◎第三諸中觀師如何答覆。
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3 How a Mādhyamika responds to those who negate the distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka
若諸法性空，生死涅槃所有因果不可安立，龍猛菩薩謂此《諍論》是中觀師破他之過，今向自擲應遮回耳。
To the objection, "If things were empty of intrinsic existence, the causes and effects of cyclic existence and nirvāna could not be set forth, "Nāgārjuna the Protector responds that since the fallacy that the Mādhyamikas were going to adduce has been advanced against them, they will turn it around and use it against the objectors.
《中論》二十四品云，汝將自諸過，欲轉為我過，如現乘馬上，而自忘其馬。若有見諸法，是由自性有，則汝見諸法，皆無有因緣。」
The twenty-fourth chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
You take your own fallacies
And turn them into ours,
Like someone who while riding on a horse,
Forgets that very horse.
If you regard things
As existing intrinsically,
Then you regard all things
As having no causes or conditions.
又云﹕「若此不皆空，應無生無滅，則四聖諦等，於汝應皆無。」
Also:
If all these phenomena were not empty
There would be neither arising nor disintegration;
It would follow that for you essentialists
The four noble truths would not exist.
And there are other such passages.
故謂若無自性餘更何有者，顯然未分苗無自性與苗全無二者差別，亦未能分苗有自性與苗芽有。
Therefore, it is clear that those who argue, "If there is no essential or intrinsic existence, then what else is there?" have unquestionably failed to distinguish between a seedling's lack of intrinsic existence and a seedling's lack of existence. Because of that, they have also failed to distinguish between the existence of a seedling and the existence of a seedling by way of its own essence.
故謂若有必有自性，若無自性則謂斷無。
Therefore, they clearly hold that whatever exists must exist essentially, and if something is not essentially existent, then it does not exist.
若非爾者，何故說破自性正理，能破於有及生滅等。
Otherwise, why would they claim that the arguments refuting essential existence refute mere existence and mere production and cessation, etc.?
如是若時許有苗等，爾時便說有自性苗，若全無性說斷無者，定墮二邊，與實事師全無差別。
They claim that insofar as seedlings and such are asserted to exist, they must exist essentially and they claim that if seedlings utterly lack essential existence, they must be utterly nonexistent. In taking these positions, they undeniably fall to both extremes of permanence and of annihilation. Thus, their perspective is no different from that of the essentialists.
《四百論釋》云﹕「如實事師，若時說有諸法，爾時即說是有自性，若時無性，爾時便說諸法一切永無等同兔角。未出二邊，故此所樂一切難成。」
For, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on [Aryadeva's] "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says clearly: The essentialists say that whenever things exist, there is essence. As they see it, without essence these things would be completely nonexistent—like the horn of a donkey. Therefore these essentialists cannot avoid being proponents of both extremes of permanence and of annihilation. Consequently, it is difficult to reconcile all of their explicit assertions.
乃至未解月稱論師所分，有無自性，與有無法四者差別，定墮二邊，不能通達中觀深義。
The glorious Candrakirti distinguishes intrinsic existence from existence; he also distinguishes the absence of intrinsic existence from nonexistence. Unless you know this you will no doubt fall to both extremes, and thus you will not know the meaning of the middle way which is without extremes.
謂以若無自性則全無法，於性空之空，全無安立因果之處，故墮斷邊。
For when it turns out that a phenomenon utterly lacks essential existence, for you it will be utterly nonexistent; then, since there will be no way at all to posit cause and effect within emptiness—emptiness of intrinsic existence—you will fall to an extreme of annihilation.
若許有法必許有性，則不能立因果如幻，實無自性現似有性，故墮常邊。
Also, once you accept that a phenomenon exists, you will have to assert that it essentially exists. In that case it will be impossible for you to treat cause and effect as similar to illusions in the sense that they appear to exist intrinsically whereas they do not. Consequently, you will fall to the extreme of permanence.
若達一
- p.420 -
切法，本無自性如微塵許，不墮有邊。
Therefore, to avoid falling to the extreme of existence, you must realize that from the outset all phenomena lack even a particle of essential existence.
如是則於苗等諸法，非由作用空而為無事，有力能作各各所作，引決定智，遠離無邊。
And to escape the extreme of nonexistence, you must develop definite knowledge that things such as seedlings nevertheless have the power to perform their own functions; that is, they do not turn into non-things which are empty of the capacity to perform functions.
◎《顯句論》中亦明了辨別無與無性，如云﹕「若汝立諸法皆無自性，如世尊說自所作業自受異熟，則彼一切皆為汝破，誹謗因果，故汝即是無見之主。
A clear differentiation between the absence of intrinsic existence and nonexistence is also set forth in Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》:
Objection: This claim that things lack intrinsic existence will wipe out everything the Bhagavan said, such as, "You experience the fruition of the karma that you yourself have done." By making this claim, you mistakenly deny karma and its effects. Therefore, you are the supreme nihilists.
答曰﹕我非無見，我是破除有無二邊，光顯能往般涅槃城無二之道。
Reply: We are not nihilists. We refute both the proposition of existence and the proposition of nonexistence; we illuminate the path free from these two, the path that leads to the city of nirvāna.
我亦非說斷無諸業作者果等。若爾云何，謂善安立彼無自性。
We also do not claim, "Karma, agents, effects, and so forth do not exist." What do we say? We posit that these lack intrinsic nature.
若無自性，能作所作不應理故，過失仍在。
Objection: There is still a defect in your position because it is not tenable for things that lack intrinsic nature to function.
此過非有，唯有自性不見作用故，唯無自性見有作用故。」
Reply: Again, there is no such defect, because functionality is not attested in that which has intrinsic nature; functionality is attested only in that which lacks intrinsic nature.
此實事師謂若無自性以破自性理，即破從業生諸異熟，與許破自性理破因果者，所許無別。
The essentialist's position is that the denial of intrinsic nature prevents karma from giving rise to effects. This is no different from the assertion [by Tibetans who claim to be Mādhyamikas] that the arguments which refute intrinsic existence refute cause and effect.
若破因果即成斷見之主，雖中觀師與實事師共同許可，
The Mādhyamika and the essentialist agree that if one denies cause and effect, one becomes the most extreme sort of nihilist.
然中觀師自不許為破除因果，而實事師覺破自性，亦定破因果，故說中觀師為斷無者或斷見者。
However, the Mādhyamika does not deny cause and effect. Still, the essentialist calls the Mādhyamika a "nihilist" or "annihilationist," supposing that if you refute intrinsic nature, then you certainly must also refute cause and effect.
藏地自許中觀師者，多許破自性理能破因果，順實事師，反說以理破壞因果是中觀宗，而起勝解。
Most Tibetans who claim to be Mādhyamikas seem to agree with the essentialist's assertion that if an argument refutes intrinsic nature, it must also refute cause and effect. Yet unlike essentialists, these Tibetans seem pleased that reason refutes cause and effect, taking this to be the Mādhyamaka system.
又答諍云﹕「我非無見，是破有無二邊顯解脫道。」
In answer to this objection, Candrakirti responds: "We are not nihilists; we eliminate the propositions of existence and nonexistence; we illuminate the path to liberation."
餘文即明破有無理。
The rest of the passage shows how he avoids the positions of existence and nonexistence.
其中說云﹕「我等非說無業果等。」是除無邊，謂若許無業果等，則成無見者，然我不許爾。
By saying, "We do not claim that karma, effects, and so forth are nonexistent," Candrakirti avoids the nihilistic position. We would be nihilists if we asserted that cause, effect, and so forth do not exist, but we do not assert this.
其次問云﹕「若爾云何。」
In response to the question, "Well, what do you hold?"
答云﹕「安立或許彼業果等全無自性。」是遣有邊。
Candrakirti says, "We posit, or assert, that these—karma, effects, and so forth—lack intrinsic nature." He thereby avoids the position of existence.
次云﹕「若無自性能作
- p.421 -
所作不應理故過失仍在。」是實事師諍云﹕「汝雖說云，非是無見是說無性，然前設過，若無自性因果不成，尚未能斷。」
The statement, "There is still a defect in your position because it is not tenable for that which lacks intrinsic nature to function," indicates the essentialist's objection— "You Mādhyamikas say, ‘We do not propound nonexistence; we propound an absence of intrinsic nature,' but you still cannot escape the fallacy that we have already stated: Without intrinsic nature, cause and effect are not tenable."
以於彼宗無性與無，二無差別，故如是諍。
Those essentialists raise this objection because in their system there is no difference between the absence of intrinsic nature and nonexistence.
次答彼云﹕「因生果等，能作所作於有自性不可成立，唯於無性彼等乃成。」
In reply, Candrakirti says that functions— such as causes giving rise to effects—are impossible in the context of intrinsic existence and are possible only in the absence of intrinsic existence.
