers to a conventional valid cognition which realizes that things like a reflection's being an actual face are false. It cannot refer simply to forms and such being false in conventional terms.
◎如是中觀師於名言中，自宗安立生死涅槃眾多建立，及於名言破實事師所樂不共妄計諸義。
In this way, we Mādhyamikas posit conventionally, within our own system, many presentations of cyclic existence and nirvāna; we also refute the conventional existence of constructs that are put forward as unique assertions by essentialists.
此諸道理極難通達，故能無倒通達二諦建立者，絕無或有。
As this is extremely difficult, accurate knowledge of the presentation of the two truths scarcely exists.
謂於世俗破實事師所許諸法，須以正理觀察而破，
Misunderstanding may arise as follows. When we refute the conventional existence of the constructs that the essentialists assert, we must carry out the refutation using rational analysis.
然自於世俗許生滅等。亦作是念，具觀慧者許與不許，是由有無能立，能立復待隨正理行。
Moreover, in taking their own stance on matters such as the existence of conventional production and cessation, reflective individuals will decide what to assert according to what can be proven, and proof is based in a sequence of reasoning.
次以正理正觀察時，見自所許諸世俗法，與實事師徧計所執，若正理害二俱妨害，若不妨害二俱不害。
Taking this into consideration, some feel that under rational analysis the proposed conventions of production, etc. and the imaginary constructs of essentialists have the same status as either contradicted or not contradicted by reason.
次見大自在天及自性等，於名言中若許為無，則自色等亦須許無，若於名言許色等有，則自在等亦須許有，二者相等。
Thus, if they deny the conventional existence of constructs such as a divine creator or a primal essence, then they must also deny the conventional existence of forms and such; if they hold that forms do exist conventionally, then they would also have to accept the existence of a divine creator. They see those two as equivalent.
故覺自宗任於何法此是此非皆不可說，恃為獲得中觀真實。
They say that it is inappropriate for their own system to identify or to assert of any phenomenon, "This is such and such; this is not such and such." They presume that in this they have found the Madhyamaka reality.
又有隨順如此誤解，住無所取，便為修習清淨正見尤為眾多。
Further, in accordance with such understanding, they hold that stabilizing your mind without apprehending anything at all is cultivation of the genuine Madhyamaka view.
諸如此類，非是智者所愛正論，由未了知如前所說正理所破，遂以破除自性正理破壞一切名言建立。
There are a great many who assert this. It is evident that such talk does not please the learned. For, having failed to identify the object negated by reason as explained above, those who say this use the arguments that refute intrinsic existence to destroy all presentations of conventionalities.
是執正見與諸邪見，錯則俱錯，不錯則俱不錯，大邪見故。
Consequently, theirs is a highly inaccurate position; it treats the correct view and the wrong view as the same in the degree to which they are mistaken or non-mistaken.
故如
- p.441 -
此類雖長時修，非但不能略近正見返漸遙遠，由與自宗緣起正道，可許一切生死涅槃緣起建立，極相違故。
As a result, prolonged habituation to such a view does not bring you the least bit closer to the correct view. In fact, it takes you farther away from it, for such a wrong view stands in stark contradiction to the path of dependent-arising, the path in which all of the teachings on the dependent-arisings of cyclic existence and nirvāna are tenable within our system.
◎《入中論》云﹕「無知睡擾諸外道，如其徧計妄計我，幻陽燄等諸徧計，此於世間亦非有。」
Therefore, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
The self as it is imagined by the non-Buddhist philosophers
Who are disturbed by the sleep of ignorance,
And things that are ascribed to mirages,
Magicians' illusions, and so forth, do not exist even for the world.
此說外道不共欲樂及如前引自部實事諸師不共欲樂諸徧計執，於自世俗亦說非有，此義當釋。
He says that what is imagined in the unique assertions of non-Buddhist philosophers—or, according to the earlier citation, in the unique assertions of Buddhist essentialists—does not exist even conventionally in our Madhyamaka system. I will explain this point.
此於名言許有許無，為從何門而安立耶?
How does one determine whether something exists conventionally?
謂若有一於名言識是所共許，如所許義，餘名言量無能違害，及能如理觀察真實或有無自性，以此正理亦無違害，則於名言許彼為有，與此相違，即許為無。
We hold that something exists conventionally
(1)if it is known to a conventional consciousness;
(2) if no other conventional valid cognition contradicts its being as it is thus known; and
(3) if reason that accurately analyzes reality—that is, analyzes whether something intrinsically exists—does not contradict it. We hold that what fails to meet those criteria does not exist.
其名言識，謂任於何法，唯如所顯隨順而轉，不更觀察其所現義，為唯於心如是現耶抑為彼義實如是耶，名不思擇真實義識，非是一切全無觀察。
In a sense, conventional consciousness operates in a non-inquisitive manner. It operates only within the context of how a given phenomenon appears to it, without analyzing, "Is this how the object actually exists, or does it just appear this way to my mind?" It is called non-analytical consciousness, but it is not the case that it is utterly non-inquisitive.
此唯如世間共許，或如名言識顯現而轉，非觀真理為何而隨轉故，亦名世許。
It operates within the context of how things appear, how they are known, to a worldly or conventional consciousness. It does not operate via analysis of how things actually exist. Therefore, it is called mundane knowledge.
故如此識徧於宗派，變未變心一切皆有。任於誰身，皆名世許或名無觀察識。
This kind of consciousness occurs in all persons, whether or not they have become involved in philosophical tenet systems. Thus, no matter whose mind-stream it occurs in, this is called "mundane knowledge" or "non-analytical consciousness."
莫執唯於世間常人未以宗派變心者乃有，即由宗派已變心者，雖有眾多有觀察識，謂觀唯如名言許耶抑於真實如是住耶，
Do not suppose that it exists only in the mind-streams of those worldly persons who are not involved in philosophical tenet systems. Those who are involved in such systems may often have minds that analyze, "Is conventional knowledge accurate?" or "Does this object exist this way in reality?"
然非彼一切識，皆是觀察實理之識。
Still, how could all of their consciousnesses analyze how things actually exist?
故問何為世共許，非是唯問離諸宗派世間老人，即可觀察五蘊身中無觀察識，如何而轉，言於彼識共許，謂所顯現或所領納設名言處。
Therefore, if you want to understand what worldly knowledge is, you cannot ask only those worldly elders who hold no philosophical tenets. However, it is sufficient to consider how non-analytical minds operate in the mind-streams of the two parties in a debate. What these consciousnesses know is the perceptual or experiential basis for the construction of conventional language.
- p.442 -
又諸業果及地道等，雖於庸俗未能徧許，然由聽聞及領納等，緣彼境時，於諸通常不觀實理之識，亦能顯現，故無世間不許之過。
Ordinary people do not understand karma and its effects, the levels and paths, or such matters, but they hear about and experience them, thereby taking them as objects. As this is so, they appear even to ordinary consciousnesses that are not analyzing how things actually exist. We thus avoid the fallacy that these would not be things that the world knows.
餘名言量所違害者，譬如於繩妄執為蛇及於陽燄妄執為水，雖是未觀實理識所執取，然彼所取義，由名言量而能違害，故於名言亦無彼等。
Other conventional valid cognitions do not contradict that which exists conventionally. For example, a consciousness that does not analyze how things actually exist may think that a rope is a snake or that a mirage is water. However, conventional valid cognition does contradict the objects apprehended by such consciousnesses, so those objects do not exist even conventionally.
如理觀察有無自性之正理無違害者，謂於名言所立諸義，雖名言量之所成立，然正觀察有無自性正理之識，於一切種定須無害。
A reasoning consciousness that accurately analyzes whether something intrinsically exists does not contradict that which exists conventionally. What is posited conventionally must be established by conventional valid cognition. In addition, reasoning consciousnesses that accurately analyze whether it intrinsically exists definitely must not contradict it in any way.