◎《四百論釋》云﹕「我非說無事，是說緣起故。汝說有事耶，非唯說緣起故。汝何所說，宣說緣起。何為緣起義，謂無自性義。即自性無生義，能生性如幻現，陽燄，影像，乾闥婆城，化，夢果義，空無我義。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
We are not proponents of nonexistence, for we are proponents of dependent-arising. Are we proponents of real things? No, because we are proponents only of dependent-arising. What do we propound? We propound dependent-arising. What is the meaning of dependent-arising? It means the absence of intrinsic existence; it means no intrinsically existent production; it means the arising of effects whose nature is similar to a magician's illusion, a mirage, a reflection, a phantom city, an emanation, or a dream; it means emptiness and selflessness.
此顯由許緣起，能除有事無事二邊之理。
Candrakirti shows that by asserting dependent-arising you can avoid the two extremes, the position that things exist and the position that things do not exist.
此由說緣起義是自性無生，故能除有實事論。
He avoids the position that things exist by explaining that dependent-arising means no intrinsically existent production,
顯說能生如幻等果為緣起義，故能除無事論。
and he avoids the position that things do not exist by indicating that dependent-arising refers to the arising of effects that are like a magician's illusion.
言「有事」者，略有二義，謂自性義及作用義。
Therefore, "thing" may refer either to "intrinsic existence" or to "the capacity to perform a function."
實事師之有事，是有自性義，無事論之事，是有作用義。
Between these two, the "thing" in "the essentialist position that things exist" refers only to intrinsic existence; "thing" in "the position that things do not exist" refers to things that perform functions.
除彼二執即破自性，顯有因果如幻化故。
For in avoiding those two extremes, Candrakirti refutes intrinsic existence and indicates that there do exist causes and effects that are like a magician's illusions.
又《四百論釋》云﹕「豈無緣過去境之念耶，誰云其無，我等非破緣起，如其所有即如是定解。
Moreover, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says: Question: Do you Mādhyamikas claim that there are no memory consciousnesses that have as their objects the things of the past? Reply: Who would claim that such do not exist? We do not eliminate dependent-arising.
論主已安立云，念謂於倒義，唯顛倒而生，故念所緣是過去事。
The master Aryadeva himself gives a precise statement of how memory exists:
Therefore, the arising of what we call "memory"
Is only an unreal subject with an unreal object.
Therefore, what memory observes is something in the past.
若彼有性，其念由緣實有義故，亦可有性。
If the past thing essentially existed, then the memory of it would be observing an object that essentially exists. Therefore, that memory would be essentially existent.
若過去事全無自性，則緣彼念亦應無性，故云顛倒亦善成立。
But insofar as that past thing lacks intrinsic existence, the memory observing it also lacks intrinsic existence. Therefore, Aryadeva has established that the past object and the memory of it are unreal.
言顛倒者，是無自性及緣起義，非是餘義。
"Unreal" means only "lacking intrinsic existence" and "dependent-arising";
事斷無義，非顛倒義。
it does not mean the nonexistence of things that can perform functions.
又過去事，非一切種全無所有，是所念故，見彼果故，亦非有性，應性常故，應可取故。」
A past thing is not entirely nonexistent because it is an object of memory and its effects can be seen. It also does not essentially exist, for if it did it would have to be permanent and it would have to be directly apprehensible.
此說過去等事，既非全無，亦
- p.422 -
非有性，其顛倒虛妄義即緣起義，非無事義。
Candrakirtisays that these—past objects and such—are not utterly nonexistent and are also not essentially existent; he explains that unreal or false means being a dependent-arising and does not mean that things do not exist.
故許諸法有自性者是實事論，或墮有邊，非說唯有法者，即實事論及實有師。
Therefore, if you claim that these phenomena are essentially existent, then you are a proponent of real things; you have fallen to the extreme of intrinsic existence. However, to hold that these phenomena are simply existent does not make you a proponent of real things or a proponent of real existence.
如是若說內外諸法，由作用空為無事者是無事論，或墮無邊，非說彼無性者即墮無邊。
Similarly, if you hold that internal and external things are non-things, devoid of the capacity to perform functions, then you are propounding the nonexistence of things, and you have fallen to the extreme of nonexistence.
◎若未如是分別全無與無自性，有性與有之差別，而於破除有無邊時，但作是說，我非說無，是說非有，及非說有，是說非無者，純相違語，非能略說中觀深義。
However, you do not fall to an extreme of nonexistence by saying that things lack intrinsic existence. Some [Tibetans who claim to be Mādhyamikas] do not distinguish utter nonexistence from the absence of intrinsic existence, and do not distinguish essential existence from mere existence. They hope to avoid falling to the extremes of existence and nonexistence simply by saying, "We do not claim that things are nonexistent (med pa); we say that they are not existent (yod pama yin pa). We do not claim that things exist (yod pa); we say that they are not nonexistent (med pa ma yin pa)." This is nothing but a mass of contradictions; it does not in the least explain the meaning of the middle way.
由破他時觀察有無自性等而破，自亦現許彼二決斷。而又許有俱非義故。
For when they refute others, they perform the refutation via an investigation of whether or not something intrinsically exists. Therefore, they have to limit the possibilities to two [i.e., it intrinsically exists or it does not]; yet in making their own assertions they claim there is something that is neither of those two.
隨於何事觀察自性，或有或無，於有無二，須能決斷，若第三聚非彼所攝，理不應觀自性有無。
Why should they have to limit the possibilities to two when they investigate something to see whether or not it intrinsically exists? Because if there were a third possibility beyond those two, it would not be reasonable to investigate the question, "Which is it, intrinsically existent or not intrinsically existent?"
如同有說顯色中有，問青中有或黃中有。
It would be as though there were a color and someone asked, "Is it blue or is it yellow?"
如是能斷自性有無決定者，須總於所知，能斷有無決定。如於諦實，能斷諦實一多決定者，須總於一多能得決定。
Limiting things to two possibilities—either they intrinsically exist or they do not—derives from the universal limitation that anything imaginable either exists or does not exist. Similarly, the limitation that what truly exists must either truly exist as single or truly exist as plural is based on the universal limitation that anything must be either single or plural.
能如是決斷者，須能遮第三聚，故許有俱非之法，實屬亂說。
When there is such a limitation, any further alternative is necessarily precluded; hence, it is utter nonsense to assert a phenomenon that is neither of those two.
如《迴諍論》云﹕「若違無自性，應是有自性。」
As Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says: If the absence of intrinsic nature were refuted, Then the presence of intrinsic nature would be proven.
如是許者，隨於何法，皆不能遮第三聚法而得定數，唯懷疑惑，以於有無等決斷一品，則於他品不決斷故。
Moreover, there will always be some doubt in the minds of those who make these claims because they have no way of making a definitive list that excludes any further alternative. This is because as they see it the exclusion of one possibility—such as "exists" or "does not exist"—does not entail the other possibility.
◎若許於是非等，無第三聚者，則於有無亦相同故。
If they accept that there are some cases—such as "is" (yin) and "is not" (min)—which exclude any further alternatives, then they should know that it is exactly the same in the case of "exists" (yod) and "does not exist" (med)."
然彼說者，是於《中觀論》，宣說非有非無之語，所起誤解。
Evidently their position is an overly literal misunderstanding of Mādhyamaka texts that say, "is not existent and is not nonexistent."
若許爾者，如不可說為有為無，亦不應說非有非無，俱於四句如是說故。
Therefore, if—as they claim— it is inappropriate to say "exists" or "does not exist," then it would also be wrong to say, "is not existent and is not nonexistent" because those Mādhyamaka texts say that you should reject all four possibilities.
- p.423 -
《中觀論》云﹕「說有是執常，言無是斷見，故於有無二，智者不應住。」
Therefore, Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 does not refer to simple existence and nonexistence when it states:
To say "it exists" is a conception of permanence;
To say "it does not exist" is a view of annihilation.
Hence the learned should not dwell
In either existence or nonexistence.
然非僅說有無，是說諸法若有自性，成常斷見，
This clearly means that the person who claims that things intrinsically exist will have views of permanence and annihilation.
如《明顯句論》解釋前文執有執無，為有事無事見。
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 explains that in this passage the conception of existence and nonexistence refers to the view that things exist and the view that things do not exist.
其後又云﹕「何故若見有事無事成常斷見耶，若有自性者，非無故應常，若先有現無，是故應成斷。若說法由自性而有，性無可滅終不應無，故許有性應成常見。又先住時許法有性，如是後壞許為無故，應成斷見。」
It then says:
Why is it that when you have the view that things exist and the view that things do not exist, it follows that you have views of permanence and of annihilation? As Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
Whatever exists intrinsically is permanent
Since it does not become nonexistent.
If you say that an intrinsically existent thing that arose before
Is now nonexistent, that entails an extreme of annihilation.
Since intrinsic existence is not overcome, something that is said to be intrinsically existent would never become nonexistent; thus the assertion that something is intrinsically existent entails a view of permanence. Also, a view of annihilation is entailed by the assertion that there was intrinsic nature in things at an earlier time, but it has now been destroyed and no longer exists.
此說若許由自性有則成常見，即先自性，若許後壞，則成無見，非說有與壞。
Candrakirti calls the assertion of intrinsic existence a view of permanence, and says that if you assert the later destruction of what was formerly intrinsically existent, such is a view of nihilism. He does not say this of mere existence and mere disintegration.
佛護論師云，「言有言無成常斷見者，是說彼法若有自性。」此等明顯宣說常斷之理。
Also Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 clearly explains that when Nāgārjuna says, "Whatever exists intrinsically is permanent," and so forth, he is indicating the type of permanence and the type of annihilation he meant when he explained that to say "exists" or to say "does not exist" is to have views of permanence or annihilation."
總若有說，無自性之空，非善妙空性，而破除者，謗般若經，由謗法故，當墮惡趣。
In brief, if you claim that the emptiness which is the absence of intrinsic existence is not the sublime emptiness taught by the Buddha and you refute it, then you will be reborn in a miserable realm due to having abandoned the true teaching, the perfection of wisdom.
若於無性雖起勝解，然說「若無自性餘更何有」。
If you take an interest in the absence of intrinsic existence, but think, "If there is no intrinsic existence, what is there?"
謗一切法畢竟非有，亦是墮於斷見險處，如云﹕「若惡觀其空，少慧受衰損。」
and then claim that all phenomena do not exist at all, you will still fall into the chasm of a view of annihilation. Similarly, [Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》] says:
If they view emptiness in the wrong way,
Those of limited intelligence will be ruined.
《明顯句論》云﹕「且於空性，若謂一切非有者即成倒見。」
Commenting on this, Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
If, on the one hand, you were to think, "All is empty, that is, does not exist," then you would be viewing emptiness in the wrong way.
如云﹕「若倒執此法，不智當失壞，謂彼當沉沒，無見不淨中。」
In this vein [Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland] says:
If this teaching is misunderstood
It ruins the unwise, for
They sink into the filth
Of nihilistic views.
設若不欲謗毀一切，爾時便云，此一切法現前可得，云何為空，故無性義非是空義，是則謗空。
On the other hand, suppose that you do not deny all phenomena, but then say, "We have seen these things; how could they be empty? Therefore, an absence of intrinsic existence is not what emptiness means." In that case, you have definitely abandoned emptiness.
若如是謗，則作匱乏正法之業，定墮惡趣。
After you have abandoned emptiness in this way, you will definitely be reborn in a miserable realm due to this action of depriving yourself of the true teaching.
如《寶鬘論》云﹕「又若倒執此，愚者慢為智，謗法暴惡性，倒墮無間中。」
As Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》 says:
Further, if they misunderstand this,
Fools who take pride in their supposed wisdom
Will destroy themselves by abandoning it
And fall head-first to the Unrelenting Hell.
◎設謂我若先許諸法，後見無者可成無見，然我從本未許彼有，有何可斷而成斷見。
Qualm: If we had claimed that there were real things, and then later viewed them as nonexistent, then we would have a view of annihilation. However, we do not accept their existence from the outset. What is annihilated so as to make this a view of annihilation?
- p.424 -
「若先有現無，是故應成斷。」
For [Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》] says:
If you say that what arose before
Is now nonexistent, that entails annihilation.
說如此者，乃為斷見。
Thus Nāgārjuna says that such is a view of annihilation.
《明顯句論》云﹕「諸瑜伽師達世俗諦唯無，知生全無自性，達彼空性是勝義相，不墮二邊。若法現在無，爾時更何有，如是諸法自性，先未獲得後亦非見為無。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Yogis do not fall to the two extremes if they know that conventional truths—which are produced only by ignorance—lack intrinsic existence, and then know that the emptiness of those has the character of the ultimate. They think, "How could something which has now become nonexistent have existed then?" Since they do not regard earlier things as having had intrinsic nature, they do not think that such later become nonexistent.
此不應理，若斷見中皆須先許所斷法者，則順世等亦非先許前世後世及業果等，後乃謗無。本來不許彼等為有，亦應非斷滅見故。
Reply: This is not reasonable. Your supposition is that in order to have a view of annihilation, one must assert the earlier existence of whatever thing is annihilated later. In that case, it would absurdly follow that even the Lokayata proponents of materialism" would not have a view of annihilation. For it is not their claim that past and future lives, karma and its effects, etc. once existed and later became nonexistent; they do not accept such as having existed in the first place.
「若先有現無，是故應成斷」者，是實事師。
Therefore, when Nāgārjuna said, "If you say that what arose before is now nonexistent, that entails annihilation,"
若許諸法有自性者，決定當生常斷二見，謂若許自性一切時中無轉變者，應成常見。
he meant that proponents of existence who assert that things have an essential or intrinsic nature will unquestionably have views of permanence or annihilation. For, if they claim that this intrinsic nature never changes, then they will have a view of permanence;
若許先有後時壞者，應成斷見。
if they claim that it once existed and was later destroyed, then they will have a view of annihilation.
故顯自無先時有性執後時壞所成斷見者，以自不許諸法有性如微塵許可成正因，非此能離一切斷見。
Mādhyamikas do not accept the existence of even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature; this fact proves that they lack one type of view of annihilation, the type in which it is held that an intrinsic nature that once existed is later destroyed. It does not prove that they have eliminated all views of annihilation.
其餘不同說無因果斷見之理，
In a different way, Mādhyamikas are also unlike those who have the other type of view of annihilation, a view in which it is held that karma and its effects do not exist.
《明顯句論》廣說，謂斷見者，許無因果及無後世。中觀論師許彼無性，是立宗之差別。
This is set forth at length in Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》, as follows. Mādhyamikas and nihilists have different theses since those who have a view of annihilation hold that karma and its effects, as well as other worlds beyond this lifetime, do not exist, whereas Mādhyamikas hold that such things lack intrinsic existence.
又中觀師由緣起因，說業果等皆無自性，諸無見者，不許業果等皆是緣起，故不以彼為因。
Mādhyamikas propound that things such as karma and its effects lack intrinsic existence by reason of their being dependent-arisings; nihilists do not assert that karma and its effects are dependent-arisings, so they do not use dependent-arising as a reason in support of their thesis.
是由未見現在有情，從其前世而來此世及從此世而往後世，以此因相說彼等無，故於因相差別極大。
Instead, to support their claim that karma and its effects are nonexistent, the reason they give is that the living beings who are here now were not seen arriving in this life from a former one, and are not seen leaving it for a future one. Hence there is an enormous difference between nihilists and Mādhyamikas in their reasons.
《明顯句論》云﹕「有師難云，諸中觀師與無見者全無差別。何以故，此說善不善業作者果報一切世間，皆自性空，諸無見者亦說彼無，故中觀師與無見者全無差別。
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says: Some say that Mādhyamikas are no different from nihilists. Why? Because Mādhyamikas propound that virtuous and nonvirtuous actions, agents, and effects, as well as all the worlds of this and other lifetimes are empty of intrinsic existence, while nihilists also propound that those are nonexistent. Hence they argue that Mādhyamikas do not differ from nihilists.
然非如是，諸中觀師說有緣起，由緣起故說此世他世等一切無性。
Such is not the case, for Mādhyamikas propound dependent-arising and propound that because of being dependent-arisings, everything—this world, other worlds, and so forth—lacks intrinsic existence.
諸無見者非由如是，是緣起故，
- p.425 -
就性空門，達後世等是無實事。
The nihilists' understanding that things such as other worlds beyond this lifetime are not real is not reached via knowledge that those things are empty of intrinsic existence due to being dependent-arisings.
若爾云何，謂緣現世諸法行相自性，然未見彼從前世而來此世，及從此世而往他世，謗無餘世，等同此世可緣之事。」
What do they claim? They regard the aspects of the things in this world as naturally existent; they do not see them come to this world from another or go to another world from this one, so they deny the existence of other things [e.g., former and future lives] which are in fact like the things seen in this world.
◎若謂諸中觀師與無見者，因雖不同，然達業果及前後世無性是同，此無性見則極相等。
Qualm: Even though Mādhyamikas and nihilists cite different reasons, their views of the absence of intrinsic existence are the same because they are alike in realizing that karma and its effects and the worlds of past and future lifetimes lack essential or intrinsic existence.
此亦不同，他許無性是畢竟無，於二謗中俱不許有。
Reply: Even in this they differ. For nihilists hold that the absence of intrinsic existence is utter nonexistence, and thus they do not accept karma, etc. as either of the two truths.
中觀論師許世俗有業果等故。
Mādhyamikas, however, accept conventionally the existence of such things as karma and its effects.