若由彼理之所成立，是由自性成立為有，則違名言之義。
Whatever such reasoning establishes as existing must exist essentially, so it is contradictory for such to be a conventional object.
故無妄執理智無害與彼所成二事為一，說於名言，從諸善惡感生苦樂與自在自性造生若樂，是則俱是，非則俱非，邪分別處。
Because of this, it is wrong to confuse (1) not being contradicted by a reasoning consciousness and (2) being established by a reasoning consciousness. Such confusion is the basis for the misconception that the following two propositions stand equally, either both true or both false:
自在自性造生苦樂與善不善感生苦樂，二雖俱非觀察有無自性正理之所成立，然以正理違不違害，於一切種不相等故。
1. Pleasure and pain arise conventionally from virtue and nonvirtue.
2. Pleasure and pain arise from a divine creator and a primal essence.
This misconception is incorrect. The two propositions are equivalent to the extent that a line of reasoning that accurately analyzes whether things intrinsically exist will establish neither, but the two are not alike in all respects—one is contradicted by reason and the other is not.
又自他部諸實事師，不共欲樂徧計無時分方分之能取所取，及神我自性大自在等，彼師立時，是以道理已觀自性是否如是，次自亦謂是由如是觀察正理，已得彼義而後安立。
A partless object and subject, a self, a primal essence, a divine creator—such things are imaginary constructs put forward in the unique assertions of Buddhist and non-Buddhist essentialists. When they posit such, they do so after rational analysis of whether such things essentially exist; they think that this sort of rational analysis will discover these things.
故於彼義，以餘觀察有無自性正理觀察，亦應受許。以許彼義是堪正理所觀察故。
Thus, because they assert that these things can withstand rational analysis, they have to accept that others outside of their schools can perform such rational analysis in order to discover whether these things intrinsically exist.
如是觀時，若不能堪無垢正理觀察重擔，故彼非是正理所得，即便遮遣，以彼若有，須此正理所獲得故。
When analyzed in this way, such things cannot withstand the pressure of inquiry by impeccable reasoning. Thus, when reason does not find them, they stand refuted—for if they did exist, such reasoning would have to find them.
色聲等者，唯於無內外亂緣所損名言諸識，如其共許而為安立。
We posit forms, sound, and such only as they are known to conventional consciousnesses that are not impaired by internal or external causes of error.
非觀彼等唯名言耶，亦實義如是耶，
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由彼觀察獲得自性，然後乃許。
We do not assert them as part of a system in which an analysis of whether they are mere conventions or instead have objective existence will find that they are essentially or intrinsically existent.
故於彼等，不可以觀察有無自性之理而為觀察，以未許彼義堪忍正理觀察故。
Thus, rational analysis of whether they intrinsically exist is irrelevant because we do not assert that these objects can withstand rational analysis.
等如有人，說此是羊，不可觀察是馬是象。
For example, if someone claims, "This is a sheep," it is inappropriate to analyze this claim by asking, "Is it a horse or is it an elephant?" This is similar.
又於世間，雖是無始共許之義，若理所害則於名言亦定非有，如由無明於諸法上增益自性，及薩迦耶見執有自性我及我所，及執昨日山為今日山等諸境界，故非世間所許一切，中觀諸師便於世俗而徧受許。
There are things that have been "known to the world" from beginningless time, and yet do not exist even conventionally inasmuch as reason contradicts them. As examples, one can cite the essence that ignorance superimposes on things, the essentially existent "I" and "mine" conceived by the reifying view of the perishing aggregates, or the object of the conception that yesterday's mountain is today's mountain. Therefore, it is not the case that Mādhyamikas conventionally accept everything that is known to the world.
又色聲等，於名言中與諸外道妄執假立，有無不同之理，有說前者，一切世間皆可共許，後唯邪宗乃稱說故。
Some argue that in terms of conventional existence, forms, sounds, and so forth are not equivalent to the constructs of non-Buddhist philosophers for the reason that the former are known to all the world whereas the latter are known only to advocates of philosophical tenets.
此未能判別，若不爾者，於名言中應無如幻色等，應有自性所成，此過繁多。
Those who hold this position have failed to make careful distinctions. Otherwise, they would see the many unwanted implications of their argument, such as: In conventional terms, forms and such could not be like illusions; rather, at the conventional level they would have to exist essentially.
《六十正理論釋》云﹕「又顛倒者，謂執樂等，雖於世俗諸法亦非住彼性故。不顛倒者，謂執苦等，於世俗中諸法容有彼體性故。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》 says:
The inaccurate are those that apprehend these things in cyclic existence only as blissful and so forth, because even conventionally these things do not have this nature. The accurate are those that apprehend these things as suffering and so forth because these things have such a nature conventionally.
此說常恆等四，雖於世間共同稱許，然執是為彼雖於世俗亦說為倒，無常等四，雖於世間未徧稱許，然執是彼則不顛倒。
He explains that although the permanence and so forth of the things of cyclic existence is "common knowledge" in the world, such conceptions are inaccurate even conventionally. Also, even though their impermanence and so forth are not known to all the world, such conceptions are accurate.
如是執蘊為無常等之分別，雖於現境有所錯亂，然於執境無量能害，故名不倒或不錯亂。
Thus, a conceptual consciousness which apprehends the aggregates as impermanent and so forth is mistaken with regard to its appearing object, but we call it accurate, or non-mistaken, insofar as What it discerns is not contradicted by valid cognition.
諸根之識，於現境錯亂，又無所餘無錯亂分，故不名無錯亂。
Sensory consciousnesses are mistaken with regard to their appearing objects, and we do not call them non-mistaken since they have no other factor that is non-mistaken.
又諸根識，於所顯現錯亂雖同，然如所顯義，就世間有無，則現影像等之根識，是邪世俗。
All sensory consciousnesses are alike in being mistaken with regard to what appears to them. However, sensory consciousnesses such as those to which a reflection appears are incorrect conventional consciousnesses; other, unimpaired sensory consciousnesses are correct conventional consciousnesses.
除此諸餘無損根識，是正世俗。
This is based on whether there is an object compatible with what appears to the worldly perspective of that sensory consciousness.
又諸分別執蘊常等之境名言中無，故可破除。然執無常等之境名言中有，故非正理所能破除。
Since the objects conceived by conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend the aggregates as permanent and so forth do not exist Conventionally, reason can refute them. However, the referent objects of the conceptions of the aggregates as impermanent, etc. do exist conventionally; hence, reason cannot refute them.
又於勝義，或由
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自性所成常等四法，而非是有，如是於彼二中，無常等四亦是非有，故觀待真實，執有彼八，全無是倒非倒之別。
There is no ultimate or essential permanence and so forth; likewise, there is no ultimate or essential impermanence and so forth. Therefore the conceptions of those eight as existing in reality are identical in their degree accuracy.
故密意說，「隨行色常無常苦樂有我無我皆行於相。」
Thinking of this, the Buddha said [in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras] that you are meditating on signs of true existence whether you meditate upon forms as permanent or impermanent, as blissful or painful, as having self or not having self.
◎若謂若以正理，破於諸法增益自性無明之執，而不破壞名言諸義，二者相違。
Qualm: Ignorance superimposes intrinsic nature on things. For you to use reason to overcome its perspective, yet not to refute conventional objects—this is a contradiction,
《入中論》云﹕「癡覆自性故世俗，由此偽法現諦實，佛說彼是世俗諦。」
because Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" says:
The Sage said that because ignorance obscures the nature of phenomena,
It is a "concealer" (kun rdzob, samvrti).
The fabrications that it perceives as true
Are called "truths-for-a-concealer".
此說由無明增上安立色等為世俗諦故。
Thus Candrakirti says that forms, sounds, and so forth are posited as conventional truths through the force of ignorance.