《明顯句論》云﹕「若爾，彼等亦於諸法無性通達為無，由此見故，且有相等。答曰﹕非有。中觀論師許世俗有，彼等不許，故非相等。」
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Qualm: Even so, their views are similar in one way because nihilists consider the absence of an essence in things to be nonexistence.
Reply: This is not so. They are not similar because Mādhyamikas assert that things without essence exist conventionally; these nihilists do not assert them at all.
此即顯示，若中觀師於世俗中不許業果等，與順世派見解相同。
This shows that those who claim to be Mādhyamikas, yet do not accept the existence of karma and its effects even conventionally, in fact have a view similar to that of the Lokāyata nihilists.
又與斷見不同之理，論師未說彼有所許我無所許。
What reason does the master Candrakirti give for the difference between Mādhyamikas and nihilists? He does not say, "Because they have assertions, whereas we do not."
又未曾說彼等許無，我不說無是許非有，而許是說無性及立為緣起因，並於世俗許諸建立。
He does not say, "They assert that those are nonexistent, whereas we do not say that they are nonexistent (med pa); rather, we hold that they are not existent (yod pa ma yin)." Instead, he says that Mādhyamikas propound that karma and such lack intrinsic existence; he says that Mādhyamikas cite dependent-arising as the reason for that lack of intrinsic existence; he says that Mādhyamikas do accept those teachings on karma and such in conventional terms.
◎ 若謂業果等法皆無自性是極應理，然斷見者亦說無彼，故許彼等無有自性，就無性分同中觀師。
Qualm: You propose that things such as karma and its effects lack essential or intrinsic existence. Those nihilists also assert that such things lack intrinsic existence inasmuch as they assert that they are nonexistent. Therefore they agree with the Mādhyamikas about the lack of intrinsic existence.
此最不同。譬如於一竊財之賊，有人不知是彼所竊，妄說彼竊，有人見是彼賊所竊，云是彼竊。
Reply: Again, there is a very great difference. For example, suppose someone who does not know who stole some jewels deceptively states, "That person committed the robbery." Another person—who saw the thief steal the jewels—also says, "That person committed the robbery."
如其二人說彼竊財，賊雖實竊，然一是妄語，一是實語，故不相同。
As it happens, they identify the same thief who has actually stolen the jewels. Yet they are not alike, for one spoke deceptively and the other honestly.
如《明顯句論》云﹕「若云事同，設無實事雖如是同，然證者異，故不相同。
In this vein, Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Objection: Mādhyamikas and nihilists agree about real things.
Reply: Even if they agree that real things do not exist, they are still not the same because the way that they know that is different.
譬同於一盜，有非實知由非愛故，覆意倒說是此所竊，餘見彼竊正為破除。
For example, suppose someone does not really know that a certain person committed a robbery, but out of animosity toward that person dishonestly proclaims, "This person committed the robbery." Another person makes the same accusation having actually seen that robbery.
其事雖無異，然由覺者異故，應說前人是說妄
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語，餘是實語。
Even though there is no difference between those two with regard to the fact, still there is a difference in the two accusers, for of the one it is said, "That one speaks dishonestly," and of the other, "That one speaks honestly."
若審觀察，前者惡稱有罪，餘則不爾。
A careful investigation of the first person will lead to disgrace and reproach, but such is not the case with the second.
如是此中，諸如實知諸法自性，了解宣說，與無見者非如實知諸法自性，同時知說，皆不相等。」
Similarly, here also, when the understanding and the utterances of the Mādhyamikas, who accurately know the nature of things, are compared to those of nihilists, who do not accurately know the nature of things, what they know and say are not alike.
此亦善破，「有說了解無自性時，認為正理破業果等，遂於自宗不立因果，彼於世俗雖是邪行，然得無謬空品正見。」
Some persons, in understanding the absence of intrinsic existence, think that reason refutes such things as karma and its effects; thus they conclude that cause and effect cannot be posited in their own system. Candrakirti totally refutes the proposition that such persons, though wrong about the class of appearances, i.e., conventionalities, have gained an accurate view of the class of emptiness.
是故空者，非作用所空之空，雖無自性須可安立因果緣起。
Therefore, do not take emptiness to mean being empty of the capacity to perform functions. Instead, you must have away to posit the dependent-arising of causes and effects despite the absence of intrinsic existence.
如《四百論釋》云﹕「如是若有法，生時無所來，如是滅無去，於此定無性。若謂無性餘更何有，答曰﹕若以染淨為因，緣起為性，彼法則有。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
In that case, regarding any object,
When it is produced, it does not come;
Likewise, when it ceases, it does not go.
It definitely does not intrinsically exist. If it does not intrinsically exist, then what is there? Dependent-arisings—entities caused by the afflicted and the pure—do exist.
此文明答「若無自性餘更何有」。
This clearly answers the question, "If there is no intrinsic existence, then what does exist?"
佛護論師亦明分辨有與有性差別而答。
The master Buddhapalita also gives an answer that clearly distinguishes existence from essential existence;
《二十二品釋》云﹕「外曰，設若無時，亦無因果及緣和合，餘更何有，是故汝是說斷無者。我非說無，唯汝所執時等有性，非應正理，然有彼等依緣假立。」
Buddhapalita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise,"》 commenting on the twentieth chapter of Nāgārjuna's text, says:
Objection: If time does not exist, and causes, effects, and collections of causes and conditions also do not exist, then what else could exist? Therefore, the Mādhyamaka position is simply a nihilistic argument.
Reply. It is not so. It is utterly impossible for time and such to exist essentially, as you imagine. However, they are established as dependent designations.
此說是破如實事師所許自性不應正理，然有緣起，依緣假立。
Thus he refutes this, saying that it is impossible for there to be essential existence as the essentialists claim. He also says that dependent-arisings exist: "They are established as dependent designations."
◎若能如是分辨有無與有無性，能遮無邊顛倒分別，則於破除有性正理，不致發生破有錯誤。
Thus, you will overcome countless wrong ideas if you distinguish intrinsic existence and the absence of intrinsic existence from existence and nonexistence. Moreover, you will not mistake the arguments refuting intrinsic existence for refutations of existence itself.
中觀諸師答諸實事智者，其主要者即彼四門，故略宣說。
Therefore, since the main answers that Mādhyamikas give to scholars who are essentialists proceed from this set of distinctions, I have given a bit of explanation.
第二顯所設難皆非能破分四，一 觀察堪不堪忍正理思擇而為破除，然不能破，二 觀察由量成不成立而為破除，然不能破，三 觀察是否四句所生而為破除，然不能破，四 觀察有事無事等四
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句而為破除，然不能破。
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2 Showing that the Mādhyamaka critique does not eradicate conventional existence.
This has four parts:
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.1 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are capable of withstanding rational analysis
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.2 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether valid cognition establishes them
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.3 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are produced in one of four alternative ways [from self, other, both, or neither]
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.4 A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma—things exist, things do not exist, and so forth—is not a legitimate Critique of conventional phenomena
今初
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.1 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are capable of withstanding rational analysis
◎若於實義如理觀察色等諸法，為有為無生不生等，是名觀察真實正理，及名觀察究竟正理。
A proper analysis of whether these phenomena—forms and such exist, or are produced, in an objective sense is what we call "a line of reasoning that analyzes reality," or "a line of reasoning that analyzes the final status of being."
我亦不許色等之生堪忍以彼正理觀察，故無應成實事之過。
Since we Mādhyamikas do not assert that the production of forms and such can withstand analysis by such reasoning, our position avoids the fallacy that there are truly existent things.
◎若彼不堪正理觀察，理所破義云何能有。
Question: If these things cannot withstand rational analysis, then how is it possible for something to exist when reason has refuted it?
此於不堪正理觀察與理所破誤為一事。
Reply: You are mistakenly conflating the inability to withstand rational analysis with invalidation by reason.
有多人說，「觀察實性正理雖破，然有生等。」
Many who have made this error claim that production and such exist even though rational analysis of reality refutes them.
此乃亂說，非我所許。
This is reckless chatter, so we do not agree.
堪不堪忍正理觀察之義，謂以觀察真實之理有得無得。
To ask whether something can withstand rational analysis is to ask whether it is found by a line of reasoning that analyzes reality.
如《四百論釋》云﹕「我等觀察，唯為尋求自性故。」
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature.
是於色等，尋求有無生滅等性，即於色等尋求有無自性生滅，非以彼理尋求生滅，故說彼理名觀實性，以彼觀察有無真實生滅等故。
So this is seeking to discover whether forms and so forth have an intrinsic nature that is produced, ceases, and so forth. Thus, the analysis searches to see whether forms and so forth have production and cessation that exist essentially; it is not that this line of reasoning searches for mere production and cessation. Therefore, this line of reasoning is said to "analyze reality" because it analyzes whether production, cessation, and so forth are established in reality."