答曰﹕無過。
Reply: There is no fault here.
立色聲等為世俗諦之諦，是由意樂增上為諦。
When we posit things such as forms and sounds as conventional truths, "truth" means that they are true through the force of a particular thought.
此意須是諦執，故於增益自性無明而為諦。
Since that thought must be considered a conception of true existence, forms, sounds, and so forth are truths for the ignorance that superimposes intrinsic existence on them.
故於已斷染污無明二阿羅漢及八地以上諸菩薩前，所現諸法唯虛偽性非諦實性，以無諦實增上慢故。
Therefore, Candrakirti refers to the two types of arhats who have eliminated afflicted ignorance and to bodhisattvas on the eighth level and above when he says, "They see these appearances as fabrications and not as true because they do not have an exaggerating conception of true existence."
論說於諸無實執者，唯現世俗，其理即此。
For this reason, Candrakirti says that for those who do not have the conception of true existence, forms and so forth are "mere conventionalities."
故色聲等，雖由無明立為諦實，然非由無明立色聲等，譬於執繩為蛇之邪識，雖繩為蛇，然繩非由彼邪識安立。
Therefore, the truth of forms, sounds, and such is posited in the perspective of ignorance, but ignorance does not posit things such as forms and sounds. For example, from the perspective of a wrong consciousness that apprehends a rope as a snake, the rope is a snake, but this wrong consciousness does not posit the rope.
其能安立色聲等之心，謂無損害眼等六識。
Since the minds that posit things like form and sound are the six unimpaired consciousnesses associated with the eye, etc.,
故此所立義名言中有，非是正理所能破除，其無明所執，雖於世俗亦非有，以此是於諸法增益自性，如此自性，雖於名言亦定無故。
the objects they establish do exist conventionally, and thus reason does not refute them. However, even conventionally they do not exist as ignorance apprehends them. This is because ignorance superimposes an essential or intrinsic nature on things, and this intrinsic nature does not exist even conventionally.
是故正理雖於名言亦能破除，假若正理不能破此，則於名言不能成立諸法如幻。
Therefore, reason conventionally refutes what ignorance apprehends; if it did not, then you could not prove that, at the conventional level, things are like illusions.
又於愚癡所增自性，次更增益愛非愛等諸差別相起貪瞋等，故以正理亦能破壞貪等行相。
Ignorance superimposes an intrinsic nature on things; from this, attachment, hostility, and so forth arise, further superimposing features such as attractiveness or unattractiveness upon that intrinsic nature. Therefore, reason can also be used to eradicate the way that attachment and such apprehend objects.
如《四百論釋》云﹕「貪等唯於癡所徧計諸法自性，而更增益愛非愛等差別而轉，故非異癡
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而轉，必依於癡，癡最勝故。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
Attachment and so forth superimpose features such as attractiveness or unattractiveness only upon the intrinsic nature of things that ignorance has superimposed. Therefore they do not work apart from ignorance; they depend upon ignorance. This is because ignorance is the main affliction.
此諸煩惱，雖是無始俱生而轉，然彼行相正理能破，故彼所著境，名言亦無。
These are the innate afflictions that have operated from beginningless time. However, because reason can eradicate the way that they apprehend things, their referent objects do not exist even conventionally.
是故俱生心有二境，謂以正理能不能破。
Therefore, objects of innate minds are of two types: those that reason can refute and those that reason cannot refute.
其能安立此色聲等諸名言量俱生之境，名言中有，非以正理所能破除。
The objects of the innate conventional valid cognitions that posit things like form and sound do exist conventionally; hence, reason does not refute them.
如是佛護論師及月稱論師宗中，雖於名言亦破自性，故名言諸義極難安立。
Accordingly, since we refute essential or intrinsic existence even conventionally in the system of the masters Buddhapālita and Candrakirti, it seems to be very difficult to posit conventional objects.
若未善知安立彼等離諸妨難，則於行品不能善得定解，現見多成毀謗惡見，故具慧者，應當善巧此宗安立世俗之理，恐繁不說。
If you do not understand how to posit these well, without contradiction, then you will not be fully certain about the practices on the performance class." It seems that this causes most individuals to fall into an overly negative view. Therefore, the intelligent should master this system's procedure for positing conventionalities. At this point, I am afraid I may have said more than enough about this; I will not elaborate any further.
◎第三觀察是否四句所生而為破除，顯不能破。
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.3 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are produced in one of four alternative ways.
由破自，他，俱，無因生，若能破生，則四句生雖於名言此宗說無，故於破生不須簡別。
Objection: Madhyamaka refutes production from self, from another, and from both, as well as causeless production. Does this refute production? If you claim that it does, then since these four alternative types of production do not exist even conventionally in this Madhyamaka system, there is no need to add any qualifying phrase to the refutation of production.
若不能破，則破四生亦不能破勝義之生。
If you claim that it does not, then your refutation of the four alternatives of production fails to refute ultimate production.
前說非許，當答後難。
Reply: We do not accept the former of these two positions, so I will explain the answer to the latter.
若許勝義之生，須許堪忍觀真實性正理觀察。
Those who assert ultimate production must assert that it with stands analysis by reasoning that analyzes reality.
爾時須以正理觀察自他等四從何句生，由許勝義生，故定須許四句隨一觀察。
As this is so, they must use reason to analyze production so as to discover which it is among the four alternatives—production from self, other, and so forth. Hence, those who assert ultimate production are definitely required to assert that it can be analytically fixed within one of the four alternatives.
若僅受許依此因緣有此生起，未許實生。
Because we assert mere production—the arising of particular effects in dependence on particular causes and conditions—we do not assert real production.
未許彼故，云何能以觀真實之理，觀從自他等何者而生，以不須許堪忍正理所觀察故。
Since we do not assert real production, why would we use reasoning that analyzes reality to analyze production as to which it is—production from self, other, and so forth? For, we are not required to assert that production withstands rational analysis.
又依緣生，即能破除四句之生，《入中論》云﹕「諸法依緣起，非分別能觀，故此緣起理，斷諸惡見綱。」
Moreover, dependent production itself refutes the four alternative types of production. As Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Because things arise dependently These mistaken conceptions cannot bear scrutiny. Therefore, the reasoning of dependent-arising Cuts all the entanglements of bad views.
故月稱論師，許依緣生破四句生，汝若許不從四句生則全無生，故違月稱所許而說。
Therefore, Candrakirti asserts that dependent production refutes the four alternative types of production. However, you claim that if there is no production from among the four alternative types, then even mere production does not exist. Hence it seems that what you propose is the opposite of what Candrakirti asserts.
又彼論云﹕「無因自在等，及從自他俱，非能生諸法，是故依緣生。」
Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" also says:
Because things are not produced
Causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator,
Or from self, other, or both self and other,
They are produced dependently.
如汝則成自語相違，
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故依緣而生之緣起，永離四邊。
However, according to you, it would be contradictory for Candrakirti to say this. Therefore, dependently produced dependent-arisings are free from the four extreme types of production.
莫更問云，離四邊者為四何邊，此等亦是未分無生自性無生二者差別而成過失。
So do not ask, "That which is free from extremes—which of the four extremes is it?" Once again, these opponents go wrong by not distinguishing "no intrinsic production" from "no production."
云何論說，「真實時若理，觀從自他生，非理以此理，名言亦非理。」
Qualm: How do you explain the statement in Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way":
The argument which shows that production from self and from other
Are untenable in the context of ultimate reality
Also shows that production is untenable even conventionally.
此顯若許自相之生或實有生，則於名言由彼正理亦能破除，然非破生。
Reply: This means that if you assert substantially existent production, or production that exists by way of its intrinsic character, then those arguments refute it even conventionally. It does not at all indicate a refutation of mere production,
即彼論結合文云﹕「若謂染淨之因須實體生，此說唯餘言說存在，何以故，真實時等。」
for in the transition to that passage, [Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》] says:
Objection: The things that serve as the causes of afflicted and pure phenomena must produce substantially existent entities.
Reply: If this were so, then the very words of your statement would not remain. Why?
廣引彼頌，其釋又云﹕「故自相生，於二諦中皆悉非有 ，雖非樂欲亦當受許。」
At this point Candrakirti gives the verse cited above, "The argument which shows that production from self and from other...." Commenting on that verse, he says: You must therefore admit, albeit unwillingly, that production by way of intrinsic character does not exist in terms of either of the two truths.
故自性生是勝義生，若此許者雖名言許，如彼勝義生而當破除。
Thus, insofar as essentially existent production is ultimate production, when others assert it—even if they assert it conventionally— you must refute its propriety just as you refute ultimate production.
是此論師所許勝處，故於名言亦不應許有自性生。
Since this is the excellent assertion of the master Candrakirti, you should not assert essentially existent production even conventionally.
◎《入中論》云﹕「如石女兒自體生，真實中無世非有，如是諸法由自性，世間真實皆不生。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
The self-generation of the son of a barren woman
Exists neither in reality nor in the world.
Similarly, all these things lack essential production
Both for the world and in reality.
若執自性無生或無生性謂全無生，反難緣生與無性生二者相違，呵為無耳無心。
Some hold that the lack of intrinsic production—production's lack of intrinsic existence—must mean that production does not exist. They argue that dependent production and the absence of intrinsic production are contradictory. Candrakirti says [in the Commentary on the "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" that those who say this have no ears or heart.
說無性生，未聞所說自性，妄執無生意謂無耳，及說自性未解其義，意謂無心。
In saying that they have no ears, he means that they do not hear the qualification "intrinsic" when we refer to the lack of intrinsic production; they hold that we have said, "lack of production." In saying that they have no heart, he means that even if they hear it they have no comprehension of the meaning of the word "intrinsic."
如《六十正理論》云﹕「緣生即無生，勝見真實說，」
Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
The supreme knower of reality e
Said that dependent production is not production.
其釋中云﹕「若見緣起諸法自性皆不可得，以依緣生者，即如影像，無性生故。
Commenting on that passage, Candrakirti's Commentary on the 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
When you see dependent-arising, you do not perceive things as intrinsically existent. This is because the dependently produced is not intrinsically produced, like a reflection.
若謂既依緣生豈非是生，云何說彼無生，若云無生則不應說是依緣生，故此非理互相違故。
Objection: Is it not the case that the dependently produced is only produced? How can you say that it is not produced? If you say that something is not produced, then you should not say that it is dependently produced. Therefore, because these are mutually exclusive, your position is incorrect.
噫唏嗚呼無心無耳，亦相攻難，此實令我極為難處。若時我說依緣生法，即如影像自性無生，爾時豈有可攻難處。」
Reply: Poor thing! With neither ears nor heart, you still argue. This puts us in a difficult situation. We contend that dependently produced things are, like reflections, not produced intrinsically. As this is the case, how can your objection stand a chance?
故應珍重判彼差別。
Thus you should cherish these distinctions.
《無熱惱請問經》云﹕
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「若從緣生即無生，於彼非有生自性，若法仗緣說彼空，若了知空不放逸。」
Also, the 《Question of the Nāga King Anavatapta》 says:
Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced;
It is not intrinsically produced.
Whatever depends upon conditions, I consider empty;
One who knows emptiness is diligent.
初句說言「緣生即無生」，第二句顯示無生之理云﹕「於彼非有生自性。」是於所破加簡別，言謂無性生。
After the Buddha has stated in the first line, "Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced," he indicates with the second line the manner of non-production, "It is not intrinsically produced." Thus, adding a qualifying phrase to the object of negation, the Buddha says that things are not produced intrinsically.
頗見一類，聞彼諸句未解彼理，專相違說，「生即無生，依即無依」，狂言愈大，知見愈高。
Some hear these words and do not understand them; they say, "Only the produced is not produced; only the dependent does not depend." They evidently think that aggressively advocating this mass of contradictions constitutes an advanced view.
《明顯句論》引《楞伽經》云﹕「大慧，無自性生，我密意說一切法無生，」此說極顯。
This is also stated very clearly in the 《Descent into Lanka Sūtra》 as quoted by Candrakirti in his 《Clear Words》:
Mahamati, thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced.
又破生等應不應加勝義簡別，義雖已答，然分別答至下當說。
This actually answers the question whether the qualification "ultimately" should be added to the refutation of production and so forth. However, I will answer this question more specifically below.
此等皆是，顯示彼一切能破，皆不能破無自性中因果建立。
These points explained above indicate that none of the refutations set forth by opponents can refute this procedure for positing things such as cause and effect in the absence of intrinsic existence.
似能破中最究竟者，謂自破他如何觀察，即彼諸過於自能破無餘徧轉。
In general, the height of false refutation is an argument that obliterates the analysis that was supposed to refute the opponent, leaving no trace.
汝等所立，即似能破最究竟者。以破他宗觀察正理害不害等皆被遮迴，其能破理成所破故。
Thus, your statement is the height of false refutation. This is because the method you use to refute your opponent's position, analyzing whether reason contradicts it and so forth, can be turned against you and used to refute your critique.
若謂汝許有色等，故於彼等此觀察轉，我等無宗故，彼觀察不能轉入。
Qualm: You assert the existence of forms and such, so the analysis of them in terms of the four alternatives does bear upon your position. We, however, have no position of our own, so such analysis does not apply to us.
此答不能斷彼諸過，於應成派及自續派，何决擇時茲當宣說。
Reply: This argument cannot avoid those fallacies. I will explain this later in the section on whether the view is established through reductio ad absurdum arguments or through autonomous syllogisms.
◎第四破除有事無事四句無能妨害。
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.4 A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena
若謂中觀諸教典中，破一切事，或破自性有無二俱二非四句無不攝法，故以正理能破一切。
Qualm: The Madhyamaka texts refute all four parts of the tetralemma—a thing or intrinsic nature (1) exists, (2) does not exist, (3) both exists and does not exist, and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four.
此如前說事有二種，若以自性所成之事，隨於二諦許何諦有皆當破除，能作用事於名言中非能破除。
Reply: As indicated earlier, "thing" has two meanings. Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however, at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions.
又無事中，若於無為許由自性所成無事，如此無事亦當破除，如是之有事無事二俱當破，有自性之俱非亦當破除。
As for non-things, if you hold that non-compounded phenomena are essentially existent non-things, then we also refute such non-things. We likewise refute something that is both such a thing and such a non-thing, and We also refute something that essentially exists as neither.
故一切
- p.448 -
破四句之理，皆當如是知。
Thus, you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as "essentially."
若未能加如此簡別而破四句，破除有事及無事時，
Suppose that you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;
作是破云﹕「俱非彼二。」
you then say, "It is not the case that they both exist and do not exist."
次又破云﹕「亦非非二。」是自許相違。
If you now continue with the refutation, saying, "It is also not the case that they are neither existent nor nonexistent," then you explicitly contradict your own position.
雖知如是而云無過，強抵賴者，我等不與瘋狂共諍。
If you then stubbornly insist, "Even so, there is no fallacy," then the debate is over because we do not debate with the obstinate.
復次破蘊自性之體，或破其我便發智慧，了無自性或了無我。
Furthermore, when you refute essential or intrinsic nature, or self, With regard to the aggregates, this gives rise to a wisdom consciousness thinking, "Intrinsic nature, or self, does not exist."
若復破慧無自性境，是為破壞中觀正見，由破能達諸法無性智慧境故。
If you also refute the lack of intrinsic nature that is the object of that wisdom consciousness, then you are refuting the Madhyamaka view. This is because you have refuted the object of the wisdom consciousness that knows that phenomena lack intrinsic nature.