若以彼理觀察尋求，無有少分生等可得，名不忍觀察，非唯彼理所未能得，便名彼破。
When such a line of reasoning analyzes or searches for production and so forth, it does not find a trace of them; they are "unable to withstand analysis." However, the fact that this line of reasoning does not find them does not entail that it refutes them.
若是有法須由彼成，彼所未成乃名彼破。
Rather, reason refutes something that—if it did exist—would have to be established by reason, but which reason does not establish.
色等生滅是由名言識所成立，色等雖有，非由理智所成，故彼未得如何名破。
Conventional consciousnesses establish the production and cessation of forms and such; although forms and such exist, reasoning consciousnesses do not establish them. Therefore, while reason does not find forms and such, how could it refute them?
譬如眼識雖不得聲，非眼能破。
For example, a visual consciousness does not find sounds, but this does not refute them. This is similar.
故生滅等若有自性或真實有，則須由彼正理所得，以彼正理是於色等如理觀察有無自性之生滅故。
Therefore, if production, cessation, and so forth existed essentially, i.e., were established in reality, then reason would have to find them because it accurately analyzes whether forms and such have essentially existent production and cessation.
由如是理未得生等，能破自性或真實生滅，以有自性須彼所得，彼未得故。
Since such analysis does not find production and so forth, it refutes production, cessation, and so forth that exist essentially, that is, in reality. For if they existed essentially, that analysis would have to find them, but it does not.
譬如若東方有瓶，其尋瓶者決定能得，若於東方尋瓶未得，彼雖能遮東方有瓶，然彼何能遮瓶
- p.428 -
是有。
For example, when a searcher who is certain to find a pot in the east if it is there searches in the east for a pot and does not find it, this refutes the existence of a pot in the east. Yet how could it refute the mere existence of a pot?
如是若有自性之生，則中觀理決定能得，若尋求時彼未得生，由彼能破自體或自性之生，然生是有如何能破。
Similarly, Mādhyamaka analysis is certain to find essentially existent production if such exists; when it does not find production, this constitutes a refutation of intrinsically or essentially existent production. How could it refute mere production?
如《四百論釋》云﹕「故以正理如是觀察，若根境識無有自性，則非性成，
In this vein, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 is clear: Therefore, when reason analyzes in this way, there is no essential nature that exists in the sensory faculties, objects, or consciousnesses; hence, they have no essential existence.
設若彼等由自性成，則以正理正觀察時，如其安住，應極明了見有自性，然不可得故成性空。
If they essentially existed, then under analysis by reason their status as essentially existent would be seen even more clearly, but it is not. Therefore, they are established as "empty of intrinsic nature."
又色聲等諸世俗法，雖其是有，非觀真實或觀有無自性正理之所成立，故正理觀察不於彼轉，此大論師曾數宣說。
Candrakirti repeatedly allows that these conventionalities, such as forms and sounds, do exist. However, they are not in the least established by reasoning that analyzes reality, that is, analyzes whether they have intrinsic nature. Thus the scrutiny of reason is not applied to them.
又以正理觀察時，若以正理未能獲得，便壞彼諸世俗法者，說是對於建立世俗未獲善巧。」
Also, Candrakirti often says that it is those who are incompetent at positing conventionalities who claim that conventionalities are destroyed when, upon rational analysis, reason does not find them.
若觀有無自性之理能破彼等，則正理觀察於色受等諸世俗法亦極應轉。
If reasoning that analyzes whether they have intrinsic nature could refute them, then you would have to apply intense rational scrutiny to these conventionalities, i.e., forms, feelings, and so forth.
然此論師之論中，於一切種畢竟破除，故說觀察有無自性正理未得之義，即是正理破除之義者，是極漂流中觀之外。
However, the texts of this master completely refute such efforts. Therefore, it is those who have wandered very far from the middle way who claim that something is invalidated when it is not found by reasoning that analyzes whether it has intrinsic nature.
◎如是根本聖智，是未能見色等生滅，豈彼是見生滅等無。
Similarly, the meditative equipoise of a noble being does not see the production and cessation of forms and so forth, but how could it see production, cessation, and so forth as nonexistent?
觀察有無自性之理，亦是未能得生滅等，非是量定生滅等無，故未辨別諸不堪忍正理觀察與正理所破。
Also, reasoning that analyzes whether things have intrinsic nature does not find production and so forth, but it does not consider production, cessation, and so forth to be nonexistent.
根本聖智未見生滅與見無生滅，觀察有無自性，理智未得生滅與得無生滅，混執為一。況現在人，即諸先覺亦有誤解，故具慧者應細觀察，善辨彼等。
Therefore, even some earlier scholars," not to mention those today, seem to have erred by not differentiating, and instead considering identical, the following pairs:
(1) something unable to withstand rational analysis vs. something invalidated by reason;
(2) the non-perception of production and cessation by a noble being's wisdom of meditative equipoise vs. the perception of production and cessation as nonexistent by a noble being's wisdom of meditative equipoise; and
(3) the non-discovery of production and cessation by a reasoning consciousness which analyzes whether they intrinsically exist vs. the discovery that production and cessation are nonexistent.
Therefore, the intelligent should analyze this in detail and make careful distinctions!
◎由是因緣我非是說，較勝義量，諸名言識勢力強大，及非是許，諸名言識破勝義量。
In saying this, we do not assert that conventional consciousness is more powerful than knowledge of the ultimate; nor do we assert that conventional consciousness contradicts knowledge of the ultimate.
然
- p.429 -
汝若說觀察真實之正理，觀察名言色受等境，若彼未得即是彼理之所破者，非但不能破除於他，返以世間共許之量破彼破者。
However, you claim that rational analysis of reality refutes conventional forms, feelings, and so forth when it analyzes them and does not find them. It does not refute them. In fact, mundane knowledge will contradict any attempt to refute conventional phenomena.
《入中論》云﹕「若世於汝無所損，應就世間而破此，汝先與此世間諍，我後當依有力者。」
Candrakīrti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
If you think that the world does not contradict you,
Then refute something that is based right in the world.
You and the world can argue about it
And afterwards I will follow the stronger party.
其釋論云﹕「我為破除世間世俗住極艱辛，汝今當破世間世俗，設若世間於汝無損，我亦於汝當為助伴，然彼世間定能損汝。」
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
We have endured great hardship in order to overturn worldly conventionalities. Please, you eliminate worldly conventionalities. If the world does not contradict you, then we will join you. However, the world does contradict you.
此說「我為破除世間世俗住極艱辛」者，是說為淨此眼識等錯亂心故，及色塵等錯亂境故，策勵修道，不許彼是正理所破，是由修道所破之事。
The statement, "We have endured great hardship in order to overturn worldly conventionalities," refers to striving at the path in order to purify mistaken subjects, such as visual consciousnesses, and mistaken appearances of objects, such as forms. Hence we do not assert that these are objects that are refuted by reason. Rather, we consider them objects that are negated by the cultivation of the path.
次言「汝今當破世間世俗」等者，是中觀師破彼實有依他起性。彼云，我亦以正理破汝世俗出相同過，
The statement, "Please, you eliminate worldly conventionalities," answers those Cittāmatrins who draw the following parallel: "If you Mādhyamikas refute substantially existent dependent entities, then we will use reason to refute your conventionalities."
答曰﹕如我能破依他性，若汝能以正理破除世俗，我當於汝亦為助伴。
Candrakirti replies, "We can refute the intrinsic existence of dependent entities; if you can use reason to give a similar refutation of conventionalities, then we will go along with you."
此說若理能破，我亦不須為破彼故，修道難行是為所欲，故顯正理非能破除諸世俗法。
He means that if reason could refute conventionalities, we would want that, as it would render unnecessary the hardships involved in cultivating the path in order to overcome them. Therefore, this passage shows that reason does not refute conventionalities.
又說非但不能破除，若強破者反為世間共量所害。由名言識能害如是相似正理，故較彼等亦許力大。
Since it does not refute them, Candrakirti says that what is commonly known in the world contradicts any attempt to refute them. Hence, conventional knowledge contradicts any apparently reasonable argument to that effect. We therefore assert that conventional knowledge is more powerful than those arguments.
諸實事師以正理觀察，破外境等世俗法時，僅是彼理未能獲得，非彼能破。
Consequently, when essentialists use rational analysis to refute conventional phenomena such as external objects, reason does not find those conventional phenomena, but it does not contradict them.
◎有說於名言中不破色等之義，是依牧童等世人不破，觀察實性正理能破。
Objection: When we say that we do not refute forms and so forth in conventional terms, we mean that they are not refuted in the eyes of ordinary worldly people, such as shepherds. However, rational analysis of reality does refute them.
極不應理。具觀慧者，是於觀察實性正理能不能破而有疑惑，未由宗派改變心者，不能破除，無所疑
- p.430 -
故。
Reply: Your position is quite unacceptable. Reflective individuals may wonder whether rational analysis of reality refutes these, yet they never doubt that such things remain unrefuted for those whose minds have not been affected by tenets.
若觀實性正理能破，須於名言而破除故。觀察實性正理，非能破一切生者，月稱論師明了宣說。
Moreover, if rational analysis of reality did refute them, then that refutation would have to be done in conventional terms. The master Candrakirti also clearly states that rational analysis of reality does not refute all forms of production.
《四百論釋》云﹕「若此觀察破一切生，顯示有為皆無生者，爾時彼等不應如幻，應以石女兒等而為量度，然恐違犯無緣起過，故不順彼喻，令如幻等，不違緣起。」
His 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
Incorrect position: Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis refutes all forms of production.
Reply: In that case, the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magician's illusion. Rather, we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman. Wary of the absurd implication that dependent-arisings would not exist, we avoid such comparisons. Instead, we compare the production of things to a magician's illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent-arising.
言此觀察者，謂觀察真實之正理。
The phrase "this analysis" refers to rational analysis of reality.
言破一切生者，謂於所破不加簡別，凡是有生，一切皆破。
"Refutes all forms of production" means refuting all production of any kind without adding any qualification to the object to be negated.
言石女兒等者，謂破一切生，如石女兒及兔角等，一切作用空成為無事。
The passage referring to the barren woman should be understood as follows: If reason refuted all production, then production—like the son of a barren woman, the horns of a hare, and such—would be a non-thing, empty of all function.
若如是者，恐犯斷無緣起之過，故不同彼，永離一切作用功能石女兒等之無生，當如幻等，破除實有或自性生。
In that case, there would be the fallacy that dependent-arisings would not exist. We are wary of that. Hence we do not say that it is like the non-production of something devoid of the capacity to perform functions, such as the son of a barren woman. We say that production is like a magician's illusion and so forth. Therefore, we refute truly existent or intrinsically existent production.
又《四百論釋》云﹕「設若眼等非有，何故建立眼等諸根業異熟體。我等豈破此異熟體。若破眼等彼何非破。我等觀察唯為尋求自性故，我等於此破除有性諸法，非破眼等所作緣起業異熟體。彼可容有，故有所說異熟眼等。」
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》says:
Objection: If eyes and such do not exist, then how can the sensory faculties of organs such as the eye be considered things that result from karma?
Reply: Would we refute that it is the nature of these to result from karma?
Objection: Since you are demonstrating the refutation of eyes and such, how could you not refute that?
Reply: Because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore, they exist. Hence, when eyes and such are explained only as results of karma, they do exist.
此顯然說，以諸正理齊此破除，齊此非破，如此辨別一處說已，餘未說者一切皆同，定須了知。
Hence Candrakirti very clearly states exactly what reason does and does not refute. Therefore, once he makes these distinctions in one passage, they must be applied, even when they are not stated, in all similar passages throughout the text.
故自尋求時，境上有性，正理能破，非破其有。說諸正理唯為尋求自性為勝，故彼正理，是為尋求自性有無。
Therefore, reason refutes essential existence—objective existence found on the side of the thing itself; it does not refute mere existence. Since he says that reason is intent on seeking intrinsic nature, reason seeks to discover whether something intrinsically exists.
說正理破，亦是破除自性之義，故當分辨彼二差別。
Therefore, this means that a refutation by such analysis is a refutation of intrinsic existence. Hence, distinguish these two.
非但不破如斯業果，說中觀師定須受許，
Candrakirti does not refute that such instances are results of karma; moreover, he says that Mādhyamikas must assert this.
即彼論後又云﹕「是故智者於世間義，莫以所說順見真實正理觀察，應當受許不可思議諸業異熟，如從變化起變化理，一切
- p.431 -
世間皆當受許。」
The continuation of that passage says: Therefore, the learned do not subject worldly objects to the analysis just explained, i.e., the analysis congruent with the perception of reality. Instead, they accept that worldly objects are simply the inconceivable results of karma. They accept the whole world as though it were an emanation projected by another emanation.
如是自己建立二諦，若以決擇勝義之理，妨害自所建立世俗，建立二諦自內相違，豈可稱為安立二諦殊勝智者。
So when you present the two truths, does the line of reasoning that establishes the ultimate contradict the presentation of the conventional? If it does, then your presentation of the two truths contradicts itself. In that case, how can you have perfected the skill of positing the two truths?
若二建立無少相違，則以決擇勝義之理，破除世俗建立而成相違。
If, on the other hand, there is no trace of internal contradiction in your presentation of the two truths, then it is a contradiction to claim that the line of reasoning that establishes the ultimate refutes the presentation of conventionalities.
《明顯句論》云﹕「汝於勝義及世俗諦，不善巧故，則於一法以理觀察，由非正理破壞其法，我善安立世俗諦故，住世間品。汝為破除一分世俗立餘道理，我以餘理而返破除，如世耆長，唯為破汝失世間法者，非破世俗。」
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 also says:
Unskilled in ultimate and conventional truths, you sometimes apply analytical standards inappropriately and destroy the conventional. Because we are skilled in positing conventional truths, we stay with the world's position, and we use its conventional standards to overturn the standards that you set so as to eliminate the category of conventionalities. Like the elders of the world, we drive out only you who deviate from the traditional standards of the world; we do not drive out conventionalities.
此說唯破失壞世俗諸宗論師，不破世俗。若以觀察實性之理破壞世俗，說是不善安立二諦，故以正理破世俗色等，決定非此論師真意。
Thus he says that he refutes only proponents of tenets that deviate from conventionalities; he does not refute conventionalities. He also says that it is those who are unskilled in positing the two truths who destroy conventionalities by using analysis, i.e., rational analysis of reality. Thus, this master did not at all intend to use reason to refute conventional forms and such.
◎總之，非唯中觀論師，凡是自部印度諸宗，許有二諦建立者，雖可由他補特伽羅於自所立二諦建立出相違過，然彼自於所立二諦，許勝義理破世俗義，我敢斷言定無一人。
In brief, while one person may try to find contradictions in another person's presentation of the two truths, I hold that there is no one from any Indian Buddhist tenet system, Madhyamaka or otherwise, who says, "In my own presentation of the two truths, reasoning directed at the ultimate eradicates conventional objects."
◎第二觀察由量成不成立而為破除，然不能破。
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2.2 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether valid cognition establishes them
許有色等，非許量所未成要許量成。
As to assertions about forms and such, we do not hold that valid cognition does not establish them; valid cognition does establish them.
若爾論云「世間皆非量」，云何應理。
Qualm: Then how can Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" be correct when it says, "The world is not valid in any way"?
此破世間眼等諸識於真實為量，非破於一切境為量。
Reply: That passage refutes the notion that the world's visual consciousnesses and such are valid with regard to reality. It does not refute their validity regarding all objects.
《入中論釋》云﹕「如是思維真實，唯諸聖者乃為定量，非諸非聖，為說世間諸違害故。」
In this vein, Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says: Accordingly, only noble beings are authorities on the contemplation of reality; those who are not noble beings are not.
若觀察真實許世間見亦為定量，故云「設若世間是定量，世見真實聖何為，諸餘聖道何所作，
- p.432 -
愚蒙是量亦非理。」
Those who are not noble beings would be authorities on reality if our acceptance of the world's critique meant that we accept the validity of the world's perception of our analysis of reality.
[The Commentary on the "Middle Way" says]:
If the world were an authority, it would see reality.
Then what need would there be for those others called noble beings?
What would the noble path accomplish?
It is not right that fools should be authorities.
釋云﹕「若唯眼等能定真實，為證聖道力勵持戒聞思修等應非有果，然非如是。」
In the commentary following that [Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary], Candrakirti says: Because mere visual consciousness and such would ascertain reality, it would be fruitless to work at ethics or to study, reflect, and meditate in order to understand the noble path. However, this is not the case.
故云﹕「世間皆非量，世無害真實。」
Therefore [the 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says]: Because the world is not valid in any way, The world has no critique in the context of reality.
《六十正理論釋》云﹕「若見彼等有，則非見真實，故世尊謂眼耳鼻等皆非量。」
Also Candrakirti's 《Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》 says: To view those forms and such as simply existing is not to see reality. In order to establish this, the Bhagavan said, "The eye, ear, and nose consciousnesses are not valid cognitions."
引此等證，顯然是於勝真實境破彼為量，非於餘境。
Since Candrakirti cites such scripture, it is extremely clear that what he refutes is that visual consciousnesses and such are valid with regard to a special object—reality—and not that they are valid with regard to other objects.
若不爾者，則說「若眼等識，於色聲等名言義境是定量者，為見真實，不應更求聖道。」
If it is not taken in this way, his statements would be inconsistent. Suppose Candrakirti meant, "If visual consciousnesses and such were valid regarding conventional objects such as forms and sounds, then it would absurdly follow that there is no need to strive at the noble path in order to perceive reality."