若許雙破有無自性，應問彼云，決定諸蘊無自性慧，其境無性如何能破，應當宣說。
This is what I ask of those who claim to refute both intrinsic nature and the absence of intrinsic nature: Please tell me how you refute the absence of intrinsic nature that is the object of the wisdom consciousness ascertaining that the aggregates do not intrinsically exist.
若謂《中論》云﹕「若少有非空，亦當有少空，若無少不空，空亦云何有。」
Qualm: Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
If there were the slightest trace which is non-empty,
Then a trace of emptiness would exist as well;
As there is no trace that is non-empty,
How could there be a trace of emptiness?
全無不空故，無自性空亦非有。
Therefore, because there is nothing that is not empty, the emptiness that is the absence of intrinsic existence also does not exist.
此中空不空者，謂有自性空與不空，全論前後一切皆然。
Reply: Here in the 《Fundamental Treatise》, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end.
故性不空即是有性。若謂無少自性無性之空亦非有者，更有何事尤為可笑。
Thus "not empty of intrinsic nature" means "having intrinsic nature." What could be more ridiculous than your position that since there is no intrinsic nature, the emptiness that is the absence of intrinsic nature also does not exist!
如於苗芽執無自性時，此決定解唯於苗芽執性非有，俱不執云，其無自性為有為無，應當閉目向內觀之極易明了。
Furthermore, the definite knowledge which apprehends that something such as a seedling lacks essential or intrinsic nature apprehends that there is no intrinsic nature in the seedling. It does not think, "This absence of intrinsic nature exists," nor does it think, "This absence of intrinsic nature does not exist." Close your eyes, turn inward, and know this; it is very easy to understand.
由是因緣，於無自性不可執有，為遣更執無性為有，故以正理破有空性。
It would not be appropriate to apprehend the absence of intrinsic nature as existing in that way.
縱使應理，然亦唯是更以餘心，破除另執無性為有覺心之境，若破通達苗芽無性智慧之境極不應理。
Suppose that this did mean that it is proper to use reason to refute the existence of emptiness in order to overcome the conception that the absence of intrinsic nature exists. You would still have to hold that you are refuting the object of some other mind which apprehends the absence of intrinsic nature as something that exists; it would be quite wrong to refute the object of the wisdom that realizes that a seedling does not intrinsically exist.
我等破除苗芽自性，便決定解自性非有，次由餘心縱執無性是有，然所執境亦非正理所破。
When we refute the essential or intrinsic nature of a seedling, we have definite knowledge that the seedling does not intrinsically exist. Then, even if some other awareness apprehends that absence of intrinsic nature as existing, reason does not refute the object of that other mind.
若許空性是有自性，則當破除。
However, if that mind holds that emptiness exists essentially, then reason does refute that.
若爾於無自性，云何能起有自性執，
Qualm: How could someone develop an apprehension that the absence of intrinsic nature intrinsically exists?
謂緣苗芽無自性時，雖不執苗有自性，然能起執苗之無性是有自性。
Reply. In perceiving the seedling's lack of intrinsic nature, you do not establish this lack as the seedling's intrinsic nature. Still, you might develop the idea that the absence of intrinsic nature is the intrinsic nature of that seedling.
如於
- p.449 -
無瓶，雖不執謂瓶實是有，然能執謂無瓶是實。
For example, in the absence of a pot, you would not develop the idea, "The truth is that there is a pot," but you might develop the idea, "The truth is that there is no pot."
由是若說，以無少許非自性空，故芽無性空亦無自性，是為正因。
Accordingly, since there is nothing at all that is not empty of intrinsic existence, it is perfectly reasonable to say that even the emptiness which is a seedling's lack of intrinsic nature lacks essential existence.
《四百論釋》說，是破有性之空，如云「若所說空少有自性，是則諸法亦當有性。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 speaks of refuting the essential existence of emptiness:
If that which is called emptiness did have some essential existence, then things would have intrinsic nature.
為顯非有，故說頌言，「若無不空者，空復從何生，如無餘所治，能治云何起。」
However, it does not. In order to indicate this, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
As there is nothing that is not empty,
From what can emptiness arise?
As there is nothing to oppose,
How can there be a remedy?
不爾若破無性之空，則無無性。
If you disagree, and you refute the existence of the emptiness which is the absence of intrinsic nature, then the absence of intrinsic nature would not exist.
若爾則當有自性體，於一切種性不可破。
In that case, since essential or intrinsic nature would exist, it would be totally inappropriate to refute intrinsic nature.
如《迴諍論》云﹕「若即無自性，能遣無自性，遮無自性已，即成有自性。」
For, in this vein, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
How could the absence of intrinsic nature in my words
Refute my claim that things lack intrinsic nature?
If the absence of intrinsic nature were refuted,
Then the presence of intrinsic nature would be proven.
自釋亦云﹕「如云莫言即言遮言，如是若以無自性語遣法無性其喻應理。然此唯以無自性語，破諸法性，若無性言即能遣除諸法無性，破無性故諸法有性，有自性故即非是空。」此說極顯。
And, Nāgārjuna's 《Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"》, commenting on that, says very clearly:
Objection: Just as someone might stop sound with the sound, "Don't make a sound," so the absence of intrinsic existence in your words refutes your claim that there is no intrinsic nature in things.
Reply: The example is correct, but your point is not. Here, words that have no intrinsic nature do refute the intrinsic existence of things. If the absence of intrinsic nature in words could refute the absence of intrinsic nature in things, then this would refute the absence of intrinsic nature itself. Therefore, things would have intrinsic nature, and because of having intrinsic nature, they would not be empty.
故前所引《中觀論》云﹕「空亦云何有，」
Therefore—just after the passage in the 《Fundamental Treatise》 cited above, "How could there be a trace of emptiness?"
其後又云﹕「諸佛說空性，為出一切見，若復見於空，說彼無可治。」
Nāgārjuna says:
The Conqueror said that emptiness
Eradicates all dogmatic views;
As for those who take a dogmatic view of emptiness,
He said that they are incurable.
此說見於空者，非說凡見自性為空，是說於性空之空執為諦實或見為實事。
Again, having a dogmatic view of emptiness does not mean taking the view that things are empty of intrinsic nature. It means thinking of emptiness, emptiness of intrinsic nature, as truly existent or viewing it as a real thing.
《佛護論》云﹕「若執諸法有性為彼說空，謂由緣起因緣增上假名有事，非是諸事實有自性，由顯諸法自性空故，能遣彼執。若有於空執為實事，誰亦不能破除其執，譬如說云，悉無所有，若復乞云，其無所有願當惠施，何能令彼了解為無，」及喻顯說。
For, Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 says this very clearly, giving an example: It is possible to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that things exist essentially. You can explain emptiness and show them that things are empty of essence, saying, "As these are dependent-arisings, they are designated as this or that thing through the force of causes and conditions; things do not exist essentially." However, there is no way to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that emptiness is a real thing. For example, if you tell someone, "I have nothing," and that person then says, "Give me that nothing," how could you make that person understand that you have nothing?
若不爾者，喻則不合，猶如有一向他乞財，說無財時，若作是念，此人無財，此執非過。
If it is not taken in this way, the example would also be inappropriate. Suppose you say to me, "Give me some money," and I reply, "I have no money." If you conclude, "This person has no money," then there is no problem.
若於無財反執為財，爾時不能令知無財。
However, if you think of "no money" as a kind of money, then there is no way that I can assure you that I have no money.
若問諸法有無自
- p.450 -
性，告曰無性，若執無性，說者實欲令起是解，彼豈是過。
In just the same way, suppose you ask, "Do things have intrinsic nature or not?" and I say, "They do not have intrinsic nature." If you then think, "Things do not have intrinsic nature," how could that be a problem? I wanted you to get this idea.
然於無性反執有性，是為過失。
However, if you think that things' lack of intrinsic nature is itself intrinsically existent, then this is a problem.
若依汝意說，無財時執為無財，亦當被破，故依我說最為端嚴。
According to your interpretation, when you hear me say that I have no money and then develop the idea, "This person has no money," then even that idea must be refuted. So it would be wonderful for you to rely on what I have said.
《明顯句論》云﹕「於空執事」非是破空，故唯見空亦非有過。
Also, in the 《Clear Words》 Candrakīrti speaks of clinging to emptinessas a real thing, hence, he is not refuting emptiness itself, and there is no fault in simply having the view of emptiness.
故《般若攝頌》說，「菩薩若執此蘊空，行相非信無生處。」
The 《Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines》 says:
A bodhisattva who thinks, "The aggregates are empty," is meditating on signs and lacks faith in the realm of non-production.
《寶鬘論》說，「諸見我無我，故大能仁遮。」
Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》 says:
Therefore the Great Sage refuted
Views of self and selflessness.
諸餘經論說，不可起空無我見，皆如前說應當了知。
Although these and other scriptures and treatises say that it is wrong to have a view of emptiness or selflessness, you should understand them as I have explained above.
若不爾者，則舍利子問觀自在，欲行甚深般若波羅蜜多當云何學，答云「應正隨觀彼諸五蘊皆自性空。」
Otherwise, they would contradict a great many statements in other texts. In the 《Heart Sūtra》, Śariputra asks Avalokiteśvara how one who wishes to practice the profound perfection of wisdom should train. In reply, Avalokiteśvara says: A bodhisattva should correctly view these five aggregates as empty of intrinsic existence.
《攝頌》云﹕「徧知諸法無自性，是行般若波羅蜜。」
The 《Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines》 says:
One who knows that phenomena do not intrinsically exist is practicing the supreme perfection of wisdom.
《入中論》云﹕「故由觀我我所空，此瑜伽師當解脫，」此等多能與彼相違。
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Consequently, a yogi views the emptiness of the self
And that which belongs to the self, and thereby becomes free.
是故一切衰損根本，即是增益自性無明，而能與彼行相正反，拔除彼者，唯達無性或無我慧。
Therefore, the root of all problems is the ignorance that superimposes intrinsic existence. There is only one consciousness that can uproot it by apprehending things in a way that explicitly contradicts it. That consciousness is the wisdom that knows selflessness, the absence of intrinsic existence.
若破此相即破真實義見，雖非所樂然須受許。
As this is so, if you refute this way of apprehending things, then you will have to admit, albeit unwillingly, that you are refuting the view of reality.
《四百論》云﹕「無二寂靜門。」
At the point where Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says, "There is no second door to peace,"
釋云，永盡貪愛是能證得涅槃之因，除無性見更無少法，是能如是盡貪之因，故無自性為相無我，是無第二寂靜之門，趣涅槃城，此乃無等唯一之門。
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four hundred Stanzas"》 says:
The extinction of attachment is the cause of attaining nirvāna and, except for the view of the absence of intrinsic existence, there is no other teaching that can cause that extinction of attachment. Thus, selflessness—characterized by the absence of intrinsic existence—is the one and only door to peace. As a gateway to the city of nirvāna, it is alone, and nothing can match it.
雖亦有空無相無願三解脫門，然唯無我正見最勝，由了諸法悉皆無我，一切法貪無餘永盡，豈於少法見少可求或相可緣。
Although there are the three doors of liberation called "emptiness," "signlessness," and "wishlessness," still only the view of selflessness takes priority. If you know phenomena without exception as selfless and thereby extinguish every attachment to all things, then how could you ever long for anything or apprehend signs in anything?
故唯無我是無第二寂靜之門。
Because of this, selflessness alone is the one and only door to peace.
是故《菩提資糧論》云﹕「無自性故空，是空取何相，遣一切相故，智者何所願。」
Therefore, the 《Equipment for Enlightenment》 explains:
Because phenomena do not intrinsically exist, they are empty.
Further, because phenomena are empty, what use are signs?
Inasmuch as they have overcome all signs
Why would the learned wish for such phenomena?
此將經說三解脫門，與此處說唯性空
- p.451 -
見一解脫門，斷相違失，以教理成此為解脫門。
Thus Candrakirti clears up the apparent contradiction between scriptural explanations that there are three doors to liberation and other texts which explain that the view of emptiness of intrinsic existence is the only door to liberation. He uses scripture and reason to prove that just this view is the door to liberation.
斷性之境何須更破以證彼者即能對治二我相執，於彼全無相執氣故。
Why should the mere negation of intrinsic nature imply the refutation of the object of wisdom? It should not, for such knowledge remedies the conceptions of the two selves assigns and it lacks even a trace of such a misconception.
若於如此分別亦見過患，善惡分別悉破除者，顯然欲樹支那堪布所遺教規。
If you regard as defective even such a conception, and refute all conceptuality of any sort—good or bad—then it is evident that you want to set up the system of the Chinese abbot Ha-shang.
◎第二破所破太狹。
1.3.2.1.2.2 Refuting an overly restricted identification of the object to be negated
有作是言，所破自性具三差別，一自性非由因緣所生，二時位無變，三不待他立。
Opponent: The object to be negated is an intrinsic nature that has three attributes:
(1) causes and conditions do not bring it into being,
(2) its condition is immutable, and
(3) it is posited without depending on some other phenomenon.
如《中論》云﹕「自性從因緣，出生則非理，若從因緣生，性應成所作。若性是所作，云何應道理。自性非新作，及不觀待他。」
For, Nãgàrjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
It is not reasonable that a nature
Should arise from causes and conditions.
If it did arise from causes and conditions
Then a nature would be something that is made.
How could it be suitable
For a nature to be something that is made?
A nature is not fabricated
And does not depend on another.
若許芽等內外諸法有如是性，中觀諸師雖亦須破，然於此中明所破者是當明其所破根本，由破彼故，須於相續生中觀見，證法無性。
Reply. In general, if someone claims that internal and external things—e.g., seedlings—have "intrinsic nature" in this sense, then Mādhyamikas indeed must refute such. However, here, identifying the object to be negated means identifying the fundamental object of negation. When you refute the fundamental object of negation, then the Madhyamaka view—knowledge that phenomena lack intrinsic nature—develops in your mind-stream.
諸有為法是因緣生及有變壞，自部諸師皆共極成，對彼不應更成無性，彼亦應達諸法無性。有是等過，故彼豈是不共所破。
Fallacies arise if we follow this opponent's interpretation. Since the partisans of non-Madhyamaka Buddhist schools have already established that compounded phenomena are produced by causes and conditions and are mutable, we should not have to demonstrate to them the absence of intrinsic nature. They also should have recognized that things lack intrinsic nature. So how can this be the unique Madhyamaka object of negation?
雖中觀論多難彼云﹕「若有自性，應不待因緣及不變等。」是就能徧說彼過失，非就所破當體而明。
Many Madhyamaka texts adduce arguments such as: If things existed essentially, then they could not depend on causes and conditions, they would have to be immutable, and so forth. However, these statements indicate fallacies that would be entailed if things existed essentially; they do not identify the object of negation on its own terms.
又勝義有及真實有並諦實有，亦應不由因緣生等，然彼非是勝義等義。
It is the case that if something existed ultimately, existed in reality, or truly existed, then it could not depend on causes and conditions, and so forth; however, that is not what ultimate existence means.
譬如於瓶雖徧無常，然非無常即是瓶義，雖立大腹等為瓶之義。
For example, even though being a potentails being impermanent, impermanence is not the proper meaning of pot; rather you have to say that it means a "bulbous splay-based thing able to perform the function of holding water."