全無關系，等同說云，「眼識見色為聞聲故耳應無義。」
This would be as senseless as saying that if visual consciousness is aware of form, it follows that the ear is not needed to hear sounds.
◎若謂「為觀色聲等尋求聖道應無有義」是所樂許，由此豈能成所非欲。
On the other hand, suppose he meant, "If the visual consciousness were valid with regard to forms, then it would absurdly follow that it is pointless to strive at the noble path in order to perceive things such as forms and sounds." We completely agree with this, so what unwanted absurdity does it demonstrate?
《四百論釋》云﹕「若彼於此諸根識等增益為現，又許為量，極無係屬。不欺誑識世見為量，然世尊說此識是有為故，是虛妄欺誑法，猶如幻事。」
Qualm: Candrakīrti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says: It is quite inconsistent to call sensory consciousness "perception" and also to consider it valid with regard to other things. As the world sees it, a valid cognition is simply a non-deceptive consciousness; however, the Bhagavan said that even consciousness, because it is composite, has a false and deceptive quality and is like a magician's illusion.
若是虛妄欺誑之法及如幻者，非不欺誑。以住此相之事，現餘相故，若如是者，計執為量不應道理，餘一切識皆成量故。總破眼等諸識是量，如何會解。
That which has a false and deceptive quality and is like a magician's illusion is not non-deceptive because it exists in one way but appears in another. It is not right to designate such as a valid cognition because it would then absurdly follow that all consciousnesses would be valid cognitions. How do you interpret this general refutation of the position that visual consciousnesses and such are valid cognitions?
◎此與眼耳鼻等，皆非量等不同，是大疑處，故當詳釋。
Reply: Unlike the passage, "Eye, ear, and nose are not valid," this passage has been a source of grave doubt. Therefore, I will explain it in detail.
如是破諸識等是現及量者，是破分別師許，故當先述彼宗。
This refutation of the position that the visual consciousnesses and such are both perceptions and valid cognitions is a refutation of the assertions of the logicians. Therefore, let us start by considering what they assert.
如《四百論釋》云﹕「此分別師全未熟悉世間義故，如諸愚童，最初唯應令練習彼，為顯此故詰問觀察。
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says: Because these logicians are utterly unpracticed in the sensibilities of the world, you must train them from the very beginning, like young children. Hence, in order to teach them, you question them closely,
汝現云何，答謂現識。
asking, "What is a perception in your system?" They answer, "A consciousness is a perception."
為何等識，謂離分別。
"What sort of consciousness?" "One that is free from conceptuality."
分別為何，諸
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於境義增益名種，散動轉想。
"What is this conceptuality?" "It is the fluctuation of the discrimination that is involved in the superimposition of names and types to objects.
五種根識由離彼故，於不可議境自相轉，故名為現。」
Because they are free from that, the five sensory consciousnesses engage only the inexpressible intrinsic character of their objects. They are therefore called 'perceptions'.
謂離分別無錯亂識許為現識。
Hence the logicians hold that a perception is a consciousness that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.
無錯亂者，謂於境自相如實而取，由五根現識量度自相，故色聲等自相是彼五現識之所量。
It is non-mistaken in that it apprehends the intrinsic character of the object just as it is. Thus, since all five sensory perceptions comprehend the intrinsic character of their objects, the intrinsic characteristics of forms, sounds, and so forth are the objects comprehended by those five perceptions.
五識成量之處，亦即五境之自相也，
Therefore, it is in relation to the intrinsic character of these five objects that they consider such perceptions to be valid.
然此論師如下所說，雖於名言亦不許有自性自相，豈許諸根識於自相為量。
As we will explain, the master Candrakirti does not accept even conventionally that anything exists essentially or by way of its intrinsic character. Thus, how could he accept this claim that the sensory consciousnesses are valid with regard to the intrinsic character of their objects?
故此破除根識為量者，是破許彼等於五境自相為量。
Therefore, this refutation of the claim that sensory consciousnesses are valid is a refutation of the view that they are valid with regard to the intrinsic character of the five objects.
破除之理，即引世尊說彼諸識虛妄欺誑而破。
This refutation is made by way of the Bhagavan's statement that consciousness is false and deceptive.
由說欺誑破不欺誑即是破量，以不欺誑是量相故。
The statement that it is deceptive refutes its being non-deceptive, and this in turn refutes its validity because "that which is non-deceptive" is the definition of "valid cognition."
欺誑之理即住此相之事，現為餘相。
In what sense is it deceptive? As Candrakirti puts it, "it exists in one way but appears in another."
謂色聲等五境，實無自相，於諸根識現有自相，故說彼等於自相境非是正量。
This means that the five objects—forms, sounds, and so forth—are not established by way of their intrinsic character, but appear to the sensory consciousnesses as though they were. Therefore, those sensory consciousnesses are not valid with regard to the intrinsic character of their objects.
總此意趣，謂諸根識於五境自相非是正量，以待五境所現自相是欺誑故。
In brief, what Candrakirti intended in this passage is that the sensory consciousnesses are not valid with regard to the intrinsic character of the five objects because they are deceived in relation to the appearance of intrinsic character in the five objects.
五境實空無自相，現自相故，如現二月之識。
This is because those five objects are empty of intrinsic character, yet appear to have it. For example, it is like a consciousness that perceives two moons.
其實事諸師，謂色聲等若無自相自性，則說彼等空無一切作用功能而成無事，故若不於五境自相為現量，則於五境無成量之處。
On this point, essentialists claim that if forms, sounds, and so forth did not exist intrinsically—that is, were not established by way of their intrinsic character—they would be non-things, devoid of all capacity to perform functions. They therefore assert that if the sensory consciousnesses are not valid perceptual cognitions of the intrinsic character of the five objects, then there can be no valid cognition of the five objects;
若於五境成量，亦許於彼自相成量。
if the sensory consciousnesses are valid cognitions of the five objects, then they will be valid cognitions of the intrinsic character of those objects.
此論師謂，若有自相或有自性，則成實有，安立實境之量，雖須於自相為量，
According to the master Candrakirti, if something were established by way of its intrinsic character, or essence, it would be something true. Hence a valid cognition that posited such." truly existent object would have to be valid regarding the object's intrinsic character.
然境虛妄，故立此境之量不須於自相為量。
However, because objects are false, the valid cognition that posits them does not have to be valid regarding their intrinsic character.
《四百論釋》云﹕「以世間見，遣真實見，亦非正理。彼唯於世間立為量故，彼所緣義亦是虛妄欺誑法故。」
For, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
It is not reasonable that worldly perception should cancel perception of reality, because worldly perception is valid only for the world,
and because the objects it observes have a false and deceptive quality.
故破於自相為量，非須全破其是量。
Therefore, since Candrakirti is refuting the logician's position that sensory consciousnesses are valid regarding the intrinsic character of objects, he need not refute the position that they are simply valid cognitions.
故非總破名言諸識為量。
Consequently, Candrakirti is not giving a general refutation of the position that there are valid cognitions among conventional consciousnesses.
若不爾者，則說
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「不欺誑識世見為量」不應正理。
If he were, then it would not be reasonable for him to say, "As the world sees it, a valid cognition is simply a nondeceptive consciousness,"
一切名言識，破為量故。
because he would have refuted the validity of every sort of conventional consciousness.
《明顯句論》云﹕「故由如是四量，安立世間通達諸義。」與此建立現比教喻四量相違故。
Also, this would contradict Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》, where he presents direct, inferential, scriptural, and analogical valid cognitions, saying, "We therefore posit that the world knows objects with four valid cognitions.
又破有性能量所量，不破緣起觀待所立能量所量，
Candrakirti refutes essentially existent valid cognitions and objects of comprehension; he does not refute valid cognitions and objects of comprehension that are contingently posited dependent-arisings.
即前論云﹕「此等皆是觀待假立，若有能量乃有所量義，若有所量義乃有能量，能量所量非有自性。」
That same text [《the Clear Words》] says:
Those are established through mutual dependence. When valid cognitions exist, then there are things that are the objects of comprehension. When there are things that are objects of comprehension, then there are valid cognitions. However, neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension exist essentially.
故無翳等內外錯亂因緣損害諸根識等，唯無明力錯亂，執取實無自性現有性境，此不能害無倒名言。
Therefore, if a sensory consciousness is unimpaired—that is, no eye disease or other internal or external cause of error is affecting it— then it is accurate in conventional terms. It is mistaken in terms of appearance because, under the influence of ignorance, it apprehends its object as though it were intrinsically existent—which it is not. Yet this does not contradict its conventional accuracy.
《入中論》云﹕「許妄見有二，根明有過根。諸有過根識，望善根識倒，諸無損六根，所取世共證，就世為諦實，餘就世立倒。」
Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" says:
Also, perceivers of falsities are of two types:
Those with clear sensory faculties and those with impaired sensory faculties.
A consciousness with an impaired sensory faculty
Is considered wrong in relation to a consciousness with a good sensory faculty.
Those objects known by the world
And apprehended with the six unimpaired sensory faculties
Are true for the world.
The rest Are posited as unreal for the world.
此說名言識境，待名言識各立二類，謂倒無倒內身所有損根因緣。
Thus conventional consciousnesses and their objects are of two types: accurate in relation to conventional consciousness and inaccurate in relation to conventional consciousness.
《入中論釋》云﹕「若諸翳膜黃眼等病，及食達都羅等，是為內有壞根因緣。」
With regard to internal conditions that impair the sensory faculties, Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Eye disease, jaundice, and so forth, as well as eating datura and so forth, are internal conditions that impair the Sensory faculties.
身外有者，如前論云﹕「由油水鏡及空谷等發言說聲，又由日光處時差別，正現前等，是為外有損根因緣。
With regard to external conditions that impair the sensory faculties, that same text says:
External conditions that impair the sensory faculties include sesame oil, water, mirrors, sounds spoken from within caves and such, as well as sunlight at certain times and places.
內雖未有損根因緣，由此諸緣而於影像谷響陽燄，亦成妄執水等因緣。
Even in the absence of internal conditions that impair the sensory faculties, these cause the apprehension of reflections, echoes, the water of a mirage, and so forth.
如是幻師等所配咒藥亦當了知。能損意者，謂前諸事及諸邪宗，諸似比量。」
You should understand that this is also the case with the medicine, mantra, and such used by conjurers and so forth. As for what impairs the mental sensory faculty, there are those just mentioned as well as incorrect tenets, etc., and false inference.
此說邪宗及諸似因，皆是損害意識因緣。
Thus he says that bad tenets and false reasoning are conditions that degrade the mental consciousness.
又睡眠等，是損夢中意識因緣，故無明所執之境，如下當說雖於名言亦無，然由無明所作損害，非此所說違害因緣。
He says that conditions such as sleep also degrade the mental consciousnesses associated with dreams and so forth. [619) Therefore, you should not consider the impairment of being affected by ignorance as a cause of impairment in this context—even though the object apprehended by ignorance does not exist even conventionally, as will be explained below.
◎設作是念，若五根識，無餘錯亂因緣損害，便於名言為不錯亂，則彼所現自相，於名言
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中亦應許有，然此師不許，故須許為錯亂。若如是者，則此諸識為於名言安立色等之量，不應道理，以於名言色等亦錯亂故。
Qualm: If the five sensory consciousnesses that are unimpaired by causes of error other than ignorance are non-mistaken conventionally, then the intrinsic character that appears to them must exist conventionally. However, the master Candrakirti does not assert such. Therefore, we must assert that the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken; in that case it is not feasible for those consciousnesses to be valid cognitions that posit things such as forms and sounds in conventional terms. Why? In conventional terms, they are mistaken with regard to forms.
答曰﹕清辨論師許色等境於名言有自相之性，破唯識師於徧計執。由無自相之性，謂相無自性時，於徧計執設能計所計雙關觀察，若能徧計自性差別之名覺，許於名言無自相之性者，則謗依他起事，是顯然許依他起性，於名言中有自相性。
Reply: On this point, the master Bhavaviveka asserts that it is the nature of forms and such to exist conventionally by way of their intrinsic character. The Cittamatrins argue that imaginary constructs lack characteristic nature because it is not their nature to exist by way of intrinsic character. To refute them, Bhavaviveka investigates the agents and objects involved in the process of imaginary construction. He says that if they assert that the terms and minds that construct entities and features lack intrinsic character conventionally, then they are inappropriately denying the existence of contingent entities. Therefore, it is clear that Bhavaviveka asserts that contingent entities have intrinsic character conventionally.
第二十五品《般若燈論》云﹕「若謂說色意言言說徧計執性皆為無者，是謗有事。毀謗意言及言說故。」
Along the same lines, Bhavaviveka's 《Lamp for [Nāgārjuna's] "Fundamental Treatise"》 comments on the twenty-fifth chapter of Nāgārjuna's text as follows:
If you say that the very nature of a construct—the mental and verbal expression "form"—does not exist, then you are mistakenly denying things, for you are mistakenly denying mental and verbal expressions.
《觀禁大疏》云﹕「此文顯示瑜伽諸師謂徧計執，由相無自性性，故說為無性。若於說色自性差別，意言分別言說名言能徧計性，謂由相無性性故無自性者，是謗世俗依他起事，不應道理。」
In his 《Explanatory Commentary on [Bhāvaviveka's] "Lamp for the 'Fundamental Treatise'"》, on this, the master Avalokitavrata says: This statement by Bhāvaviveka indicates the following: As to the nature of the imaginary construct, the Yogacarins say that it has no nature inasmuch as it has no characteristic nature. In the case of entities and attributes such as "form," what is the nature that constructs mental expressions, i.e., conceptions, and verbal expressions, i.e., conventions? If you say that there is no such nature because they have no characteristic nature, this is unsuitable, since you would be inappropriately denying even conventional existence in things that are contingent.
此說名覺所攝依他，若於名言許相無性則成誹謗。
He says that if you assert that those contingent entities that are included among the imputing terms and minds lack characteristic nature even conventionally, then it is an inappropriate denial.
其相無自性之相者，即是自相或名自性。
"Character" in the phrase "lack characteristic nature" refers to intrinsic character or intrinsic nature.
唯識諸師說徧計執無彼自相，於依他起有彼自相故有自性。
Cittamātrins assert that imputations do not have such character, but that contingent entities do, and therefore exist intrinsically.
然從他生無自然性，說名無性，解深密經亦如是說。
Nonetheless, because contingent entities arise from other things, they have no self-produced nature and hence Cittamātrins hold that they lack nature in this sense.
謂一切法皆無自性，是密意說。
The Buddha explained it this way in the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》; he said that there was an ulterior meaning behind the statements in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras which say that all phenomena lack nature.
蓮華戒論師云﹕「彼經顯示三種無性所有密意，開顯遠離二邊中道，故是樹立了義之宗。」
In this regard, the master Kamalaśīla said in his Illumination of the Middle Way:
By indicating the intended meanings of the three types of naturelessness, that sutra [the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》] teaches the middle way free from the two extremes. Consequently, the system it sets up is strictly definitive.
若於勝義增益依他有自性者，是徧計執，故彼非有。
Kamalaśīla's argument is that [the Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning] teaches the meaning of the middle way by showing that the ultimate nature that is superimposed upon contingent entities is an imaginary construct, and is thus nonexistent,
由於名言依他起性有自相故，遣除損減，故許顯示中道之義，故此論師亦於名言許有自相。
while also teaching that contingent entities have intrinsic character conventionally—thus avoiding an inappropriate negation. Hence the master Kamalaśīla also asserts that objects have intrinsic character conventionally.
《入中論釋》云﹕「如於繩上蛇是徧計，於實
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蛇是圓成實。
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way"》 Commentary says:
For example, a snake is an imaginary construct when conceived in relation to a rope, but is perfectly real when conceived in relation to an actual snake.
如是自性，若於緣起諸所作性依他起上是為徧計，於佛行境立為圓成，如是了知三性建立。
Similarly, a nature is an imaginary construct when conceived with regard to contingent entities, which are dependently arisen fabrications. However, as the object of a buddha, it is considered perfectly real. Understand the presentation of the three natures in this way;
次當解說經中密意，『若經所說非實意，知不了義當引釋。』」謂解深密經立三自性是不了義。
then explain what the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》 means.
He states this as commentary on these lines from his 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》:
Any sutra that explains something that is not reality,
And sets forth the provisional, should be understood as such and interpreted.
自宗之徧計，謂於依他執有自性，故於名言亦不許依他有自相之性。
Thus, it is obvious that he considers the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》's presentation of the three natures to be provisional. In his own system, the imaginary refers to the intrinsic existence of the contingent; hence, Candrakirti does not assert that contingent entities have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature even conventionally.
唯識諸師除徧計執，不許依他及圓成實相無自性。
The Cittamātrins accept the nonexistence of characteristic nature only for imaginaries, but do not assert that with regard to the contingent and the perfectly real.
故許彼二，是有自相或有自性。
Thus, they assert that these two have essential character, intrinsic nature.
正依解深密經，故許彼二是勝義有。
It appears that this assertion is based mainly on the 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》. Because of this, they assert that the contingent and the perfectly real exist ultimately.
佛護論師月稱論師，謂若有自相所成實體，則是實有，清辨論師等，唯爾不許是勝義有。
The masters Buddhapālita and Candrakirti assert that if something were to existby way of its intrinsic character, then it would have to be truly existent; masters such as Bhavaviveka assert that this alone does not imply that something ultimately exists.
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