如是若勝義有等，雖應許為無方分法，然非無方分法即根本所破，以彼唯是宗派妄執不共假立，此執非諸有情繫縛生死之本故。
Likewise, if something existed ultimately, etc., it would have to be a partless thing; still, here in Madhyamaka we do not suggest that "partless thing" is the fundamental object of negation. Since partless things are merely imputed from the unique perspective of advocates of philosophical tenets, such notions are not the fundamental cause that binds embodied beings in cyclic existence.
又雖决擇彼無自性極善修習，然於無始無明妄執全
- p.452 -
無違害，即使究竟現證彼義，然終不能遣除俱生諸煩惱故。
Further, even if you determined that those partless things lack intrinsic nature and then meditated on that, this would not at all counter the ignorant conception which has operated from beginningless time. Therefore, even optimal and direct knowledge of that would not overcome the innate afflictions.
故以正見善決擇時，若不了知正為決擇俱生無明所執義無，於彼支分破除分別所執諸境，不破俱生無明行相。
Thus, when making philosophical determinations, make your principal task to determine that an object as conceived by innate ignorance does not exist. Ancillary to that, refute objects of acquired misconceptions.
破人我時，惟破常一自在之我，破法我時，唯破無分極微所取，及破能取無分剎那，并破具三差別自性等宗派假立諸法，於一切種決定不可。
If you do not understand this, and fail to eradicate the perspective of innate ignorance, then, when you refute a personal self, you will only refute a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent. When you refute an objective self, you will only refute things that are imputed by the advocates of philosophical tenets—such as objects that are partless particles, partless moments of experience, or a natural substrate with three gunas ("strands") asserted by the Samkhyas. This is completely inappropriate.
若不爾者，決擇見時唯決擇彼，修時亦應唯修習彼，以決擇見義為修故。
If you think otherwise, then when you make philosophical determinations, you will establish nothing more than this shallow selflessness. As philosophical determinations are made for the purposes of meditation, when you meditate you will have to meditate only on this.
故修已觀證及修究竟亦唯應爾，如是由見無彼分別執計二我，便謂已斷俱生煩惱，太為過失。
Therefore, even if you actualized such a selflessness in meditation and consummated your cultivation of it, nothing would come of it. It would be extremely absurd to claim that you can overcome innate afflictions by seeing as nonexistent the two selves imputed by acquired misconceptions.
《入中論》云﹕「證無我時斷常我，非許此為我執依，故達無我為盡拔，我見根本最希有。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self,
But we do not consider this the basis of the conception of "I."
It is therefore astonishing to claim that knowing this selflessness
Expunges and uproots the view of self.
《釋論》亦云﹕「為以喻門顯示此義互無係屬，故說頌曰﹕見自室有蛇，除畏云無象，謂能除蛇怖，奇哉為他譏。」
Also, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
To elucidate this very point, the irrelevance of such to innate afflictions, by way of an example:
Someone sees a snake living in the wall of his house. To ease his concern, someone else says, "There is no elephant here."
Alas, to others it is ridiculous To suppose that this would dispel the fear of the snake.
此雖是說補特伽羅無我，然法無我亦同。可作是說，「證無我時斷妄我，不許此為無明依，故知無我謂盡拔，無明根本甚希有。」
Candrakirti refers to the selflessness of the person, but it is the same for the selflessness of objects; he could have added:
When knowing selflessness, some eliminate an acquired conception of self,
But we do not consider this the basis of ignorance.
It is therefore astonishing to claim that knowing this selflessness
Expunges and uproots ignorance.
若爾論師如前所引，說非新作及不待他為自性相，此說為就觀察門耶抑為許有如是性耶。
Question: In the statement by Nāgārjuna set forth above, he says that the defining characteristics of a "nature" are not being fabricated and not depending upon something else. Was he speaking hypothetically or does such a nature exist?
說彼即是諸法法性，即於彼上立為自性，非是新作非依仗他。
Reply: The Buddha posits a "nature," saying, "This is the reality of Phenomena." It is not fabricated and does not depend on something else.
彼性是有，《入中論釋》云﹕「論師許有如是差別行相性耶，世尊依何增上廣說，隨諸如來出不出世，諸法法性恆如是住，有彼法性。
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 establishes that it exists, citing a sūtra source:
Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nāgārjuna claims? Yes, it is the "reality" of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, "Whether tathâgatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains."
所言法性，此復云何，即此眼等自性。
What is this "reality"? It is the nature of things such as these eyes.
眼等自性復為何等，謂彼非新作性無待於他。
And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else;
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離無明翳智所證性為有此耶，誰云其無。彼若無者為何義故，諸菩薩眾修習波羅蜜多諸道，為證法性。故諸菩薩發起如是多百難行。」并引經證而善成立。
it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships in order to know reality?
於前豈非破一切法有自性耶，
Question: Did you not previously argue that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature?
我等豈未多次宣說諸法，若非由內心立其自性有，塵許亦無，於如此性，雖法性勝義諦亦無少許，況諸餘法。
Reply: Even phenomena that are not internal mental constructs lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature. Have we not given this answer several times? Therefore, what need is there to speak of other phenomena in terms of such a nature? Even reality, the ultimate truth, has no intrinsic nature at all.
《明顯句論》云﹕「三世無亂非由新造作火之本性，此非先無後新生起，非待因緣。如火熱性，或彼此岸或長與短，當知說此名為自性。火如是性為可有耶，然此亦非由自性有亦非全無，雖然如是，為令聞者離恐怖故，增益強說世俗中有。」
For, Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
The "final nature" is the unfabricated fundamental entity which is ineluctably present in fire in the past, present, and future; it is not the later occurrence of something that was not there before; it does not depend on causes and conditions like the heat of water, or here and there, or long and short. Does fire have such a nature? It neither essentially has it nor essentially lacks it. Nevertheless, to avoid frightening listeners, I reify it and say, "It exists conventionally."
即於此性亦破自性說名言有。
Thus Candrakirti refutes the view that this nature exists essentially; he says that it exists conventionally.
若謂此說為斷聞者恐怖故，增益說即不許有。
Objection: He does not assert that it exists, for he says that he reifies it in order to avoid frightening listeners.
此不應理，餘法皆是為彼假說，彼亦應無。
Reply: That is not reasonable. He also spoke of other phenomena, having imputed them for that same reason. So if the final nature did not exist, those other phenomena also would not exist.
又如前引，若無彼義，則修梵行應空無義，說彼過難，成立此有。
As cited earlier, Candrakirti proves that the final nature exists, making the argument that if it did not exist, then it would absurdly follow that pure conduct is senseless.
《入中論釋》云﹕「又此自性非唯論師自許，亦能教他受許此義，故此自性，是於兩俱建立極成。」
Also, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
Not only does the master Nāgārjuna assert this nature, others also can be made to accept it. Thus he posits this nature as established for both parties to the debate.
不爾則應許中觀宗不得解脫。
If it were otherwise, then you would have to hold that in Madhyamaka it is impossible to attain freedom.
得涅槃者現證涅槃，復說涅槃即是滅諦。又說彼是勝義諦故。
This is because (1) candrakirti says that to attain nirvāna means to perceive nirvāna, and he says that nirvāņa is considered a true cessation and that true cessations are ultimate truths; and
無勝義諦故，得涅槃時必須現證勝義滅諦，《六十正理論釋》，以多力勵已善成立。
(2) ultimate truths would not exist. In his Commentary on the 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》, Candrakirti takes pains to prove that when you attain nirvāņa, you must perceive the ultimate truth of cessation.
由是眼等有為，於自性體非可為有，於以法性所立性中，亦不可有，故隨於何性皆悉不成，真勝義諦雖於法性所立性中，而可為有，然立此性非無新作及不待他，於自性體亦無少許，故亦唯
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於名言說有。
Accordingly, compounded phenomena such as eyes are not natures in the sense of being essentially existent, nor are they natures when reality is posited as the final nature. So they are neither sort of nature. Ultimate truths are natures when reality is posited as the final nature, but what establishes them as such natures is that they are non-fabricated and do not depend upon something else. They do not at all exist as natures in the sense of being essentially existent. Thus, they exist merely conventionally.
言新作者，謂先無新生之所作性。不待他者，謂不待因緣。
"Fabricated" means "produced" in the sense of a new occurrence of something that did not exist before; "to depend upon something else" means to depend on causes and conditions.
色等諸法，於二自性，悉不成立。故於法性所立自性，為見彼性而修諸道，所修梵行非空無義。
Since forms and so forth are neither type of nature, when you speak of cultivating the path in order to view the final nature, "nature" has the sense of reality. Therefore, Candrakirti says that pure conduct is not senseless.
又說畢竟不許諸法有自性體，與今忽爾許有自性二不相違。
Moreover, he explains that his utter lack of an assertion that phenomena have a nature in the sense of essential existence does not contradict his incidental assertion of a final nature.
《入中論釋》云﹕「奇哉錯誤，若已不許少許實事，忽許自性非由新作不觀待他，汝乃專說互違義者，茲當宣說。
Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
Objection: Alas, utterly wrong! You do not assert real things at all, but also incidentally assert a nature that is non-fabricated and does not depend upon something else. You are saying things that are blatantly contradictory.
汝未了知此論意趣，此論意趣謂說眼等緣起本性，愚稚異生所能執取。
Reply: In saying this, you miss the point of the 《Fundamental Treatise》. This is what it means: If eyes and such—dependent-arising that are evident to ordinary childish beings—
若彼即是彼法自性，其性顛倒，為證彼故而修梵行，則空無義。
were their own nature, then pure conduct would be senseless because even inaccurate consciousnesses could know that nature.
由非即彼便是自性，故為見自性，修淨梵行則有義利。
Because they are not their own nature, pure conduct for the sake of viewing that nature does have a purpose.
此復我由待世俗諦，說非新作及不待他。若性非是愚夫所見，此為自性亦應正理。
Further, I say that this nature, as compared to conventional truths, is non-fabricated and does not depend upon something else. Only something that ordinary childish beings do not see is suitable to be the nature.
僅以此故勝義非事，亦非無事。此即自性寂靜性故。」
Therefore, the ultimate is neither a thing nor a non-thing; by nature, it is simply peace.
此中有事無事，如前宣說二邊時說，謂自性有及畢竟無。
Here "thing" and "non-thing" refer to essential existence and utter nonexistence, as explained above in the section on dualism.
◎如是決擇諸法無微塵許自性實體，此由自性所空空性，於色等法差別事上，此為能別法。
Now when you as an ordinary being determine that phenomena lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature, you find that emptiness—emptiness of intrinsic nature—is an attribute of the phenomena, such as form, that serve as its substrata.
故於一心之境，有彼二事，非為相違。由其未能遣二相故，此空是為假勝義諦。
Thus, it is not contradictory for both substrata and attribute to be objects of a single mind. Since you have not stopped dualistic appearance, that emptiness is a nominal rather than actual ultimate truth.
若修能達無性正見，現證彼義實無自性，現似有性一切亂相於彼悉遣。
By accustoming yourself to that view which knows the absence of intrinsic nature, you will know it by perceiving it. For such a consciousness, all mistaken appearances stop. Mistaken appearance here means the appearance of intrinsic existence where there is no intrinsic existence.
故此現證法性之智，不見色等。
Therefore, since the consciousness directly perceiving that reality does not perceive substrata such as forms,
如是之法及法性，於彼慧前二皆非有。
neither that reality nor its substrata exist from the perspective of that mind.
故立彼二為法及法性者，是就其餘名言識立。
So emptiness and forms, etc. must be posited as reality and substrata from the perspective of some other mind, a conventional mind.
由是因緣，勝義諦者，是於寂滅一切自性戲論之上，更離無性現似有性一切戲論，而為安
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立。
As this is so, an ultimate truth is posited where, in addition to the stilling of all elaborations of essential existence, there is also a sheer stoppage of all elaborations of mistaken appearances, appearances of intrinsic existence where there is none.
故許彼有，豈須許有自性自體。
Thus, while we assert a final nature, how could we be forced to accept an essentially existent nature?
《明顯句論》云﹕「無明翳力緣諸事相，由不見彼，此性即是離無明翳，聖人之境，即立此性為彼自性。」
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Driven by the impairment of ignorance, ordinary beings perceive a certain aspect in things. As noble beings who are free from the impairment of ignorance do not see that mistaken aspect, there is something else that serves as their object. That very entity is posited as the final nature of those things.
又云﹕「諸事之無生自性，此復俱非。唯屬無事無體性故，非於諸事自性中有。」
Also: Things' lack of intrinsically existent production is not anything. Thus, since it is just a non-thing, it has no essence. Therefore, it is not the intrinsic nature of things.
又有許勝義諦，不於所斷二我戲論而為安立，謂於能證真實之心無亂境中，自現在相，如青黃等。
Some [Tibetans] do not posit ultimate truth as the sheer elimination of the elaborations of the objects of negation, e.g., the two selves. Instead they hold that, as the object of a mind that non-mistakenly knows how things exist, the ultimate appears to exist under its own power—just as things such as blue and yellow appear to an ordinary mind.
又以知如是有，便為通達深義正見。
Ascertaining that it does exist in that way is the view that knows the profound.
又謂通達內外諸法，有情執為二我所依，為無自性，是正見歧途。
They also claim that it is a misstep with regard to the correct view to regard external and internal phenomena—the bases with regard to which living beings cling to the two selves—as lacking intrinsic existence.
此出一切大乘小乘經教之外，由許破除一切有情繫縛生死根本我執。
These assertions stand outside the sphere of all the scriptures, Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. They accept that it is necessary to stop the conception of self, the root that binds all living beings in cyclic existence.
然說通達我執所計我事，無性不能遣執，而說通達與彼無關餘實有法，反能遮遣我執縛故。
They then assert that you do not stop the conception of self by realizing that there is no intrinsic existence in the substrata it apprehends as a self; rather, you stop it by knowing as truly existent some other unrelated phenomenon.
譬如東方無蛇，妄執為有恐怖憂苦，為遣彼苦，而說令達東方無蛇，不能遣其蛇執，當令別執西方有樹，方能除遣蛇執憂苦，與此說者全無差別。
This is no different from the following scenario: Suppose that there is no snake in the east, but someone thinks that there is and is terrified. You say to the distressed person, "You cannot stop your idea that there is a snake by thinking, 'In the east there is no snake at all.' Rather you should think, 'There is a tree in the west.' That will stop your idea that there is a snake and will end your distress."
諸自愛者，應當遠棄如此邪執，
Hence, you who wish the good for yourselves should stay far away from such wrong views.
次於破除繫縛生死，一切衰損根本無明行相之方便，
You should work on the method for eradicating the way that ignorance apprehends things, this ignorance being the root of all that binds you and degrades you in cyclic existence.
謂當依止建樹諸了義經，及將經義不令向餘引轉諸正理聚聖者龍猛父子論典，度越三有大海彼岸。
Regarding this method, the texts of the father, the noble Nāgārjuna, and his spiritual son Aryadeva clearly set forth vast collections of arguments that build deep and certain knowledge of the definitive scriptures and how it is that the meaning of these scriptures cannot be otherwise interpreted. Relying on these texts by Nāgārjuna and Aryadeva, cross to the other side of the ocean of cyclic existence.
由於所破破除邪執，是於得中觀斷除歧途，最為切要，故今廣說。
To avoid missteps in reaching the Madhyamaka view, it is most crucial to refute wrong ideas about the object of negation. For that reason I have given an extended explanation.
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